Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendants immigrated to the U.S. from Somalia years ago and lived in Southern California. They were convicted of sending or conspiring to send, $10,900 to Somalia to support a foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339, and money laundering.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The government may have violated the Fourth Amendment and did violate the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1861, when it collected the telephony metadata of millions of Americans, including at least one of the defendants, but suppression was not warranted in this case because the metadata collection did not taint the evidence introduced at trial. The court’s review of the classified record confirmed that the metadata did not and was not necessary to support the probable cause showing for the FISA warrant application. The Fourth Amendment requires notice to a criminal defendant when the prosecution intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose information obtained or derived from surveillance of that defendant conducted pursuant to the government’s foreign intelligence authorities, but in this case, any lack of notice did not prejudice the defendants. Evidentiary rulings challenged by the defendants did not, individually or cumulatively, impermissibly prejudice the defense and sufficient evidence supported the convictions. View "United States v. Moalin" on Justia Law

The City of Oakland filed suit alleging that Wells Fargo engaged in discriminatory lending practices by issuing predatory loans to its Black and Latino residents in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA). On appeal, Wells Fargo challenged the district court's partial denial of its motion to dismiss the City's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).In Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami (Miami I), 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017), the Supreme Court held that to establish proximate cause under the FHA, a plaintiff must do more than show that its injuries foreseeably flowed from the alleged statutory violation. Rather, some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged is required. Pursuant to Miami I, the Ninth Circuit held, after reviewing the FHA's text and legislative history, that Congress clearly intended the nature of the statutory cause of action at issue in this case to be broad and inclusive enough to encompass less direct, aggregate, and city-wide injuries. Furthermore, all three of the Holmes factors support the panel's conclusion that it is administratively feasible for the district court to administer the aggregate, city-wide injuries that the City claims it suffered as a result of Wells Fargo's unlawful discriminatory lending practices throughout the City.The panel held that the allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to plead that Oakland's reduced property-tax revenues, but not its increased municipal expenses, are proximately caused by Wells Fargo's discriminatory lending practices. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's denial of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss as to the City's claims for lost property-tax revenues and the district court's grant of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss as to Oakland's claims for increased municipal expenses. The panel also held that the FHA's proximate-cause requirement applies to claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court's denial of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss as to the City's claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Oakland v. Wells Fargo & Co." on Justia Law

Following the lead of at least two sister circuits and noting the deference owed to prison officials in light of the special duties that arise in the prison context, the Ninth Circuit held that intermediate scrutiny applies to equal protection challenges of prison regulations which facially discriminate on the basis of gender.In this case, plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials discriminated against him based on his male gender by not allowing him to purchase certain prison vendor products available only to female inmates. The panel held that plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that he has standing to bring his equal protection challenge of the Department's regulation governing inmates' personal property. The panel also held that imprisoned men and women of the same security classification subject to the challenged regulation are similarly situated for the purpose of this case, and that prison regulations such as this one, which facially discriminate on the basis of gender, must receive intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the panel vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. Because the panel had not yet established intermediate scrutiny as the applicable standard at the time the district court reviewed the regulation at issue, the panel remanded for the district court to determine the issue in the first instance. View "Harrison v. Kernan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Portland, alleging that Portland's pre-towing notice was inadequate under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), rather than Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), to analyze plaintiff's adequacy of notice claim. The panel first reiterated a settled principle: Due process requires that individualized notice be given before an illegally parked car is towed unless the state has a "strong justification" for not doing so. In this case, the district court did not consider the differences between Mullane and Mathews, but relied on a non-precedential memorandum disposition instead. The panel held that no reason appears why Mullane should not govern the adequacy of pre-towing notice, because it governs the adequacy of notice in other contexts. Therefore, the panel remanded for the district court to apply Mullane's "reasonably calculated" standard and for further proceedings. View "Grimm v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in an action challenging Arizona Revised Statute 5-112(U). Section 5-112(U) requires, among other things, that any simulcast of live horseracing into Arizona that originates outside the state "must be offered to each commercial live-racing permittee … and additional wagering facility" in the state.The panel held that the Interstate Horse Racing Act of 1978 (IHA) does not preempt section 5-112(U). The panel also held that Monarch, a simulcast purchaser and sales agent for racetracks, and Laurel Park, a Maryland racetrack whose races Monarch simulcasts, had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The panel explained that the IHA does not address how the states can regulate simulcasts, and the Arizona statute does not address Laurel Park's statutory right to consent before interstate wagering on its races can be conducted. Therefore, it is not facially impossible to comply with both laws. Furthermore, the Arizona statute does not frustrate the intent of the IHA.The panel rejected plaintiffs' contention that section 5-112(U) is an unconstitutional regulation on commercial speech and a forbidden content-based restriction; rejected plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment and Due Process challenges; held that the Arizona statute does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause; and held that the statute did not give rise to a Contract Clause claim. View "Monarch Content Management LLC v. Arizona Department of Gaming" on Justia Law

