Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction prohibiting the City of Los Angeles from discarding homeless individuals' "Bulky Items" that are stored in public areas, as authorized by a provision of its municipal code.The panel agreed with the district court that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that this provision, on its face, violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures. The panel found Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012), which upheld a preliminary injunction that prohibited Los Angeles from summarily destroying homeless individuals' publicly stored personal property, persuasive. The panel also concluded that the clauses authorizing the discarding of those items are not severable from the remainder of the provision. The panel emphasized that its holding imposes no new constraints on the City: its prior caselaw states clearly that the government may not summarily destroy the unabandoned personal property of homeless individuals that is kept in public areas. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court appropriately concluded that the remaining preliminary injunction factors tipped in plaintiffs' favor. View "Garcia v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12182(a), the Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated 1991Accessibility Guidelines requiring that in sports stadiums, “[w]heelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seating plan and shall be provided so as to provide people with physical disabilities a choice of admission prices and lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public.” A 1996 DOJ guidance document (Accessible Stadiums) provides: Wheelchair seating locations must provide lines of sight comparable to those provided to other spectators. In stadiums where spectators can be expected to stand during the show or event (for example, football, baseball, basketball games, or rock concerts), all or substantially all of the wheelchair seating locations must provide a line of sight over standing spectators."Plaintiffs, baseball fans with ADA-qualifying disabilities, use wheelchairs for mobility. The Stadium, designed in 1996 and constructed in 1997-1999, has vertically stacked seating levels sloped toward the field. There is wheelchair-accessible seating on each level. The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ sightline claim and, regarding the Accessible Stadiums standard, concluded: [W]hen the Court reviews the illustrations considering what can be seen over the line representing the standing spectator’s shoulders, i.e., “over the shoulders and between the heads,” more of the field is visible from the accessible seat, making the views comparable." The Ninth Circuit vacated. The district court failed to explain how the Stadium satisfies all the Accessible Stadiums requirements. View "Landis v. WashingtonvState Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District" on Justia Law

Yu, a Chinese international student, enrolled in ISU's Doctoral Program in Clinical Psychology in 2008. He completed the requisite four years of instruction and successfully defended his dissertation but failed to complete a mandatory professional internship consisting of 2,000 clinical hours. Several of Yu’s supervisors commented on his limited English language fluency and that Yu had trouble “form[ing] alliances” with clients and patients, and possessed limited “ability to adjust treatment.” Dr. Landers, Yu's supervisor, dismissed Yu, later testifying that Yu was never able “to grasp the communication nuances that are required” and noting the vulnerability of the patients, who were particularly high risk. After Yu was dismissed from the internship, ISU dismissed Yu from the Program.Yu filed suit, alleging that ISU violated Title VI because it intentionally discriminated against him based on his race or national origin. Yu presented the expert testimony of Dr. Zorwick that Yu was a victim of “aversive racism,” comparable to “unconscious” or “implicit” bias. The district court ruled in favor of ISU. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Evidence of unconscious bias against a protected class in an appropriate case may be probative of whether an entity has intentionally discriminated in a Title VI case but the question is factual, and here the court permissibly found that ISU did not intentionally discriminate. View "Yu v. Idaho State University" on Justia Law

Porretti, a 62-year-old prisoner, has suffered from serious mental illnesses—Tourette’s syndrome, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, personality disorder, and paranoid schizophrenia— throughout his life. Porretti’s mental illnesses have caused him to attempt suicide and to suffer psychotic symptoms, including compulsive ingestion of metal objects like razor blades, paranoid delusions, hallucinations, and verbal tics. Porretti received Wellbutrin and Seroquel for his mental illnesses before he was incarcerated in Nevada and after he entered into the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC). In 2017, without the recommendation of a healthcare provider, NDOC stopped providing his medication because of a new administrative policy.The Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction requiring prison officials to provide Porretti’s Wellbutrin and Seroquel. The district court carefully applied the preliminary-injunction factors and rendered highly detailed factual findings that rejected opinions from NDOC’s experts for reasons grounded in the record evidence; Porrettif’s Eighth Amendment claim was likely to succeed on the merits and he would suffer irreparable harm in the form of “very serious or extreme damage to his mental health” if injunctive relief were not granted. Porretti’s severe and persistent psychotic symptoms overwhelmingly outweighed NDOC’s financial or logistical burdens in providing Wellbutrin and Seroquel. An injunction was in the public’s interest because prisons must comply with the standard of care mandated by the Eighth Amendment. View "Porretti v. Dzurenda" on Justia Law

In 2017, Pollard was indicted for possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Over the previous 20 years, he had been convicted of several felonies and served over five years in prison, including for a 2004 violation of California’s felon-in-possession statute. Pollard pled guilty. He was sentenced to 57 months and did not appeal.A year later, the Supreme Court decided “Rehaif,” holding that section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was a felon at the time of possession. Pollard moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a), contending that his guilty plea was not intelligent, knowing, or voluntary without having been informed of section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge-of-status element. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Pollard’s motion because he had not shown actual prejudice and failed to overcome the procedurally defaulted nature of his claim. View "United States v. Pollard" on Justia Law

