Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for municipal entities and officials in an action brought by a commercial charter business alleging that defendants violated the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), 33 U.S.C. 5(b)(2). The business alleged that the municipal entities and officials violated the RHA by imposing landing fees on commercial charters operating out of South Beach Harbor Marina in San Francisco Bay. The district court concluded that Congress did not intend the RHA to restrict the type of fees defendants imposed.The panel affirmed on alternative grounds, finding no indication that Congress intended to create a private right of action under section 5(b)(2). In this case, the panel applied Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), concluding that nothing in the statute's language, structure, context, and legislative history implied a private right of action. To the extent that plaintiff argues it cannot vindicate its rights if section 5(b)(2) does not include a private right of action, plaintiff overlooks that the reasonableness of the Landing Agreement is subject to challenge pursuant to the Tonnage Clause. Furthermore, even if there were no alternative mechanism for private enforcement, this alone would not require the panel to infer a private right of action. View "Lil' Man in the Boat, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint alleging that defendant, a superior court judge, violated plaintiff's due process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff, an heir to the Disney fortune, alleged that defendant violated his rights by appointing a guardian without notice or a hearing, and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by commenting (apparently with questionable factual basis) that plaintiff had Down syndrome.The panel concluded that most of plaintiff's claims are now moot after defendant removed the guardian ad litem and relinquished this case to another judge. The panel also concluded that, while defendant's statement may have been inaccurate and inappropriate, any claim challenging it is barred by judicial immunity. Finally, the district court did not err in denying leave to amend where all of plaintiff's proposed amendments were futile. View "Lund v. Cowan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction ordering E.E.'s current educational placement as his "stay put" placement during the pendency of judicial proceedings in a suit brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).The panel concluded that the ALJ acted without legal authority in determining that E.E.'s potential future placement in the 2020 individualized education plan (IEP) constituted his current placement for purposes of E.E.'s stay put placement. Therefore, because the ALJ acted ultra vires, her stay put determination was void. Consequently, the parents' stay put motion did not seek to modify an existing stay put order, so the district court correctly entered an automatic preliminary injunction pursuant to Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 559 F.3d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, the school district's proposed exception to the stay put provision is not supported by either the text of the IDEA or any other legal authority, and the panel declined to adopt it. View "E.E. v. Norris School District" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief and dismissal of state and federal claims in an action brought by Slidewaters LLC, challenging the State of Washington's imposition of COVID-19 restrictions prohibiting the waterpark from operating during 2020 and imposing capacity limits in 2021.The panel concluded that defendants have the authority under Washington law to impose the restrictions and that doing so does not violate Slidewaters' asserted rights under the U.S. Constitution. In this case, the governor had the lawful authority under Revised Code of Washington 43.06.010(12) to issue Proclamation 20-05, because the pandemic was both a public disorder and a disaster affecting life and health in Washington. Furthermore, the State Department of Labor and Industries, in promulgating an emergency rule as part of the state's efforts to curb the pandemic, Washington Administrative Code 296-800-14035, acted within its scope of authority. The panel explained that government regulation does not constitute a violation of constitutional substantive due process rights simply because the businesses or persons to whom the regulation is applied do not agree with the regulation or its application; defendants provided a rational basis for the proclamations and related rules; and the substantive due process rights of Slidewaters, its owners, and its employees are not violated by defendants' actions. Therefore, Slidewaters' application for injunctive relief was properly denied and its claims were properly dismissed. The panel also concluded that the district court did not err in consolidating Slidewaters' motion for preliminary injunction with a hearing on the merits or in reaching Slidewaters' state law claims. View "Slidewaters LLC v. Washington State Department of Labor and Industries" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal based on failure to state a claim of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the City violated his Fourth Amendment rights when authorities, without a warrant, searched his massage business.The panel concluded that the Fourth Amendment permitted the warrantless searches of plaintiff's massage business where the California massage industry is a closely regulated industry and the Fourth Amendment's warrantless search exception for administrative searches of businesses applied. The panel applied the factors in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), and held that the warrantless inspections were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because there is no question that curtailing prostitution and human trafficking is a substantial government interest; the warrant exception is necessary to further the regulatory scheme considering the potential ease of concealing violations; and the City ordinance governing massage establishments and the conditional use permit sufficiently restrained the City in both the time and purpose of each inspection. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims. View "Killgore v. City of South El Monte" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition challenging his Arizona death sentence. The panel applied the appropriate standards pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and concluded that petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.In regard to Claim 1, the panel agreed with petitioner that his right to counsel was violated when his attorney failed to request a mental health expert in advance of the sentencing hearing. Alternatively, the panel agreed with petitioner that the PCR court used a defective fact-finding process with respect to his first claim when it denied PCR counsel's funding request for a defense neuropsychological expert, effectively preventing the factual development of this claim, and that the state court's failure to hold a hearing on his first claim resulted in an unreasonable determination of the facts. On de novo review, the panel concluded that counsel's errors prejudiced petitioner.In regard to Claim 2, the panel agreed with petitioner that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to seek neurological or neuropsychological testing prior to sentencing, and that the failure to do so fell below prevailing professional norms at the time. The panel also agreed with petitioner's alternative argument that the PCR court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). On de novo review, the panel concluded that counsel's errors prejudiced petitioner. