Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants wish to openly carry handguns in California for self-protection, but California’s current licensing regime effectively establishes a statewide ban on open carry by ordinary law-abiding Californians. Appellants brought a Second Amendment suit against the Attorney General of California in his official capacity and sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of California Penal Code sections that impose criminal penalties for unlicensed open carry. The district court denied the preliminary injunction.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard to deny Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Instead of analyzing the first factor set forth in Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)—whether Appellants were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim—the district court erroneously determined that because the public interest and balance of harms disfavored the issuance of a preliminary injunction, it was not necessary to assess Appellants’ likelihood of success on the merits. The panel set forth three requirements to guide the district court’s preliminary injunction analysis on remand. View "MARK BAIRD, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was booked into a federal corrections center in San Diego for an alleged sex offense. Given the nature of his charges, Plaintiff requested protective custody. Jail officials, however, declined his request, instead placing him in general population. Plaintiff experienced harassment by other inmates, and at some point, the inmates forced Plaintiff to exercise to the point of collapse, leading to serious medical complications requiring hospitalization. Plaintiff filed suit under Bivens against two jail classification officers in their individual capacities. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Plaintiff did not state a viable Bivens claim. The district court denied the motion. Although the district court found that Plaintiff’s claim presented a “new Bivens context,” it concluded that an extension of Bivens could be warranted in his case.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court explained that when a party seeks to bring a Bivens action, courts apply a two-step test: whether the case presents a new Bivens context, and, if so, whether there are “special factors” that counsel against extending Bivens. Applying the first step, the panel held that this case presents a new Bivens context that the Supreme Court has not recognized in its Bivens jurisprudence. Applying the second step, the panel held that special factors counsel against extending Bivens to this case. The legislature and executive were best positioned to address Plaintiff’s interest and have, in fact, provided alternative remedies through administrative review procedures offered by the Board of Prisons. Accordingly, the panel declined to overstep its constitutional role to create a new damages action. View "STEVE MARQUEZ V. C. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

Two police officers were dispatched to a gym after a man reportedly threatened gym patrons and assaulted a security guard. The suspect then violently attacked the officers and refused to stop after they repeatedly deployed their tasers. One officer eventually resorted to lethal force to end the aggression. Plaintiff, the man’s mother, filed this lawsuit against Defendant and the City of Los Angeles. She claimed a violation of Section 1983 based on the officer’s allegedly unreasonable use of deadly force. She also sought to hold the City liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services. Plaintiff further brought wrongful death actions against the officer and the City under California law. The court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims for similar reasons. Defendant appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that because Defendant did not challenge the district court’s determination that a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant violated the man’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, this appeal turned solely on the second step of the qualified immunity analysis. The panel held that Defendant’s use of deadly force, including his failure to give a warning that he would be using such force, did not violate clearly established law given the specific circumstances he encountered. The court wrote that there was no basis to conclude that Defendant’s use of force here was obviously constitutionally excessive. View "PAULETTE SMITH V. EDWARD AGDEPPA, ET AL" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and a patient at Patton State Hospital in California, he was twice attacked by a fellow patient. He sued Defendant, the psychiatrist in charge of his unit, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for injuries from the second attack, alleging that Defendant violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel determined that both tests ask whether Defendant’s conduct was reasonable, and both require Alexander to show that Defendant’s conduct was worse than negligent. The panel held that under either test, Plaintiff offered no evidence that Defendant failed to act reasonably, let alone that he was “more than negligent” in not transferring Plaintiff or the other patient after the first attack. Although Plaintiff was attacked a second time, the evidence showed that Defendant’s responses to both incidents were thorough and careful. Accordingly, the panel found no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. View "SURIE ALEXANDER V. DAU NGUYEN" on Justia Law

