Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several public-sector employees filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 seeking to recover any agency fees taken from their paychecks by the Santa Clara County Correctional Peace Officers Association and Santa Clara County. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought a refund for fees paid before the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (prohibiting public-sector unions from collecting compulsory agency fees).In the district court, Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment, claiming they were entitled to a good-faith defense because their actions were expressly authorized by then-applicable United States Supreme Court law and state law. Plaintiffs appealed.On appeal, Plaintiffs acknowledge that Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2019) precludes their claim against the Union. The Ninth Circuit held that the rule announced in Danielson also applies to municipalities because "precedent recognizes that municipalities are generally liable in the same way as private corporations in sec. 1983 actions." Thus, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim against both the Union and the County. View "SEAN ALLEN V. SANTA CLARA CNTY CORR. POA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was raped by a fellow student two weeks after starting at the University of Washington. Plaintiff later learned that two other students had reported the same individual for unwanted sexual advances and contact. Plaintiff filed Title IX and common-law negligence claims against the University in the district court, which granted summary judgment to the University after finding that the University did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care. Plaintiff appealed.The Ninth Circuit certified two questions to the Washington Supreme Court:1. Does Washington law recognize a special relationship between a university and its students giving rise to a duty to use reasonable care to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of other students?2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, what is the measure and scope of that duty? View "MADELEINE BARLOW V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

The en banc Ninth Circuit court dismissed as moot an appeal from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of California Governor Newsom and state officials in an action brought by a group of parents and a student alleging Defendants violated federal law when they ordered schools to suspend in-person instruction in 2020 and early 2021, at a time when California was taking its first steps of navigating the Covid-19 pandemic.   The en banc court held that this was a classic case in which, due to intervening events, there was no longer a live controversy necessary for Article III jurisdiction. Nor was there any effective relief that could be granted by the court. The parents had not brought a claim for damages; they sought a declaratory judgment that Governor Newsom’s executive orders, to the extent they incorporated guidance on school reopening, were unconstitutional. Relatedly, they sought an injunction against the 2020-21 Reopening Framework. But Governor Newsom has rescinded the challenged executive orders, and the 2020-21 Reopening Framework has been revoked. Schools now operate under the 2021-22 Guidance, which declares that all schools may reopen for in-person learning. And the parents conceded that, since April 2021, there has been no “state-imposed barrier to reopening for in-person instruction.” The actual controversy has evaporated.The en banc court rejected Plaintiffs’ assertion that the case survived under two exceptions to mootness: the voluntary cessation exception and the capable of repetition yet evading review exception. Neither exception applied. View "MATTHEW BRACH V. GAVIN NEWSOM" on Justia Law

In determining whether a police officer’s killing of the decedent arose out of the decedent’s “operation or use of a motor vehicle” pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-820.05(B), the Ninth Circuit certified the question of law to the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona. This case presents two principal issues of first impression: (1) whether A.R.S. section 12-820.05(B) provides immunity from suit or a defense to liability, and (2) whether the decedent’s “operation or use of a motor vehicle” falls within A.R.S. section 12-820.05(B)’s motor vehicle exception. The court explained that certification is necessary because the central question of state law is dispositive of the instant case, and there is no controlling precedent from the Arizona Supreme Court. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 27(a). View "MARIA ADAME V. CITY OF SURPRISE" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was on parole when she was evicted from her apartment. She sent a letter to the parole office about her eviction and provided updated contact information, but the parole office was unable to contact her with the information provided. The parole office then suspended Plaintiff’s parole and issued a “retake warrant.” Plaintiff was arrested seven years later. At the revocation hearing, the parole office decided not to revoke Plaintiff’s parole, retroactively rescinded her parole suspension, restored her parole end date to March 2015, and released her from custody. During the two months she was detained, Plaintiff lost her home, business, and pets.   The Ninth Circuit held that the parole officer permissibly suspended plaintiff’s parole. Plaintiff’s arrest was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the parole office had a reasonable belief that she violated her parole. Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not require notice to a parolee before a parole suspension hearing, and because plaintiff was largely responsible for the seven-year delay in her arrest, her arrest did not violate due process. Plaintiff’s state law claims failed because the defendants had no waived immunity for false imprisonment or false arrest, and she could not establish the elements of her negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. View "ELIZABETH CORNEL V. STATE OF HAWAII" on Justia Law

