Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rodney Burch, the former Public Works Director for the City of Chubbuck, Idaho, filed a lawsuit against the City and Mayor Kevin England, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of Idaho state law. Burch claimed that adverse employment actions were taken against him due to his protected speech, which included criticisms of England’s policies and performance, advocacy for a city administrator position, and displaying a political yard sign supporting England’s opponent during the mayoral election.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that Burch’s criticisms and advocacy were made pursuant to his official duties and thus were not protected speech under the First Amendment. However, the court recognized that Burch’s political yard sign was protected speech. Despite this, the court concluded that Burch failed to establish a First Amendment violation because the defendants had adequate justification for their actions and would have taken the same actions regardless of the yard sign.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit agreed that Burch’s criticisms and advocacy were unprotected as they were part of his official duties. The court also found that while Burch’s yard sign was protected speech, the defendants had legitimate reasons for their actions, including Burch’s unprotected speech and the need to maintain effective city operations. Additionally, the court held that Burch’s state law claim was time-barred as the adverse employment actions occurred outside the statute of limitations.In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the defendants, holding that Burch’s First Amendment retaliation claim and Idaho state law claim both failed as a matter of law. View "Burch v. City of Chubbuck" on Justia Law

Jessica Bates, a devout Christian and widowed mother of five, applied to adopt children through the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS). Her application was denied because she could not comply with Oregon Administrative Rule § 413-200-0308(2)(k), which requires prospective adoptive parents to "respect, accept, and support" the sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression of children. Bates objected to using preferred pronouns and taking children to medical appointments for gender transitions, citing her religious beliefs. She sued, claiming the policy violated her First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied Bates's motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The court found that the policy was neutral and generally applicable, thus subject to rational basis review, which it survived. The court also concluded that the policy, as applied to Bates, compelled and restricted speech based on content and viewpoint, triggering strict scrutiny. However, it held that the policy was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in protecting LGBTQ children.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Oregon's application of § 413-200-0308(2)(k) to Bates triggered strict scrutiny for both her free speech and free exercise claims. The court found that the policy restricted and compelled speech based on content and viewpoint and was not neutral or generally applicable. The court concluded that Oregon's policy was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, as less restrictive means were available to protect LGBTQ children. The court remanded the case with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining ODHS from applying the rule to Bates in deeming her ineligible for certification as an adoptive parent. View "Bates v. Pakseresht" on Justia Law

In 2002, Tracy Allen Hampton was convicted of killing Charles Findley, Tanya Ramsdell, and Ramsdell’s unborn child. A jury sentenced him to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Hampton’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal and denied his petition for state post-conviction relief. Hampton then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the district court denied.Hampton raised four certified claims on appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that each lacked merit. The court found that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland or Napue v. Illinois in connection with the testimony of a jailhouse informant, George Ridley. Hampton was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleged failure to obtain evidence that could have been used to impeach Ridley. The court also held that Hampton’s defense counsel were not constitutionally ineffective at the guilt or sentencing phases of his trial. Additionally, the district court acted within its discretion in denying Hampton’s request for evidentiary development on his Brady, Napue, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The court declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include Hampton’s uncertified claims.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Hampton’s federal habeas petition. The court found that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also denied Hampton’s motion for reconsideration as moot. View "HAMPTON V. SHINN" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, a middle school teacher and an assistant principal, were employed by a school district in Oregon. They created the "I Resolve" campaign, which included a website and a video uploaded to YouTube, advocating for policies on gender identity, parental rights, and education. They used their own devices and time but also sent emails from their school accounts to district employees with links to the campaign. Following complaints from employees, students, and concerned citizens, and an independent investigator's determination that they violated district policies, the district terminated them but later reinstated them and transferred them to other positions.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment in favor of the school district and individual defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs alleged that their termination was in retaliation for their protected speech and that they were discriminated against based on their religion and viewpoint. The district court concluded that the defendants' interests in avoiding disruption outweighed the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights and that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's summary judgment. It held that there were genuine disputes regarding the circumstances of the plaintiffs' expressive conduct and the extent of the resulting disruption. The court affirmed the summary judgment for the individual defendants on the First Amendment claim for damages due to qualified immunity but vacated the summary judgment for the district on the First Amendment claim for damages and the related claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court also vacated the summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim and the Title VII claim, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the credibility of the district's proffered reasons for the terminations. View "DAMIANO V. GRANTS PASS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7" on Justia Law

Ryan Barry, a probationer subject to warrantless search conditions, was implicated in drug trafficking by an anonymous tipster who reported that a person named "Ryan" was selling drugs from an apartment in Van Nuys, California. The tipster also mentioned that "Ryan" drove a red convertible Ford Mustang. Officer Giovanni Espinoza of the LAPD investigated and found Barry, who matched the description and was on post-release community supervision for felony convictions. Barry was observed driving a red Mustang near the apartment. During a subsequent encounter, Barry was found with drugs and did not deny living at the apartment when informed of the impending search. Barry's possession of a key to the apartment further supported the officers' belief that he resided there.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Barry's motion to suppress the evidence found in the warrantless search of the apartment, as well as his request for an evidentiary hearing. Barry entered a conditional plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the suppression motion, and was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the search was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the standard articulated in United States v. Grandberry, which requires probable cause to believe that a parolee resides at the location to be searched. The court found that the totality of the circumstances, including Barry's responses to Officer Espinoza, the anonymous tip, and Barry's possession of a key, established probable cause that Barry resided at the apartment. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. View "USA V. BARRY" on Justia Law

