Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McGill was sentenced to death in 2004 for the murder of his former housemate, Perez. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McGill’s conviction and sentence and the state trial court denied post-conviction relief.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief, rejecting McGill’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. The post-conviction review court correctly identified and reasonably applied clearly established law in assessing professional norms and evaluating new mitigation evidence, did not apply an unconstitutional causal-nexus test, and did not need to consider the cumulative effect of nonexistent errors. Counsel’s preparation, investigation, and presentation of mitigation evidence was thorough and reasoned. The defense team uncovered a “not insignificant” amount of mitigation evidence that spanned decades of McGill’s life and presented a comprehensive picture to the jury. There is no evidence that counsel failed to uncover any reasonably available mitigation records. The court also rejected McGill’s uncertified claims that counsel was ineffective at the guilt phase by failing to retain an expert arson investigator and that his death sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause in light of Ring v. Arizona, in which the Supreme Court invalidated an Arizona statute that required the sentencing judge—not the jury—“to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.” View "McGill v. Shinn" on Justia Law

Miranda got into an argument with his son, Matthew who was driving Miranda’s truck. Matthew stopped the truck in traffic near the family’s home. Neighbors called 911. Officers found Miranda in the driver’s seat. At the police station, Miranda admitted to having consumed six beers. He submitted to a portable breath test, which revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.137%. Officers read him a standardized “implied consent affidavit.” Miranda responded three times, “No, I will not," and was told: “If you do not expressly agree to testing ... your Arizona driving privileges will be suspended for 12 months. Officers prepared a search warrant for Miranda’s blood draw. Miranda then stated that he would do a blood draw, but the officers obtained a warrant and told Miranda, “your license is suspended.” The test revealed a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit. Miranda pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and failure to comply with law enforcement in exchange for dismissal of the DUI.The Ninth Circuit the summary judgment rejection of Miranda’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging that an officer lied during the driver’s license suspension proceeding. There is no constitutional guarantee or federal right to a driver’s license so that its deprivation does not violate substantive due process. Even assuming the officer testified falsely at the administrative hearing as to whether Miranda consented to a blood test, Arizona provided sufficient post-deprivation due process. Miranda was granted a second administrative hearing before a new ALJ, who voided the suspension. Additionally, he was pursuing a state law claim in Arizona state court. View "Miranda v. City of Casa Grande" on Justia Law

California’s AB 5 codified the “ABC test” for ascertaining whether workers are classified as employees or independent contractors. The ABC test permits businesses to classify workers as independent contractors only if they meet certain conditions. If a business cannot make that showing, its workers are deemed employees, and the business must comply with specific requirements and state and federal labor laws. AB5 and its amendments, California Labor Code 2778, establishes certain occupational exemptions. Freelance writers, photographers, and others received a narrower exemption than offered to certain other professionals. The Association sued, asserting that AB5 effectuates content-based preferences for certain kinds of speech, burdens journalism, and burdens the right to film matters of public interest.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Section 2778 regulates economic activity rather than speech. It does not, on its face, limit what someone can or cannot communicate. Nor does it restrict when, where, or how someone can speak. The statute is aimed at the employment relationship—a traditional sphere of state regulation. Although the ABC classification may impose greater costs on hiring entities, which could mean fewer overall job opportunities for certain workers, such an indirect impact on speech does not necessarily rise to the level of a First Amendment violation. The court rejected an assertion that the law singled out the press as an institution and was not generally applicable. The legislature’s occupational distinctions were rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. View "American Society of Journalists and Authors, Inc. v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the seizure of their car and the deprivation of its use for five months violated their rights to due process under the federal and state constitutions. In this case, the police stopped plaintiffs' son while he was driving their car, found marijuana in the car, and arrested the son. The car was then seized pursuant to Arizona state law and eventually returned five months later. The district court dismissed all claims.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's determination that plaintiffs' claims were barred because they did not file a notice of claim under A.R.S. 12-821.01, concluding that this statute does not apply to claims for declaratory judgment or for injunctive relief. The panel confidently predicted that the Arizona Supreme Court would hold that where only nominal damages are sought, no claim must be filed under section 12-821.01 before filing suit. In regard to the district court's alternative basis for dismissal, the panel reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' biased adjudicator claims. The panel explained that the saving construction adopted by the district court cannot be reconciled with the statutory language, and that on the facts as recited in the complaint, Deputy Navajo County Attorney Moore's undisclosed, unreviewable determination that plaintiffs' petition was untimely denied them a meaningful opportunity to be heard by an unbiased adjudicator.In regard to the biased enforcer claims, the panel agreed with the district court that the Navajo County Drug Task Force was not amenable to suit under Arizona law, and thus dismissal was proper. However, both the biased adjudicator and biased enforcer nominal damages claims against Moore and Moore's supervisor for violations of Arizona due process could proceed. Finally, the panel rejected Arizona's invitation on cross-appeal to issue an advisory ruling that its civil forfeiture scheme is facially constitutional. Accordingly, the panel reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Platt v. Moore" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit withdrew a per curiam opinion filed August 4, 2021; filed an amended per curiam opinion affirming the district court's dismissal of the 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition; denied a petition for panel rehearing; and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc where petitioner challenged two sentencing enhancements—under 18 U.S.C. 2251(e) and 18 U.S.C. 3559(e)(1)—applied after his conviction on multiple counts of federal sex offenses.The panel held that petitioner's claim is foreclosed because he relies on Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), and United States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345 (3d Cir. 2016), to challenge his sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 3559(e)(1), yet he concedes that both of those decisions came down before he had exhausted his original section 2255 motion. The panel concluded that the legal basis for petitioner's claim arose before he had exhausted his section 2255 motion, and thus he cannot show that he did not have an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his challenge to the section 3559(e)(1) sentencing enhancement. The panel rejected petitioner's claim for an extension of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), in the context of a section 2241 petition as foreclosed under Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). Finally, because petitioner cannot show he lacked an unobstructed procedural shot with respect to the section 3559(e)(1) mandatory life sentencing enhancement, the panel did not need to reach the actual innocence prong for that enhancement or either prong for the section 2251(e) enhancement. The panel granted respondent's motion for judicial notice. View "Pavulak v. von Blanckensee" on Justia Law

