Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hasmik Chinaryan was driving home with her daughter and a friend when Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers mistakenly suspected her vehicle was stolen due to a DMV error with the license plates. Despite driving normally, officers conducted a high-risk felony stop, ordering Chinaryan and her passengers out of the vehicle at gunpoint, handcuffing them, and making them lie on the street while they investigated.The plaintiffs sued the officers, the LAPD, and the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California’s Bane Act, alleging illegal seizures, excessive force, and failure to properly train the officers. The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment in favor of the officers, ruling they were entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims and that there was no evidence of specific intent to violate plaintiffs’ rights under the Bane Act. A jury later found in favor of the City and the LAPD on the Monell claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the individual officers on the Fourth Amendment and Bane Act claims. The appellate court held that it was clearly established in Washington v. Lambert and Green v. City & County of San Francisco that officers cannot conduct a high-risk vehicle stop based solely on reasonable suspicion that a vehicle is stolen. The court found that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the officers acted with reckless disregard for plaintiffs’ rights. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the City and the LAPD, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining plaintiffs’ requested jury instructions. The case was remanded for a new trial on all claims against the individual officers. View "Chinaryan v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy entered the curtilage of Harson Chong’s home without a warrant, leading to the discovery of drugs, guns, and money. Chong and Tac Tran, who was present at the home, were subsequently charged with federal drug and gun offenses. They claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not object to the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially denied their suppression motions, ruling the search justified by the parole-search exception. However, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grandberry, the district court reversed, finding insufficient probable cause that Tran resided at Chong’s home. Despite this, the court upheld the search based on exigent circumstances. Chong and Tran were convicted, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. They then filed post-conviction motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deputy’s entry onto the curtilage without a warrant, consent, or exigency was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found Chong’s counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence, as the search was clearly unlawful. However, Tran lacked standing to challenge the search, as he did not reside at Chong’s home and was merely a visitor. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Chong’s § 2255 motion and remanded for relief, but affirmed the denial of Tran’s motion. View "Chong v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves a non-fatal shooting of Joseph Williams by officers of the Sparks Police Department following a 42-minute car chase. Williams had stolen alcohol and vandalized a vehicle, leading to a police pursuit. During the chase, Williams ran red lights, drove through a fence, and briefly drove on the wrong side of the freeway. The chase ended when officers pinned Williams's truck, but he continued to attempt to flee, leading officers to fire multiple rounds, injuring him.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied summary judgment on Williams's claims of excessive force, municipal liability, and battery, except for the negligence claim. The court found genuine factual disputes about the threat Williams posed and whether he was attempting to flee when officers fired. The court also denied summary judgment on the Monell claims and the battery claim, citing unresolved factual issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment. The appellate court found that video evidence clearly showed Williams attempting to accelerate, contradicting his claim. The court held that the officers' use of deadly force was objectively reasonable, given the threat Williams posed to public safety. The court also exercised pendent jurisdiction over the Monell and battery claims, finding no constitutional violation in the officers' use of force and ruling that the battery claim failed because the force used was not unreasonable. The court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Williams v. City of Sparks" on Justia Law

Charles Clements was convicted by a California state jury of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, three counts of second-degree robbery, and related enhancements. His convictions were based in part on the testimony of a jailhouse informant, Donald Boeker, who claimed Clements had solicited him to murder a key witness. Boeker testified that he received no benefits for his cooperation and that his motives were altruistic. However, it was later revealed that Boeker did receive parole consideration for his testimony, which the prosecution knew or should have known.Clements appealed the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition, which was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The district court had denied his claims, including one under Napue v. Illinois, which asserts that the prosecution knowingly used false testimony. The district court reviewed the Napue claim de novo but ultimately denied it, finding no reasonable likelihood that Boeker’s false testimony affected the jury’s judgment.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Clements’s Napue claim, holding that the prosecution violated Napue by allowing Boeker to falsely testify about not receiving any benefits for his cooperation. The court found that Boeker’s testimony was highly probative of Clements’s consciousness of guilt and identity on the aggravated kidnapping counts. The court concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to grant Clements’s habeas petition with respect to the aggravated kidnapping charges. The court did not address Clements’s Brady claim or his request for an evidentiary hearing, as the relief sought was already granted under the Napue claim. The court also affirmed the denial of Clements’s Massiah and prosecutorial misconduct claims, finding that the state court’s determinations were not objectively unreasonable. View "Clements v. Madden" on Justia Law

La Dell Grizzell, acting on behalf of her minor children, sued San Elijo Elementary School and the San Marcos Unified School District, alleging that the school violated her children's federal and state civil rights. The complaint included claims of racial discrimination and other civil rights violations, such as racial epithets, physical assaults, and discriminatory disciplinary measures. Grizzell sought to proceed without legal representation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the case without prejudice, citing the "counsel mandate," which precludes nonlawyer parents from representing their children pro se. The court emphasized that regardless of the merits of the case, Grizzell could not represent her children without an attorney. The district court instructed that the minor plaintiffs could only proceed through a licensed attorney.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that it was bound by its precedent in Johns v. County of San Diego, which prohibits nonattorney parents from representing their children in court. Despite Grizzell's arguments that this rule impedes access to justice for children from low-income families, the panel concluded that it could not deviate from established precedent. The court acknowledged the serious implications of the counsel mandate but affirmed the dismissal without prejudice, indicating that only en banc review could potentially alter the rule. View "GRIZZELL V. SAN ELIJO ELEMENTARY SCHOOL" on Justia Law

