Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two individuals, both members of a San Francisco gang known as Mac Block, were involved in a shootout at a funeral reception that resulted in the death of a man named Simmons and injuries to several bystanders. The government alleged that the defendants, after a confrontation with Simmons, retrieved firearms and returned to the scene, where a gunfight ensued. One defendant was accused of aiding and abetting the murder, while the other was alleged to have directly participated in the shooting. Both were charged with murder in aid of racketeering under the VICAR statute and with being felons in possession of firearms.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the trial. Before trial, the court considered, but ultimately denied, a motion to bifurcate the trial so that the jury would first decide whether the defendants committed murder, and only if so, then consider the racketeering elements. The court concluded that Ninth Circuit precedent, specifically United States v. Barker, precluded such bifurcation. The court also addressed a Batson challenge to the government’s peremptory strike of a Black juror, finding the government’s race-neutral explanation sufficient and not pretextual. The jury convicted both defendants on all counts, and the court denied post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that Barker forecloses bifurcation of the elements of a single VICAR murder charge, reasoning that such bifurcation would impermissibly alter the structure of the offense as defined by Congress. The court also upheld the district court’s rejection of the Batson challenge, finding no clear error in the determination that the government’s strike was not racially motivated. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. MANNING" on Justia Law

A private company operating a federal immigration detention facility in Washington State challenged the enforcement of several provisions of a state law that imposed health, safety, and inspection requirements on private detention centers. The law required the state Department of Health to adopt rules ensuring sanitary and safe conditions, authorized unannounced inspections, provided for civil penalties for violations, and created a private right of action for detainees. The company argued that these provisions violated the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity and were preempted by federal law, claiming they improperly targeted federal contractors and conflicted with federal standards.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the challenged sections of the law violated intergovernmental immunity by discriminating against the federal government and its contractor. The court compared the requirements imposed on the federal facility to those imposed on state prisons and concluded that the law treated the federal contractor less favorably. The state appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Washington legislature amended the law, but the changes did not materially alter the issues on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that the appropriate comparison for determining discrimination under intergovernmental immunity is between the federal immigration facility and other civil detention facilities in the state, not state prisons. The court directed the district court to make this comparison in the first instance. The Ninth Circuit also held that the challenged provisions were not preempted by federal law and that the district court erred in enjoining the private right of action, as the state officials named as defendants had no enforcement authority under that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. INSLEE" on Justia Law

A nonprofit Christian ministry that provides youth programs in Oregon applied for state grant funding from the Oregon Department of Education’s Youth Development Division. The Division had recently added a rule requiring all grant applicants to certify that they do not discriminate based on religion in employment, vendor selection, subcontracting, or service delivery. The ministry, whose mission is to share Christian teachings, requires all employees and volunteers to affirm a Christian Statement of Faith and be involved in a local church. After initially awarding the ministry a conditional grant, the Division withdrew the award upon discovering the ministry’s religious hiring requirements.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied the ministry’s request for a preliminary injunction to reinstate the grant and enjoin enforcement of the rule, finding the ministry unlikely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment claims. The court also dismissed all claims, including those for damages, based on qualified immunity, even though the defendants had only moved to dismiss the damages claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit held that the rule, as applied to grant-funded initiatives, is likely neutral and generally applicable, thus not violating the Free Exercise Clause, and is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition for participation in the grant program. The court also found that the ministry’s religious autonomy claims were unlikely to succeed, as the relevant doctrines are affirmative defenses, not standalone claims. However, the court held that applying the rule to the ministry’s non-grant-funded initiatives likely imposes an unconstitutional condition on expressive association. The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to enjoin enforcement of the rule as to non-grant-funded initiatives, affirmed the dismissal of damages claims due to qualified immunity, and reversed the dismissal of claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "YOUTH 71FIVE MINISTRIES V. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

A medical school graduate, age 36 at the time of graduation, applied to the neurological surgery residency program at a university medical center but was not ranked or accepted by the program in two consecutive years. The applicant alleged that the refusal to rank him was due to age-based discrimination and retaliation for prior complaints about age-related harassment and discrimination during medical school. The university maintained that the decision was based on the applicant’s mediocre academic performance and poor evaluations during sub-internships, emphasizing the highly competitive nature of the residency program.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the university. The court determined that the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (Age Act) did not apply to the residency selection process because it constituted an “employment practice” of an “employer,” which is expressly exempted from the Act’s coverage. The court also found that, even if the Age Act were applicable, there was no genuine dispute of material fact supporting the applicant’s claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the university’s decision not to rank or admit the applicant to its residency program was an “employment practice of an employer” and therefore not subject to the Age Act. The court further concluded that, to the extent any other allegedly discriminatory or retaliatory acts were identified, the applicant failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "SPATZ V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

Three California churches sought to challenge the California Child Day Care Facilities Act and its regulations, which require child day care facilities to be licensed, ensure that children are free to attend religious services or activities of their choice as decided by a child’s authorized representative, and provide notice to parents of this right. The churches, which either had their license revoked or had not yet applied for one, alleged that these requirements conflicted with their religious beliefs and practices, particularly their desire to operate preschools with mandatory religious curricula and without state licensure.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the churches’ Free Speech and Free Exercise claims for lack of standing, and their Establishment Clause and Due Process claims for failure to state a claim. The district court entered judgment in favor of the state officials after the churches declined to amend their complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the churches lacked standing to challenge the religious services provision under the Free Exercise Clause because there was no credible threat of enforcement against their intended conduct, given the state’s disavowal of such enforcement and the absence of any history of similar prosecutions. However, the court found that the churches had standing to challenge the licensure requirement under the Free Exercise Clause, but concluded that the requirement was neutral and generally applicable, thus subject only to rational basis review, which it satisfied. The court also rejected the Establishment Clause challenge, finding that the statutory exemptions were based on program type, not religion. The court found standing for the Free Speech challenge to the notice requirement but held that the compelled disclosure was factual, uncontroversial, and reasonably related to a substantial government interest. The Due Process challenge was also rejected. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment but remanded to amend the judgment so that the dismissal of the Free Exercise challenge to the religious services provision would be without prejudice. View "FOOTHILLS CHRISTIAN MINISTRIES V. JOHNSON" on Justia Law