Ballou filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that Police Chief McElvain discriminated against her because of her gender by intentionally subjecting her to internal affairs investigations to preclude her eligibility for promotion and then declining to promote her to sergeant even though she was the most qualified candidate.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of McElvain’s qualified immunity summary judgment motion. Ballou sufficiently alleged unconstitutional sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and established a prima facie claim for disparate treatment. McElvain’s articulated reasons for not promoting Ballou were pretextual. The court rejected, as “profoundly mistaken,” McElvain’s argument that to state an equal protection claim, proof of discriminatory animus alone was insufficient. The existence of a comparator is not a prerequisite to stating a disparate treatment claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on Circuit precedent, any reasonable officer would recognize that discriminatorily conducting an investigation to stall a promotion is unconstitutional. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider whether McElvain was entitled to qualified immunity on the Equal Protection claim that she suffered retaliation for opposing sex discrimination. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity on Ballou’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Ballou’s speech opposing sex discrimination in the workplace was inherently speech on a matter of public concern, protected by the First Amendment. View "Ballou v. McElvain" on Justia Law

Miller, an assistant city attorney, advised the City of Eugene not to renew contracts with DePaul, a qualified nonprofit agency for individuals with disabilities (QRF) under an Oregon law that requires cities to contract with QRFs in certain circumstances. DePaul sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that it held a clearly established constitutionally protected property interest in two 12-month security-service contracts. In 2016, Eugene had decided to modify its security services by requiring that the security service employees be armed and decided not to renew the contracts.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that Miller was entitled to qualified immunity. No court has considered DePaul’s novel argument that the Oregon QRF statute created a protected property interest in city contracts. Nor does the QRF statute on its face definitively resolve that question. DePaul did not provide any precedent addressing Oregon’s QRF statute or anything closely related. There was no precedent clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret the QRF statute as creating a protected property interest in DePaul’s annual contracts. There was also no precedent considering whether the QRF statute allows the city to end a contract if it seeks new services, such as armed security. View "DePaul Industries v. Miller" on Justia Law

Melnik, a Nevada prisoner, was charged with unauthorized or inappropriate use of the prison mail system after prison officials intercepted two envelopes addressed to him that contained methamphetamine in secret compartments in the enclosed letters. Melnik asked several times to examine the envelopes or copies of the envelopes, but those requests were denied or ignored. At the prison disciplinary hearing, images of the envelopes and information about their contents were the only evidence presented. Melnik testified that he was innocent and had been framed by other inmates but was found guilty.Melnik filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against six former or current employees of the Nevada Department of Corrections, alleging they denied him the ability to examine the evidence before the prison disciplinary proceeding. The defendants sought summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of their motion. Melnik had a constitutional right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be permitted to examine documentary evidence for use in the prison disciplinary hearing; that right was clearly established at the time when Melnik was denied access to the material. View "Melnik v. Dzurenda" on Justia Law

After being spotted in a stolen car, Sanders fled from the police. He led them on a car chase, then on a foot chase. An officer eventually caught up to Sanders, who continued to struggle. An officer then commanded a police dog to bite Sanders’s leg. Sanders was finally subdued and charged with resisting arrest. Sanders ultimately pled “no contest” and filed a civil rights action alleging the use of the police dog was excessive force.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his claims barred by Heck v. Humphrey, under which a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim must be dismissed if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. While a defendant cannot be convicted of resisting arrest if an officer used excessive force at the time of the acts resulting in the conviction, Sanders could not stipulate to the lawfulness of the dog bite as part of his plea and then use the same act to allege an excessive force claim under section 1983. View "Sanders v. City of Pittsburg" on Justia Law

In 1995, Demetrulias was sentenced to death for the fatal stabbing of Miller. Demetrulias claimed that he killed Miller in a struggle initiated by Miller when Demetrulias visited his home to collect a $40 debt. The prosecution maintained that Demetrulias stabbed Miller in the commission of a robbery.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief. Even if Demetrulias’s argument that the trial court violated his due process rights by allowing the prosecution to introduce victim character evidence in a preemptive attack on Demetrulias’s assertion of self-defense. is not barred by procedural default, the admission of the statements did not amount to constitutional error. The challenged testimony was brief and non-inflammatory and did not seek to portray Demetrius as evil but portrayed the victims as non-violent, Demetrulias also argued that if the court had given a claim-of-right instruction, the jury would have had a legal basis for finding that Demtrulias intended to collect a debt, not to rob Miller, thereby negating the specific intent to prove robbery, and would have acquitted Demetrulias of the sole special circumstance charge. Any error in failing to give the instruction was harmless as was any error in failing to give a requested instruction of voluntary manslaughter based on heat-of-passion. The California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision in not presenting evidence of organic brain damage and mental health diagnoses. View "Demetrulias v. Davis" on Justia Law