Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit previously affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim for failure to state a claim under either the Fifth or Fourth Amendments. After plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the access regulation, California Code of Regulations, Title 8, 20900(e), appropriates a right to invade the growers' property and therefore constitutes a per se physical taking, and that plaintiffs' complaint thus states a claim for an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.In light of the Supreme Court's decision, the panel reversed the district court's judgment relating to the Fifth Amendment claim. For the reasons stated in Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma, 923 F.3d at 534–36, the judgment of the district court dismissing the Fourth Amendment claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is affirmed. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury's verdict awarding "loss of life" damages to the family of Fermin Valenzuela, Jr., who died after an encounter with the police. The jury awarded the Valenzuela family a total of $13.2 million in damages on multiple theories of liability, including $3.6 million for Valenzuela's loss of life, which was independent of any pain and suffering that he endured during and after the struggle with the officers. Defendants argue that because California state law did not recognize loss of life damages, neither should 42 U.S.C. 1983.The panel reviewed the relevant in- and out-of circuit case law, including Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014), and concluded that section 1983 permitted the recovery of loss of life damages and that California state law to the contrary was inconsistent with the federal statute's goals. As the court recognized, to hold otherwise "would undermine the vital constitutional right against excessive force—perversely, it would incentivize officers to aim to kill a suspect, rather than just harm him." The panel saw no meaningful way to distinguish Chaudhry from this case. The panel resolved the remaining issues on appeal, including qualified immunity, in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "Valenzuela v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

The previous opinion is withdrawn and replaced by the following opinion concurrently filed with this order. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court's bench trial judgment upholding Alaska's political party-to-party candidate limit; (2) reversed the district court's judgment as to the individual-to-candidate limit, the individual-to-group limit, and the nonresident aggregate limit; and (3) remanded.In this case, at issue are Alaska's limits on contributions made by individuals to candidates, individuals to election-related groups, and political parties to candidates, and also its limit on the total funds a candidate may receive from out-of-state residents. On remand, the court's resolution of the challenges to the political party-to-candidate and nonresident limits remains the same, affirming the district court's decision upholding the former but reversing the decision upholding the latter. However, the panel reversed the district court's decision upholding the individual-to-candidate and individual-to-group limits, applying the five-factor Randall test and concluding that Alaska failed to meet its burden of showing that its individual contribution limit was closely drawn to meet its objectives. The panel explained that, on top of its danger signs, the limit significantly restricts the amount of funds available to challengers to run competitively against incumbents, and the already-low limit is not indexed for inflation. Furthermore, Alaska has not established a special justification for such a low limit. The panel also concluded that, similarly, Alaska has not met its burden of showing that the $500 individual-to-group limit is closely drawn to restrict contributors from circumventing the individual-to-candidate limit. View "Thompson v. Hebdon" on Justia Law

The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 imposes a $1 assessment, or “checkoff,” on each head of cattle sold in the U.S. to fund beef consumption promotional activities. The Secretary of Agriculture oversees the program. The Montana Beef Council and other qualified state beef councils (QSBCs), receive a portion of the checkoff assessments to fund promotional activities and may direct a portion of these funds to third parties for the production of advertisements and other promotional materials. R-CALF's members include cattle producers who object to their QSBCs’ advertising campaigns. In 2016, the Secretary entered into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with QSBCs which granted the Secretary preapproval authority over promotions and allowed the Secretary to decertify noncompliant QSBCs, terminating their access to checkoff funds. The Secretary must preapprove all contracts to third parties and any resulting plans. QSBCs can make noncontractual transfers of checkoff funds to third parties for promotional materials which do not need to be pre-approved. Plaintiffs contend that the distribution of funds under these arrangements is an unconstitutional compelled subsidy of private speech.The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants after holding that R-CALF had associational standing and direct standing to sue QSBCs. The speech generated by the third parties for promotional materials was government speech, exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. Given the breadth of the Secretary's authority, third-party speech not subject to pre-approval was effectively controlled by the government. View "Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