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's Arizona state court conviction for attempted second-degree murder. In this case, the trial court misstated Arizona law in its instructions to the jury by implying that a defendant could be guilty of attempted second-degree murder if he merely intended to cause serious physical injury, not death. Furthermore, trial counsel failed to object to the erroneous instruction. Petitioner petitioned for state post-conviction relief, with the assistance of different counsel, but his counsel did not raise any claims related to the instructional error, and the state trial and appellate courts denied relief. The district court ultimately denied his federal habeas corpus petition, declining to excuse petitioner's procedural default of these claims.The panel declined to excuse petitioner's procedural default under under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), so that he could seek habeas relief on the basis of constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IATC). The panel concluded that petitioner cannot satisfy Strickland's prejudice requirement for an IATC claim for failure to object to a jury instruction based on the consequent loss of a more favorable standard of appellate review. The panel also concluded that petitioner failed to demonstrate a substantial IATC claim, and accordingly, his procedural default of that claim is not excused under Martinez. View "Dickinson v. Shinn" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order granting respondent's petition for panel rehearing and denying as moot her petition for rehearing en banc, (2) a superseding opinion affirming the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition challenging his California conviction for first-degree murder, and (3) a partial dissent/concurrence.The panel concluded that the prosecutor's repeated statements to the jury during final argument that the presumption of innocence no longer applied were misstatements of clearly established law as articulated by the Supreme Court. However, the panel deferred to the state court's finding, applying the Darden standard, that there was not a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the prosecutor not misstated the law. The panel also concluded that the state court did not err under Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100 (1979), in upholding the jury's arguably inconsistent verdict. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's denial of relief. View "Ford v. Peery" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for CoreCivic in an action brought by plaintiff under Nevada state law for torts related to his year-long detention in a private prison without a court hearing. The district court granted CoreCivic's summary judgment motion on the ground that CoreCivic did not cause plaintiff's prolonged detention.The panel concluded that a jury could reasonably find that CoreCivic's actions caused plaintiff's prolonged detention. In this case, a rational jury could find that, in failing to notify the Marshals of plaintiff's detention and in dissuading and preventing him from seeking other help, CoreCivic was a cause of his pre-hearing detention as required to establish claims for false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The panel also concluded that a jury could find that CoreCivic breached a duty to plaintiff, and thus plaintiff has established triable issues as to his negligence claim. Furthermore, a jury could reasonably find CoreCivic's actions extreme and outrageous, and thus plaintiff has established triable issues as to his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Rivera v. Corrections Corporation of America" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended its opinion, ordered the amended opinion to be filed concurrently with the panel's order, and denied a petition for rehearing en banc.In the amended opinion, the panel held that Bivens remedies were available in the circumstances of this case, where a United States citizen claimed that a border patrol agent violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force while carrying out official duties within the United States and violated the First Amendment by engaging in retaliation entirely unconnected to his official duties. Plaintiff owns, operates, and lives in a bed and breakfast near the United States-Canada border in Blaine, Washington. Plaintiff alleged that a border patrol agent entered plaintiff's property to question guests and used excessive force on plaintiff, ultimately retaliating against plaintiff by, among other things, contacting the IRS to seek an investigation into plaintiff's tax status.The panel agreed with the district court's assumption that plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is a "modest extension" of Bivens cases in a new context. The panel did not find that special factors counseled hesitation such that a Bivens action in this new context is foreclosed. In this case, plaintiff, a United States citizen, is bringing a conventional Fourth Amendment excessive force claim arising out of actions by a rank-and-file border patrol agent on plaintiff's own property in the United States. The panel explained that this context is a far cry from the contexts in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017), and Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020), where the Supreme Court found that special factors counseled against a Bivens action. In regard to the First Amendment claim, the panel noted that although the Supreme Court wrote in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), that Bivens extends to First Amendment retaliation claims when federal law enforcement officials have no innocent motives for their action, the panel recognized that the Supreme Court has not expressly so held. In this case, plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim arose in a new context and the panel found no special factor making it inadvisable to find a cognizable Bivens claim in this new context. Finally, the panel considered the available alternative remedies -- intentional-tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a trespass claim against Agent Egbert, or injunctive relief -- and concluded that none of these suggested remedies defeats a Bivens action. View "Boule v. Egbert" on Justia Law