Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal without leave to amend of a complaint brought by plaintiffs, a group of elected local government officials, asserting a pre-enforcement challenge to California Government Code section 3550, which states in part that a public employer shall not deter or discourage public employees from becoming or remaining members of an employee organization.The panel concluded that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they have suffered an injury in fact sufficient to establish their standing to pursue their preenforcement challenge. The panel explained that section 3550 does not regulate plaintiffs' individual speech, and any restrictions the statute does impose on plaintiffs' ability to speak on behalf of their employers do not injure plaintiffs' constitutionally protected individual interests. In this case, plaintiffs have not shown that they have a well-founded fear that PERB will impute these statements to plaintiffs' public employers, particularly in light of concessions made by PERB in this litigation.However, dismissals for lack of Article III jurisdiction must be entered without prejudice because a court that lacks jurisdiction is powerless to reach the merits. In this case, the district court erred by dismissing the case with prejudice. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court to enter judgment dismissing the case without prejudice. View "Barke v. Banks" on Justia Law

Schlenker pled guilty to second-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. 1111 and 1153(a), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(A). In his plea agreement, he waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, except for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. After his sentencing, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the residual clause of section 924(c)(3), definition of a “crime of violence,” was unconstitutionally vague. The Ninth Circuit then held that second-degree murder is not a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of section 924(c)(3). Schlenker sought to challenge the validity of his section 924(c) sentence in a habeas proceeding but prosecutors responded that the government would consider the filing of such an action to be a breach of the plea agreement.Schlenker then filed a civil action seeking a declaration that filing a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion would not breach the plea agreement and to clarify the terms of the plea agreement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit. The district court lacked jurisdiction because there was no “case or controversy” as required under Article III. Schlenker’s declaratory action and motion to clarify improperly sought to carve out a collateral legal issue—the validity and scope of the collateral attack waiver—from a potential section 2255 motion, and to use the Declaratory Judgment Act as a substitute to challenge his sentence. View "United States v. Schlenker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Oakland’s Uniform Residential Tenant Relocation Ordinance, which requires landlords re-taking occupancy of their homes upon the expiration of a lease to pay tenants a relocation payment. Plaintiffs alleged that the relocation fee is an unconstitutional physical taking of their money for a private rather than public purpose, without just compensation. Alternatively, they claimed that the fee constitutes an unconstitutional exaction of their Oakland home and an unconstitutional seizure of their money under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Although in certain circumstances money can be the subject of a physical (per se) taking, the relocation fee required by the Ordinance was a regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship, not an unconstitutional taking of a specific and identifiable property interest. Because there was no taking, the court did not address whether the relocation fee was required for a public purpose or what just compensation would be. The court rejected an assertion that Oakland placed an unconstitutional condition (an exaction), on their preferred use of their Oakland home. The plaintiffs did not establish a cognizable theory of state action; Oakland did not participate in the monetary exchange between plaintiffs and their tenants. View "Ballinger v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

In an action brought under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the district court entered an injunction, requiring Nevada prison officials to allow the plaintiff to possess no more than a half-ounce of scented oil in his cell for personal use with his prayers.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Noting RLUIPA's expansive protections for religious liberty, the court concluded that Nevada’s regulation banning personal possession of scented oil substantially burdened the plaintiff’s religious exercise and that Nevada failed to show that the regulation was the least restrictive means of serving compelling interests in general prison security and minimizing contraband. The plain language of RLUIPA prohibits courts from evaluating the centrality of a religious practice or belief, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-5(7)(A); a court can only scrutinize the sincerity of the prisoner’s beliefs. The court, therefore, rejected assertions that scented oil was not “really that important” to the plaintiff’s worship practice or that plaintiff needed to point to textual support or oral history proving that the Prophet Mohammad used scented oil in prayer. The court noted that the regulation prohibited the plaintiff from using scented oil for prayer—the way the plaintiff believes the Prophet Muhammed prayed—for 34 out of his 35 prayers per week. View "Johnson v. Baker" on Justia Law