A group of foster children in Oregon, through their representatives, brought a class action lawsuit against the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) and state officials, alleging violations of their substantive due process rights due to serious abuses experienced while in ODHS’s legal custody. The plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of all children for whom ODHS had or would have legal responsibility, including those in ODHS’s legal custody but physically placed with their parents, either because they had not been removed from their homes or because they were on a temporary “Trial Home Visit” after removal.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon certified a general class that included all children in ODHS’s legal or physical custody. After extensive litigation, the parties reached a settlement agreement, but disagreed on whether the term “Child in Care” in the agreement included children in ODHS’s legal custody who were physically with their parents (the “Disputed Children”). The district court concluded that these children were not covered by the settlement, reasoning that children living with their biological parents did not have substantive due process rights to be free from serious abuses while in ODHS’s legal custody.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the settlement agreement and the scope of substantive due process protections. The Ninth Circuit held that the Disputed Children—those in ODHS’s legal custody but physically with their parents—are entitled to substantive due process protections. The court found that once the state assumes legal custody, it has an affirmative duty to provide reasonable safety and minimally adequate care, regardless of the child’s physical placement. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "WYATT B. V. KOTEK" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury of child molestation after he helped bathe young girls who were in his and his wife’s care through the foster system. The relevant Arizona statute defined child molestation as any direct or indirect touching of a child’s private parts, and, at the time, allowed a defendant to raise an affirmative defense by proving he was not motivated by sexual interest. The petitioner admitted to the touching but argued he lacked sexual motivation.After his first trial ended in a mistrial, the Arizona Supreme Court decided State v. Holle, which held that sexual motivation was not an element of the crime and that the lack of sexual interest was an affirmative defense the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. At the petitioner’s second trial, the court instructed the jury accordingly, and he was convicted on some counts. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Holle, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the statutory scheme unconstitutionally shifted the burden of disproving an essential element of the crime to him. The district court denied relief, finding the state courts’ application of federal law was not objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Arizona’s statutory scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving sexual motivation, which is the critical fact distinguishing criminal from innocent conduct. The court concluded that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the conviction was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "BIEGANSKI V. SHINN" on Justia Law

A Christian humanitarian organization offered a remote customer service representative position to an applicant who was openly in a same-sex marriage. After the applicant disclosed her marital status while inquiring about parental leave, the organization rescinded the job offer, citing its policy that limits employment to those who comply with its religious standards, including a prohibition on sexual conduct outside of marriage between a man and a woman. The applicant, who identifies as Christian and is active in LGBTQ advocacy, sued the organization for discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, and marital status under federal and state law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington initially granted summary judgment to the organization, finding that the church autonomy doctrine barred judicial inquiry into the religiously motivated employment decision. Upon reconsideration, the district court reversed itself, holding that the church autonomy doctrine did not apply because the organization’s hiring policy was facially discriminatory and could be evaluated using neutral legal principles. The district court also rejected the organization’s ministerial exception defense and other constitutional and statutory defenses, ultimately granting summary judgment to the applicant and entering judgment for stipulated damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception applies because customer service representatives at the organization perform key religious functions central to its mission, such as communicating its ministries to donors, engaging in prayer with supporters, and inviting participation in its religious mission. The court concluded that these duties are vital to the organization’s religious purpose, and therefore, the ministerial exception bars the applicant’s employment discrimination claims. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the organization. View "MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC." on Justia Law

During a protest in Seattle on June 7-8, 2020, Taylor Cheairs was filming the event when Officer Anderson of the Seattle Police Department (SPD) threw a blast ball grenade that exploded and struck Cheairs in the groin, causing serious injury. Cheairs sued the City of Seattle, the SPD, and unnamed officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because Cheairs was not seized, and no First Amendment violation because there was no evidence of retaliation. The court also ruled that without a constitutional violation, there could be no municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that although a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Cheairs was seized when Officer Anderson struck him with the blast ball, the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. The court noted that the protesters near Cheairs posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers, citizens, and property. The court also held that Cheairs failed to establish a viable First Amendment retaliation claim because he did not provide evidence that his filming was a substantial or motivating factor in the use of force against him. Consequently, without a viable constitutional claim, Cheairs could not establish a claim for municipal liability. View "CHEAIRS V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two national organizations and five sets of parents, challenged three Washington laws regulating minors' access to mental health care and shelter services, particularly for transgender minors. The parents' children had shown signs of gender dysphoria, and the plaintiffs argued that the laws constrained their ability to parent, forced them to censor their speech, and limited their access to information about their children.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the case for lack of standing, finding that the plaintiffs' alleged harms were speculative and not concrete injuries. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated current or future injuries sufficient to confer standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing based on current injuries because their alleged injuries were self-inflicted and not directly caused by the laws. The court also found that the plaintiffs' fears of future injuries were too speculative and not imminent. Additionally, the court held that the organizational plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not demonstrate that their members had standing to sue in their own right.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated standing to bring their claims and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action. View "International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Inslee" on Justia Law