A settlement agreement generally ends a legal dispute. Here, it was just the beginning. In August 2015, the State of California settled a dispute with a plaintiff class of inmates over alleged constitutional violations. Eight years later, the dispute continues. In settlement, the State agreed to stop housing inmates in solitary confinement for long-term or indefinite periods based on gang affiliation. The inmates’ counsel would monitor the state’s compliance for two years. The settlement agreement and monitoring period could be extended for twelve months if the inmates demonstrated continuing constitutional violations that were either alleged in their complaint or resulted from the agreement’s reforms. The twice successfully extended the settlement agreement before the district court.   The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and dismissed in part the district court’s extensions of the settlement agreement. The panel reversed the district court’s order granting the first twelve-month extension of the settlement agreement. First, the panel held that there was no basis for extending the agreement based on the inmates’ claim that the CDCR regularly mischaracterizes the confidential information used in disciplinary hearings and fails to verify the reliability of that information. Next, the panel held that there was no basis for extending the agreement based on the inmates’ claim that CDCR unconstitutionally validates inmates as gang affiliates and fails to tell the parole board that old gang validations are flawed or unreliable. The claim was not included in, or sufficiently related to, the complaint. View "TODD ASHKER, ET AL V. GAVIN NEWSOM, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that the practice of requiring lockdown inmates to use a paging system to request law library materials—instead of physically visiting the law library— deprived him of access to the courts because the paging system required inmates to request the specific source by name, and thereby prevented him from discovering a Nevada Supreme Court decision that supported his claim for postconviction relief. Specifically, Plaintiff, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, argued that the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Nika v. State, 198 P.3d 839, 850 (Nev. 2008), resurrected his habeas claim related to a jury for the instruction on mens rea, but because of the paging system, he did not learn of Nika until seven years after it was decided, at which point he had already filed three unsuccessful habeas petitions. Upon discovering Nika, Plaintiff filed additional petitions in 2016 and 2019, which were denied.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a claim that the prison officials denied him meaningful access to the courts under the First Amendment. The panel held that because Plaintiff could not show actual injury—the hindrance of a nonfrivolous underlying legal claim—he lacked standing. Plaintiff offered no reason, beyond speculation, to think that the Nevada courts would have reached a different decision had he filed a habeas claim within a year of Nika instead of seven years later. His habeas claim would have failed no matter when it was raised. View "BRENDAN NASBY V. STATE OF NEVADA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff on behalf of herself and her five minor children, appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the individual defendant police officers and the City and County of San Francisco (“Defendants”).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants—individual police officers and the City and County of San Francisco— on Plaintiff’s federal claims based on qualified immunity; remanded to the district court Plaintiff’s state law claims for false arrest and negligence; affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on the remaining state law claims; and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to recuse. The panel first considered whether there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under the three statutes cited by Defendants. The panel held that there was a jury question whether officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. There were some facts, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, that suggest Defendants may have had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.   However, Plaintiff’s federal claims are still subject to qualified immunity. In applying the qualified immunity analysis to claims of unlawful arrest, there is a two-step inquiry: whether there was probable cause for the arrest and whether reasonable officers could disagree as to the legality of the arrest. The panel held that although a reasonable jury could find that Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because, even construing all facts in Plaintiff’s favor, the law did not clearly establish that probable cause was lacking View "KIRSTIN JOHNSON, ET AL V. KIERSTIE BARR, ET AL" on Justia Law

Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, Idaho Code §§ 33-6201–06 (2020) (the “Act”), a first-of-its-kind categorical ban on the participation of transgender women and girls in women’s student athletics. Elite athletic regulatory bodies also had policies allowing transgender women athletes to compete if they met certain criteria. The Act, however, bars all transgender girls and women from participating in, or even trying out for, public school female sports teams at every age. At issue is whether the federal district court for the District of Idaho abused its discretion in August 2020 when it preliminarily enjoined the Act, holding that it likely violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Act subjects only women and girls who wish to participate in public school athletic competitions to an intrusive sex verification process and categorically bans transgender women and girls at all levels, regardless of whether they have gone through puberty or hormone therapy, from competing on female, women, or girls teams, and because the State of Idaho failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating that the Act is substantially related to its asserted interests in sex equality and opportunity for women athletes, the panel held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim. View "LINDSAY HECOX, ET AL V. BRADLEY LITTLE, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested for murder and held for almost four years before the charges against him were dismissed, months after another person confessed to the crime. Years later, Plaintiff then sued the County of Riverside and various County officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming that they had violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by suppressing the separate confession. The district court denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the Brady claim.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, without prejudice to Parker, asserting a different due process claim. A Brady violation requires that the withheld evidence have a reasonable probability of affecting a judicial proceeding, and no such proceeding was affected here. The panel held that Plaintiff could not show prejudice from the nondisclosure of the confession. A Brady violation requires that the withheld evidence have a reasonable probability of affecting a judicial proceeding. Plaintiff did not state a Brady claim because he did not assert the nondisclosure would have changed the result of any proceeding in his criminal case. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the prejudice inquiry should be whether the withheld evidence had a reasonable probability of affecting counsel’s strategy. The panel noted that no court has adopted Plaintiff’s proposed rule, and most other courts require a conviction to establish prejudice. Moreover, here, the cause of Plaintiff’s continued detention was not the suppression of the confession, but the District Attorney’s continued prosecution even after receiving the confession. View "ROGER PARKER V. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order dismissing his First and Eighth Amendment claims brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff alleged that he faced harassment, retaliation, and physical harm. Relevant here, he alleged that prison officer Lieutenant Carmen Herrera repeatedly threatened him, denied him law library access, and assaulted him several times, causing a broken arm and wrist. Plaintiff also alleged that physician’s assistant Jose Esquetini refused to treat his broken bones or take x-rays for six weeks to cover up Herrera’s assaults. Chambers asserts that he was then assaulted by Officer Enrique Velez, who allegedly sprayed him in the mouth and face with mace.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s order. Affirming the dismissal of the First Amendment retaliation claim, the panel agreed with Plaintiff that the Supreme Court’s decision in Egbert v. Boule explicitly disavowed any Bivens claims based on First Amendment retaliation. The panel held that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim failed to state a claim under Egbert. The panel held that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim similarly failed under Bivens, but dismissal of that claim should be with prejudice because even plausible allegations could not constitute a Bivens claim for excessive force under Egbert, and amendment would be futile. The panel determined that it was unclear whether the Bivens claim was viable because the plaintiff failed to allege any facts about his injuries, examination, or treatment. View "ROSCOE CHAMBERS V. C. HERRERA, ET AL" on Justia Law