San Francisco pretrial detainees filed a putative class action challenging conditions of confinement under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the denial of access to outdoor recreation and direct sunlight. The court enjoined some of the jail’s practices, finding the evidence inconclusive as to whether the lack of direct sunlight created a medical risk and that plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success in seeking exercise time outdoors. The policy of permitting general population inmates to receive 4.5-8 hours of day room time and 30 minutes of gym time daily was constitutionally sufficient but forcing pretrial detainees to live without direct sunlight for years was simply punishment. The court ordered the jail to provide one hour per week of direct sunlight to inmates who had been incarcerated for more than four years. The court dismissed the Sheriff’s Department as a superfluous defendant and dismissed individual defendants based on qualified immunity.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part. The government’s appeal was moot because the preliminary injunction order expired after 90 days, The district court did not err in denying greater preliminary injunctive relief; there is no bright-line test to determine if and when inmates are entitled to outdoor exercise. Plaintiffs did not show a likelihood of success on their “direct sunlight” claim given the district court’s extensive factual findings. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ cross-appeal of the dismissal of the Sheriff’s Department and the individual defendants. View "Norbert v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Maricopa Domestic Water Improvement District supplies water to about 300 households, including the public housing tenants of a Pinal County complex. Property owners like Pinal County are responsible for paying any past tenant’s delinquent water accounts. Pinal County acknowledged that responsibility but consistently refused to pay, contending it was immune to that policy based on its status as a public municipality. In response, the District imposed a new policy that increased to $180 the refundable security deposit required of new public housing customers before the District would provide water services. New non-public housing customers were subject to a $55 deposit.The Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the policy under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3604 and 3617, which bars discriminatory housing policies and practices, including those that cause a disparate impact according to certain protected characteristics or traits—race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. Although the District’s public housing customers are disproportionately African American, Native American, and single mothers, the District established by undisputed evidence that the policy served in a significant way its legitimate business interests; the plaintiffs failed to establish a triable issue of fact that there existed an equally effective, but less discriminatory, alternative. There was insufficient evidence that discriminatory animus was a motivating factor behind the District’s decision to implement its policy. View "Southwest Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Maricopa Domestic Water Improvement District" on Justia Law

Ohlson was a forensic scientist with the Arizona Department of Public Safety and analyzed blood samples for alcohol content, reported the findings, and testified about those findings in court proceedings. Ohlson advocated for changes in how the lab disclosed batched test results and, contrary to his superiors’ orders, communicated his opinions within the Department, with defense attorneys, and in court hearings. He was disciplined and eventually forced to retire.The district court rejected Ohlson’s allegations of First Amendment retaliation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Ohlson’s advocacy in the course of his employment duties could conceivably have adversely affected confidence in the accuracy of the Department’s test results, as well as in the Department. The defendants did not violate any clearly established law; where, as in this case, an employee, in the course of doing the job, has expressed views the employer regards as contrary to its interests, controlling legal principles remain particularly uncertain, so the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Ohlson v. Brady" on Justia Law

Maner worked as a biomedical engineer in the laboratory of Dr. Garfield for several decades. Maner learned that Garfield and another employee, Shi, were engaged in a long-term romantic relationship. Garfield brought Shi with him to research conferences to which other employees were not invited and conferred upon Shi a greater share of workplace opportunities related to publications and intellectual property than Maner felt she should have received. In 2008, Maner was arrested at work for alleged aggravated sexual assault; he pleaded guilty to a lesser state law offense. Maner subsequently received positive performance reviews and merit pay increases. Garfield approved a remote work arrangement to enable Maner to serve his probation. Garfield’s lab began to suffer a decline in grant funding. In 2011, Garfield submitted a highly negative review of Maner’s performance under the remote work arrangement. Maner’s position was eliminated based on the poor performance review and lack of funding.Maner brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and a Title VII retaliation claim alleging that his termination was for protesting Garfield’s favoritism toward Shi. The Ninth Circuit affirmed judgment for the employer. Maner’s “paramour preference” reading of Title VII fails the Supreme Court’s test for assessing whether an adverse employment action violated Title VII—whether changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer. Maner failed to establish any causal connection between the claimed protected activity and the termination decision. View "Maner v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Bartley was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4), based on his 2011 commitment to an Idaho state hospital after he was found incompetent to stand trial. Section 922(g)(4) prohibits the possession of a firearm by any person “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Bartley’s motion to dismiss.The court rejected Bartley’s contentions that the 2011 state proceedings to determine his competency to face criminal charges lacked due process and that because the state court did not find that he was both mentally ill and dangerous, the 2011 proceedings did not constitute an adjudication or commitment within the meaning of section 922(g)(4). Neither section 922(g)(4) nor 27 C.F.R. 478.11 requires a finding that the committed person was both mentally ill and dangerous nor a separate finding under Idaho law that Bartley was a person to whom section 922(g)(4) applies. Assuming without deciding that the application of section 922(g)(4) to Bartley burdened Second Amendment rights, the court applied intermediate scrutiny and found the government’s statutory objective to be “significant, substantial, or important,” and a “reasonable fit” between the challenged law and that objective. View "United States v. Bartley" on Justia Law