Defendant filed an emergency motion to stay his execution pending appeal of the denial of his motion to strike his execution warrant, vacate his execution, and enjoin violation of the district court's original judgment. Defendant argues that he is entitled to a stay pending appeal of the district court's order because the district court erred in denying his motion for injunctive relief.The Ninth Circuit denied the motion and held that defendant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that inconsistencies between the BOP's protocol for implementing his execution and Arizona's procedures violate the judgment and the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), or that it is probable that he would suffer an irreparable injury in the absence of the stay. In this case, defendant identifies six purported inconsistencies between the BOP's execution protocol and the procedures in the Department Order Manual. The panel held that the BOP's protocol and the Department Order Manual procedures on which defendant relies are largely indistinguishable. To the extent there is any difference between the federal and Arizona procedures with respect to the first four examples, the BOP has provided a declaration certifying that it will comply with those procedures. Furthermore, as to the fifth and sixth examples, the BOP has complied with the Department Order Manual's procedures. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition challenging his California conviction and death sentence for first degree murder and attempted rape. Over petitioner's objection, the trial court allowed the prosecution to present evidence of an unadjudicated murder and rape in Los Angeles County. The prosecution then relied on this "other acts evidence" to show the identity of the victim's killer and intent to commit rape and to kill.The panel held that the state court made a crucial erroneous factual determination in linking the two crimes and apparently failed to consider the entire record. Therefore, the California Supreme Court's decision finding no due process violation was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The panel also held that the admission of the evidence constituted a due process violation that prejudiced petitioner. Accordingly, the panel remanded with instructions to issue a conditional writ of habeas corpus. View "Kipp v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas corpus relief challenging petitioners' conviction and death sentence for first-degree murder, forcible rape, and robbery.The panel held that any constitutional error in admitting petitioner's reference to "Satan" was harmless at both the guilt and penalty phases, and thus rejected petitioner's First Amendment argument under Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S 159 (1992). The panel also held that because the admission of the Satan references could not have had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, petitioner cannot meet the higher Strickland standard of prejudice on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Furthermore, the district court properly denied petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence regarding his life. Finally, weighing the overwhelming weight of the aggravating evidence against the purported juror misconduct, the panel held that any misconduct was harmless. View "Kipp v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of petitioner's federal habeas petition and his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment and amend his habeas petition to add a new claim. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and street terrorism.In regard to the habeas petition, the panel applied the deferential standard in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and held that the state court's conclusion that petitioner's statements were voluntary was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Under the totality of the circumstances, petitioner was advised of his Miranda rights; the state court did not unreasonably conclude that petitioner was sixteen years old and considered his age, experience, and maturity as part of the totality of the circumstances of his confession; and the state court did not unreasonably conclude that the circumstances of the interview were not coercive. Furthermore, the video recording of the interview refutes petitioner's argument that those tactics overbore his will and rendered his confession involuntary. In regard to the Rule 60(b) motion, the panel held that the district court properly denied that motion as an unauthorized second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). View "Balbuena v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

California Government Code 32310, which bans possession of large capacity magazines (LCMs) that hold more than ten rounds of ammunition, violates the Second Amendment.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs who brought suit challenging section 32310. The panel applied a two-prong test to determine whether firearm regulations violate the Second Amendment. First, the panel held that section 32310 burdens protected conduct because firearm magazines are protected arms under the Second Amendment; LCMs are not unusual arms; LCM prohibitions are not longstanding regulations and do not enjoy a presumption of lawfulness; and there is no persuasive historical evidence in the record showing LCM possession falls outside the ambit of Second Amendment protection.Second, the panel held that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard to apply where section 32310 strikes at the core right of law-abiding citizens to self-defend by banning LCM possession within the home; section 32310 substantially burdens core Second Amendment rights; decisions in other circuits are distinguishable; and Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale does not obligate the panel to apply intermediate scrutiny. Although the state has compelling interests in preventing and mitigating gun violence, the panel held that section 32310 was not narrowly tailored to achieve such interests. Finally, even if intermediate scrutiny applied, section 32310 would still fail under the more lenient standard. View "Duncan v. Becerra" on Justia Law