The California Insurance Commissioner filed an ex parte conservation application to place the California Insurance Company (“CIC I”) in a conservatorship after CIC I’s president attempted to consummate a purchase transaction with Berkshire Hathaway without the Commissioner’s approval, and then attempted to bypass the California insurance regulatory scheme by merging CIC I with the California Insurance Company (“CIC II”), a New Mexico-domesticated shell company formed by the president. The Superior Court granted the Commissioner’s conservatorship application and appointed the Commissioner as Conservator of CIC I. Applied Underwriters, of which the president is the Chief Executive Officer, and CIC II filed separate actions in federal court asserting causes of actions under Section 1983.   The district court dismissed both actions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit held that because important considerations of federalism were at stake, the district court’s reliance on Younger abstention as a ground for dismissal was in error. The court held that an insurance conservatorship is not sufficiently akin to criminal prosecution to bring it within the purview of what constitutes a similar, Younger-eligible “civil enforcement proceeding.”   The court held that dismissal of Appellants’ claims was warranted on account of the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule. Further, Appellants’ interests were well represented in the conservatorship action; they had an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges; they failed to sufficiently allege that the conservatorship action was brought in bad faith; they failed to demonstrate irreparable injury arising from extraordinary circumstances which might justify an exception to the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule. View "APPLIED UNDERWRITERS, INC. V. RICARDO LARA" on Justia Law

Appellants, Medicaid providers and former members of public-sector unions, challenge the district courts’ dismissals of two cases, consolidated on appeal. When Appellants joined the unions, they authorized the California State Controller to deduct union dues from their Medicaid reimbursements. Appellants now contend that, when the Controller made these deductions, she violated the “anti-reassignment” provision of the Medicaid Act, which prohibits state Medicaid programs from paying anyone other than the providers or recipients of covered services.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court explained that California uses some of its Medicaid funding to provide assistance with daily activities to elderly and disabled beneficiaries under a program called In-Home Support Services (IHSS). The recipients of these services are responsible for employing and overseeing the work of their IHSS providers, who are often family members. The Controller makes a variety of standard payroll deductions, including for federal and state income tax, unemployment compensation, and retirement savings. California law also authorizes the Controller to deduct union dues from the paychecks of IHSS providers.   Thus, the court held that the Medicaid Act’s anti-reassignment provision, 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(32), does not confer a right on Medicaid providers enforceable under Section 1983. The text and legislative history of the anti-reassignment provision make clear that Congress was focused on preventing fraud and abuse in state Medicaid programs rather than on serving the needs of Medicaid providers. Because Congress did not intend to benefit Medicaid providers, the anti-reassignment provision did not confer a right as enforceable under Section 1983. View "DELORES POLK V. BETTY YEE" on Justia Law

Petitioner brought suit pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000cc et seq., the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and Arizona state law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in an action brought by Petitioner, a Muslim inmate who alleged that he is unable to pray five times a day, as the Qur’an requires because he is housed with people who harass him as he prays; and who had asked the prison to accommodate his religious practice by housing him exclusively with other prisoners based on their religious beliefs and practices.   The court held that Petitioner’s RLUIPA claim failed because denying his request to be housed only with Muslims was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. The court held that Defendants did not violate Petitioner’s First Amendment free exercise rights because denying Petitioner’s request was also reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest—avoiding the potential legal liability of housing inmates based on their religious beliefs and practices. Denying the request was rationally related to avoiding liability because by denying Petitioner’s requested accommodation, the Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry completely eliminated its risk of litigation from other prisoners based on that claim. View "SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AL SAUD V. PANNAN DAYS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against Defendant, a deputy sergeant with the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free of excessive force by pepper-spraying her without adequate justification. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for qualified immunity, and Defendant filed this interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit denied a motion for attorney’s fees sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 following the court's decision, in an unpublished disposition, affirming the denial of qualified immunity to a deputy sergeant who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free of excessive force.   The court denied fees because Plaintiff was not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of Section 1988(b). The court published this order to reaffirm that a plaintiff who accomplishes no more than to defeat a defendant’s motion for qualified immunity is not entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 1988(b), because the plaintiff has not yet prevailed on any claim. Although the Supreme Court later overruled Cooper in part, on a different issue, the holding in Cooper as to attorney’s fees remained good law. Independently, the court noted its agreement with the rule announced in Cooper, which comports with Supreme Court precedent and accords with holdings by sister circuits in the identical procedural posture. View "LINDA SENN V. KYLE SMITH" on Justia Law

The FBI issued three national security letters ("NSLs") with indefinite nondisclosure requirements to the appellant communications service provider (“Provider”). Provider complied and took no action until 2018 when it requested that the government initiate judicial review pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3511(b)(1)(A)–(B). The district court then reviewed in camera confidential declarations pertaining to the three NSLs and found continued nondisclosure statutorily authorized.   On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the nondisclosure requirements in the district court’s order are narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest in national security. The court affirmed the district court’s order requiring the recipient of three national security letters to comply with the nondisclosure requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 2709(c) “unless and until the Government informs it otherwise.” The court explained that here, the district court reviewed the three NSLs and related materials in camera and found that, given the important government interests at stake, nondisclosure remained authorized for an indefinite period and court scheduled review was unnecessary to ensure that nondisclosure continued no longer than justified. The communication service provider did not contest the government’s compelling interest or the necessity of continued nondisclosure. The court rejected the provider’s assertion that a district court is constitutionally required on its own accord to schedule future judicial review once it finds a nondisclosure order to be statutorily authorized for the foreseeable future. Finally, the court found no constitutional infirmity in the order of the district court. View "MERRICK GARLAND V. UNDER SEAL" on Justia Law