King ran a heroin distribution ring focusing on San Francisco housing projects in 1976-1980. King was convicted of first-degree murder and firearms crimes in California state court in 1981 and was sentenced to serve 27 years to life in prison. Later that year, King was convicted of federal drug trafficking crimes and was sentenced to 45 years of incarceration in 1982. King began serving his federal sentence in 2019 after completing his separate California sentence.Shortly thereafter, King directly filed a motion for compassionate release under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1), arguing that compassionate release was appropriate because he is 77 years old, highly vulnerable to COVID-19 while incarcerated, and has a wife who is struggling with cancer. The district court denied this motion as procedurally improper because it had been filed by King. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Inmates who committed crimes before November 1, 1987, cannot move for compassionate release under section 3582(c)(1) but are instead subject to the Sentencing Reform Act and can gain compassionate release only if the Bureau of Prisons requests it on the prisoner’s behalf under 18 U.S.C. 4205(g). View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Brown, who suffered physical abuse at the hands of her former boyfriend and fellow University of Arizona student at his off-campus residence, brought a Title IX action, 20 U.S.C. 1681, against the University.The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the University. Title IX liability exists for student-on-student harassment when an educational institution exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs. The control-over-context requirement was not met based on Brown’s theory that the university had substantial control over the context of Brown’s former boyfriend’s abuse of other victims and failed to take proper action. The court rejected a theory that the boyfriend, a university football player, had to have university approval to live off-campus and his housing was paid for with scholarship funds that he received from the university. View "Brown v. State of Arizona" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for qualified immunity in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that police officers used excessive force when they removed plaintiff from a city council meeting where she and others were protesting. When the protest prevented the meeting from continuing, the officers warned the protesters that they had to leave the meeting room or would be arrested. After the protestors refused and passively resisted, the officers handcuffed them and carried or pulled them by their arms from the meeting room.The panel concluded that the officers did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment where the type and amount of force used by the officers was minimal. In this case, the officers did not strike plaintiff, throw her to the ground, or use any compliance techniques or weapons for the purpose of inflicting pain on her. Rather, they held her by her arms and lifted her so they could pull her out of the meeting room after she went limp and refused to leave on her own or cooperate in being removed. Furthermore, the inherent risk of two officers pulling someone who has gone limp and refuses to move by her own power is not significant. The panel also concluded that although the City's interest in forcibly removing plaintiff was low, it was not nonexistent, and the balance of interests favors defendants. Consequently, plaintiff's Bane Act claims also failed. View "Williamson v. City of National City" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the confiscation of his mail violated his rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The panel concluded that genuine issues of material fact exist both as to whether the Arizona Department of Corrections applied its order inconsistently as to the CDs, in violation of plaintiff's free speech rights, and whether the exclusion of his Nation of Islam texts substantially burdened his religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Slade" on Justia Law

Under California law, citizens can only obtain firearms and ammunition in person at government-approved gun and ammunition shops. After purchasing a firearm, they must wait a minimum of 10 days to obtain it. Ventura County issued COVID-19 pandemic public health orders that mandated a 48-day closure of gun shops, ammunition shops, and firing ranges, while allowing other businesses like bike shops to remain open. The Orders also prohibited everyone from leaving their homes other than for preapproved reasons, which did not include traveling to gun or ammunition shops or firing ranges outside Ventura County.The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a challenge to the Orders. The Orders “burdened conduct protected by the Second Amendment, based on a historical understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment right” and failed to satisfy any level of heightened scrutiny. They were not the least restrictive means to further the governmental interest, especially when compared to businesses that had no bearing on fundamental rights, yet were allowed to remain open. The County failed to provide any explanation suggesting that gun shops, ammunition shops, and firing ranges posed a greater risk of spreading COVID-19 than other businesses and activities nor any evidence that it considered less restrictive alternatives. The Orders imposed a far greater burden than California’s 10-day waiting period. View "McDougall v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the bail schedule set by the San Francisco Superior Court, an arm of the state, violated their equal protection and due process rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983 because it failed to take into account pre-arraignment detainees’ inability to pay pre-set mandatory bail amounts. Following years of litigation, the district court enjoined the Sheriff, who had Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages, from enforcing the bail schedule and any other state determination that made the existence or duration of pre-trial detention dependent on the detainee’s ability to pay. The court then awarded a reduced lodestar amount of attorney’s fees ($1,950,000.00) to the class and held California responsible for payment.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the award, rejecting arguments that the state was not liable for fees because it was dismissed from the case on the ground of Eleventh Amendment immunity and did not otherwise participate in the litigation. Despite Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Sheriff could be sued in her capacity as a state official for injunctive relief, and the state could be assessed a reasonable attorney’s fee under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The state had the necessary notice and an opportunity to respond to claims that the official-capacity suit against the Sheriff could properly be treated as a suit against California. View "Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco" on Justia Law