After Mathew Gordon died within 30 hours of being admitted as a pretrial detainee, his mother filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging claims of inadequate medical care under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a previous appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that inadequate medical care claims brought by pretrial detainees require a showing of objective, not subjective, deliberate indifference (Gordon I). The district court, on remand, granted summary judgment for the individual defendants based on qualified immunity and for the entity defendant on the ground that plaintiff could not establish a custom or practice sufficient under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).The Ninth Circuit affirmed as to plaintiff's Monell claim and individual defendants Deputy Robert Denney, Nurse Brianna Garcia, and Sergeant Brian Tunque. However, the panel reversed and remanded as to individual defendant Nurse Debbie Finley. In regard to Finley and Denney, the panel concluded that the district court committed legal error by using a subjective standard in analyzing the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity test. Furthermore, in regard to Finely, the panel concluded that summary judgment was not proper because the available law at the time of the incident clearly established Gordon's constitutional rights to proper medical screening to ensure the medically appropriate protocol was initiated. However, in regards to Denney, the panel concluded that although it now holds that Gordon had a constitutional right to direct-view safety checks, that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident. View "Gordon v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part in an action brought by parents and a student challenging the State of California's extended prohibition on in-person schooling during the Covid-19 pandemic. The panel concluded that, despite recent changes to the State's Covid-related regulations, this case is not moot.On the merits, the panel held that the district court properly rejected the substantive due process claims of those plaintiffs who challenge California's decision to temporarily provide public education in an almost exclusively online format. The panel explained that both it and the Supreme Court have repeatedly declined to recognize a federal constitutional right to have the State affirmatively provide an education in any particular manner, and plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing that the panel can or should recognize such a right in this case.However, in regard to the State's interference in the in-person provision of private education to the children of five of the plaintiffs in this case, the panel concluded that the State's forced closure of their private schools implicates a right that has long been considered fundamental under the applicable caselaw—the right of parents to control their children's education and to choose their children's educational forum. The panel explained that California's ban on in-person schooling abridges a fundamental liberty of these five plaintiffs that is protected by the Due Process Clause, and thus that prohibition can be upheld only if it withstands strict scrutiny. Given the State's closure order's lack of narrow tailoring, the panel cannot say that, as a matter of law, it survives such scrutiny. Therefore, the panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to these five plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings.In regard to plaintiffs' claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the panel concluded that the public-school plaintiffs have failed to make a sufficient showing of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The panel explained that the challenged distinctions that the State has drawn between public schools and other facilities are subject only to rational-basis scrutiny, and these distinctions readily survive that lenient review. In regard to the private-school plaintiffs, the panel vacated the district court's judgment rejecting their Equal Protection claims and remanded for further consideration in light of the conclusion that the State's actions implicate a fundamental right of those plaintiffs. View "Brach v. Newsom" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition in which petitioner, a federal prisoner, sought to challenge his 2014 career offender sentence. Petitioner had previously filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion in Ohio that was denied. Petitioner contends that, in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions, his previous convictions do not qualify him for career offender status. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013).Generally, a federal prisoner who seeks to challenge the legality of confinement must utilize a section 2255 motion. Under the "escape hatch" provision of section 2255(e), a federal prisoner may file a section 2241 petition only when the prisoner makes a claim of actual innocence and has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting that claim. The district court held that petitioner failed to meet either of these requirements.The panel agreed with the district court that petitioner has not established a claim of actual innocence. In this case, petitioner does not dispute the validity of the conviction or that he committed the drug and firearm crimes leading to his sentence. Rather, petitioner claims actual innocence in light of Allen v. Ives, 950 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2020). The panel distinguished Allen from this case and held that petitioner cannot show that he was actually innocent of the career offender enhancement utilized during sentencing. View "Shepherd v. Unknown Party" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff Donald Shooter's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that the Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives, Javan Mesnard, and the Arizona Governor's Chief of Staff, Kirk Adams, wrongfully engineered Shooter's expulsion as a representative from the Arizona House. In early 2018, Shooter was expelled from the Arizona House by a 56-3 vote after a legislative investigation into sexual harassment allegations concluded that he had created a hostile work environment. After the cause of action was removed to federal court, the district court dismissed the federal claim and remanded the state-law claims back to state court.The panel agreed that Shooter's federal cause of action under section 1983 was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because the complaint's allegations do not raise a plausible inference of sex discrimination, the panel concluded that Shooter's equal protection claim based on such a theory was properly dismissed. Furthermore, Shooter's two distinct due process theories are barred by qualified immunity. In this case, Shooter has failed to demonstrate a clearly established right to any due process protections beyond those already afforded to him by the Arizona House of Representatives. The panel concluded that the district court correctly held that Mesnard and Adams were entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing sua sponte to grant Shooter leave to amend. View "Shooter v. Arizona" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in California state court, was granted habeas corpus relief on numerous claims under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The State appeals and petitioner cross-appeals the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief on his constitutional challenge to California's financial-gain special circumstance.The Ninth Circuit concluded that petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase by counsel's unprofessional failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence pertaining to petitioner's familial history and his mental health. The panel also concluded that petitioner has shown Strickland prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court's denial of petitioner's claim was an unreasonable application of Strickland and, thus, petitioner is entitled to relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act as to the sentence of death.The panel reversed the judgment of the district court granting the habeas petition as to petitioner's conviction, affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the petition as to petitioner's death sentence, affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the petition on petitioner's claims based on a financial-gain special circumstance, and remanded to the district court to enter an appropriate order. View "Noguera v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting the County and law enforcement officers summary judgment, holding that plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging a claim for excessive force was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Plaintiff argues that her conviction after jury trial for violations of California Penal Code 148(a)(1) and her section 1983 claim are not necessarily based on the same transaction.The panel held that the relevant inquiry is whether the record contains factual circumstances that support the underlying conviction under section 148(a)(1), not whether the conviction was obtained by a jury verdict or a guilty plea. The panel concluded that Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005 (en banc), and Beets v. City of Los Angeles, 669 F. 3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2012), controlled application of the Heck bar as found by the district court. In this case, viewed in light of binding circuit precedent, the record compels finding the jury determined that the arresting deputy acted within the scope of his duties without the use of excessive force, and that plaintiff seeks to show that the same conduct constituted excessive force. Therefore, the district court appropriately considered summary disposition of remaining legal issues under Heck and its progeny. View "Lemos v. County of Sonoma" on Justia Law