Edward B. Spencer, an indigent and incarcerated individual, filed multiple lawsuits against various California prison officials. He initially proceeded in forma pauperis (IFP) in each case. Spencer had previously filed numerous lawsuits while incarcerated, and he conceded that two of those actions resulted in strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). However, he disputed whether two other actions, which he voluntarily dismissed, should count as strikes.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California revoked Spencer's IFP status in four cases, finding that he had four strikes, including the two voluntary dismissals. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations, which concluded that the voluntary dismissals counted as strikes under the PLRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's revocation of Spencer's IFP status. The Ninth Circuit held that voluntary dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) do not constitute strikes under the PLRA. The court reasoned that the "on the grounds that" clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) requires grounds to be decided by a court, and voluntary dismissals do not have grounds decided by a court. Therefore, Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissals cannot count as strikes because they are never "on the grounds that" the case was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's revocation of Spencer's IFP status in each of the four cases on appeal and remanded for further proceedings. The court did not address any other issues urged by the parties. View "Spencer v. Milan" on Justia Law

Two Korean spas, collectively referred to as "the Spa," had a policy of granting entry only to biological women, excluding men and preoperative transgender women. The Washington State Human Rights Commission (HRC) initiated an enforcement action against the Spa, alleging that this policy violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), which prohibits discrimination in public facilities based on sexual orientation, including gender expression or identity. The Spa did not challenge the statute's definition or argue that their conduct did not fit within it but claimed that enforcing WLAD against their policy violated their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the Spa's complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the Spa's conduct discriminated based on gender identity, thus falling within WLAD's scope. It also found that the HRC's enforcement did not impermissibly burden the Spa's First Amendment rights to free speech, free exercise of religion, or free association.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the Spa's entrance policy discriminated based on gender identity, which is included in WLAD's definition of sexual orientation. The court applied intermediate scrutiny to the Spa's free speech claim, concluding that WLAD imposed an incidental restriction on speech no greater than necessary to eliminate discriminatory conduct. The court also applied rational basis review to the Spa's free exercise claim, finding that WLAD was neutral and generally applicable, and that eliminating discrimination based on sex and transgender status is a legitimate government purpose. Finally, the court rejected the Spa's free association claim, determining that the Spa was neither an intimate nor an expressive association. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Olympus Spa v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

A group of innocent bystanders was injured when a fleeing suspect lost control of his car and crashed into them during a high-speed police chase. The plaintiffs, including the estate of a deceased individual and several injured parties, alleged that the police officers conducted the chase with the intent to harm the suspect and failed to provide or summon emergency services after the crash.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the officers' motion for judgment on the pleadings based on qualified immunity. The officers appealed, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiffs did not state a claim for a violation of their constitutional rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a substantive due process claim by asserting that the officers conducted the high-speed chase with a purpose to harm the suspect, which exceeded any legitimate law enforcement purpose. The court also held that the law was clearly established that such conduct was unconstitutional, thus the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.Additionally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' state-created danger claim, holding that the officers' failure to summon or render emergency services after the crash, despite witnessing the injuries, constituted deliberate indifference to a known danger. The court concluded that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the officers' actions violated clearly established law, and therefore, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim either. The court emphasized that its decision was based on the unique facts of the case and did not preclude the possibility of qualified immunity being granted at a later stage. View "Estate of Soakai v. Abdelaziz" on Justia Law

Theresa Brooke, a woman with disabilities who uses a wheelchair, visited the Ramada by Wyndham Burbank Airport hotel in August 2023. She alleged that architectural barriers at the hotel deterred her from entering. Brooke sued the hotel's owner, Tsay JBR, LLC, for violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. She sought injunctive relief under the ADA and statutory damages under the Unruh Act.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment in favor of Brooke, finding that Tsay JBR had violated the ADA due to the lack of an access aisle in the hotel's passenger loading zone. This ADA violation also constituted a violation of the Unruh Act. However, the court found that there was a factual issue regarding whether Brooke personally encountered the violation or was deterred by it, which is necessary for statutory damages under the Unruh Act. The district court scheduled a bench trial, concluding that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial did not apply to claims for statutory damages under the Unruh Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted Tsay JBR's petition for a writ of mandamus. The Ninth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment entitles parties in federal court to a jury trial on claims for statutory damages under section 52(a) of the Unruh Act. The court determined that Brooke's claim was legal in nature, both in terms of its historical analog to 18th-century English public accommodations law and the punitive and deterrent nature of the statutory damages sought. The court directed the district court to set the matter for a jury trial. View "TSAY JBR LLC V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

In 1987, John Bejarano shot and killed Roland Wright, a cab driver, during a robbery. Bejarano was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and other felonies. During the penalty phase, Bejarano made threatening statements to the jury, which contributed to his death sentence. The Nevada Supreme Court dismissed his direct appeal and Bejarano filed several unsuccessful post-conviction petitions in state and federal courts.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Bejarano’s habeas corpus petition. Bejarano argued that the district court wrongly denied him an evidentiary hearing and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting additional mitigation evidence. The district court found that Bejarano failed to exercise due diligence in developing the factual basis for his claims and denied the evidentiary hearing. It also concluded that even if trial counsel’s performance was deficient, Bejarano was not prejudiced.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Bejarano was not diligent in presenting his evidence in state court, and thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing. The court also found that Bejarano’s trial counsel’s performance was not deficient and that Bejarano was not prejudiced by any alleged deficiencies. Additionally, the court concluded that the Nevada Supreme Court provided appropriate appellate scrutiny of Bejarano’s death sentence.The Ninth Circuit denied Bejarano’s request for a certificate of appealability on three other issues, as he did not make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. The court ultimately affirmed the district court’s denial of Bejarano’s habeas corpus petition. View "Bejarano v. Reubart" on Justia Law