Roy Scott, who was unarmed and in mental distress, called the police for help. Officers Kyle Smith and Theodore Huntsman from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department responded. Despite Scott complying with their orders and not being suspected of a crime, the officers used force to restrain him. Scott lost consciousness shortly after and was later pronounced dead. Scott’s daughter Rochelle and a representative of Scott’s estate sued the Department and the two officers, alleging violations of Scott’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and Rochelle’s Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The officers appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim, holding that the officers violated Scott’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The court found that Scott was mentally ill, not suspected of a crime, and did not present a risk to officers or others, making the use of severe or deadly force constitutionally excessive. The court also held that Scott’s Fourth Amendment rights were clearly established at the time of the violation, referencing Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim.However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Rochelle’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court held that while the officers violated Rochelle’s right to familial association, that right was not clearly established at the time of the officers’ conduct, entitling the officers to qualified immunity on this claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "SCOTT V. SMITH" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Paul Rundo and Robert Boman, who were charged with conspiracy to violate the Anti-Riot Act and with substantively violating the Act. The indictment alleges that Rundo is a founding member of the "Rise Above Movement" (RAM), a militant white supremacist group. Rundo and Boman, along with other RAM members, attended several political rallies where they violently attacked counter-protesters. The indictment details their involvement in rallies in Huntington Beach, Berkeley, San Bernardino, and Charlottesville, where they engaged in organized violence and later boasted about their actions online.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed the indictment, finding the Anti-Riot Act unconstitutional due to facial overbreadth under the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the Act was not facially overbroad except for certain severable portions. On remand, the district court dismissed the indictment again, this time based on a claim of selective prosecution. The district court concluded that the government selectively prosecuted RAM members while ignoring the violence of Antifa and related far-left groups, suggesting that the prosecution was based on the offensive nature of RAM's speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that Rundo did not meet his burden to demonstrate that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted and that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive. The court found that the district court erred by comparing collective conduct to individual conduct and by holding that individual Antifa members were similarly situated to Rundo. The Ninth Circuit also held that Rundo failed to show that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive, noting that timing and other factors cited by the district court were insufficient. The court reinstated the indictment and remanded the case for trial. View "USA V. RUNDO" on Justia Law

Vincent Bell, a pretrial detainee with an amputated right leg, alleged that deputies used excessive force during a cell extraction and transfer at the San Francisco Jail. Bell claimed that Sergeant Yvette Williams did not provide him with a wheelchair or other mobility device, forcing him to hop on one leg until he fell. Deputies then carried him by his arms and leg, causing him pain and minor injuries. Bell sued under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held a jury trial. The jury found in favor of Bell on his excessive force claim against Williams and his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the City and County of San Francisco. However, the jury did not find that Williams caused Bell physical or emotional harm. The jury awarded Bell $504,000 in compensatory damages against the City but not against Williams. The district court denied the defendants' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the jury's verdict on Bell's Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim and his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, finding substantial evidence supported these claims. However, the court reversed the district court's decision on Bell's Monell theory of liability, concluding that Bell did not present substantial evidence showing that the City's training was the product of deliberate indifference to a known risk. The court also vacated the jury's compensatory damages award, deeming it grossly excessive, and remanded for a remittitur or a new trial on damages. View "BELL V. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

Zachary Rosenbaum was arrested by San Jose police officers, during which a police dog allegedly bit him for over twenty seconds after he had surrendered and lay prone on his stomach with his arms outstretched. Rosenbaum sued the City of San Jose and the officers involved under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He alleged that the prolonged dog bite caused severe lacerations and permanent nerve damage to his arm.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The defendants appealed, arguing that the bodycam video contradicted Rosenbaum's allegations. However, the district court found that the video did not contradict Rosenbaum's claims and that whether the officers acted reasonably was a triable question for the jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit held that the bodycam video generally supported Rosenbaum's allegations and that a reasonable jury could find that the officers used excessive force. The court noted that it was clearly established in the Ninth Circuit that officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they allow a police dog to continue biting a suspect who has fully surrendered and is under officer control. Therefore, the court concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Rosenbaum v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Rosa Cuevas was a passenger in a car driven by Quinntin Castro, who led police on a high-speed chase. After getting stuck in mud, Castro continued trying to flee. Police officers surrounded the car, broke the window, and sent a police dog inside. Castro shot and killed the dog and injured an officer. The officers returned fire, aiming at Castro but accidentally hitting Cuevas multiple times. Castro was ultimately killed, and Cuevas survived with severe injuries. Cuevas sued the City of Tulare and the involved officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California law, alleging excessive force.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that Cuevas was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and, alternatively, that even if she were seized, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that their use of force was excessive. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and the defendants' counterclaims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Cuevas was indeed seized under clearly established Fourth Amendment law. However, it was not clearly established that the force used by the officers was excessive. The court found that none of the cases cited by Cuevas clearly established that officers violated her rights when they shot her while defensively returning fire during an active shooting. The court also noted that in excessive-force cases where police officers face a threat, the obviousness principle will rarely be available as an end-run to the requirement that law must be clearly established. Therefore, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Cuevas v. City of Tulare" on Justia Law