Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Portland, alleging that Portland's pre-towing notice was inadequate under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), rather than Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), to analyze plaintiff's adequacy of notice claim. The panel first reiterated a settled principle: Due process requires that individualized notice be given before an illegally parked car is towed unless the state has a "strong justification" for not doing so. In this case, the district court did not consider the differences between Mullane and Mathews, but relied on a non-precedential memorandum disposition instead. The panel held that no reason appears why Mullane should not govern the adequacy of pre-towing notice, because it governs the adequacy of notice in other contexts. Therefore, the panel remanded for the district court to apply Mullane's "reasonably calculated" standard and for further proceedings. View "Grimm v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in an action challenging Arizona Revised Statute 5-112(U). Section 5-112(U) requires, among other things, that any simulcast of live horseracing into Arizona that originates outside the state "must be offered to each commercial live-racing permittee … and additional wagering facility" in the state.The panel held that the Interstate Horse Racing Act of 1978 (IHA) does not preempt section 5-112(U). The panel also held that Monarch, a simulcast purchaser and sales agent for racetracks, and Laurel Park, a Maryland racetrack whose races Monarch simulcasts, had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The panel explained that the IHA does not address how the states can regulate simulcasts, and the Arizona statute does not address Laurel Park's statutory right to consent before interstate wagering on its races can be conducted. Therefore, it is not facially impossible to comply with both laws. Furthermore, the Arizona statute does not frustrate the intent of the IHA.The panel rejected plaintiffs' contention that section 5-112(U) is an unconstitutional regulation on commercial speech and a forbidden content-based restriction; rejected plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment and Due Process challenges; held that the Arizona statute does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause; and held that the statute did not give rise to a Contract Clause claim. View "Monarch Content Management LLC v. Arizona Department of Gaming" on Justia Law

Defendant filed an emergency motion to stay his execution pending appeal of the denial of his motion to strike his execution warrant, vacate his execution, and enjoin violation of the district court's original judgment. Defendant argues that he is entitled to a stay pending appeal of the district court's order because the district court erred in denying his motion for injunctive relief.The Ninth Circuit denied the motion and held that defendant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that inconsistencies between the BOP's protocol for implementing his execution and Arizona's procedures violate the judgment and the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), or that it is probable that he would suffer an irreparable injury in the absence of the stay. In this case, defendant identifies six purported inconsistencies between the BOP's execution protocol and the procedures in the Department Order Manual. The panel held that the BOP's protocol and the Department Order Manual procedures on which defendant relies are largely indistinguishable. To the extent there is any difference between the federal and Arizona procedures with respect to the first four examples, the BOP has provided a declaration certifying that it will comply with those procedures. Furthermore, as to the fifth and sixth examples, the BOP has complied with the Department Order Manual's procedures. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition challenging his California conviction and death sentence for first degree murder and attempted rape. Over petitioner's objection, the trial court allowed the prosecution to present evidence of an unadjudicated murder and rape in Los Angeles County. The prosecution then relied on this "other acts evidence" to show the identity of the victim's killer and intent to commit rape and to kill.The panel held that the state court made a crucial erroneous factual determination in linking the two crimes and apparently failed to consider the entire record. Therefore, the California Supreme Court's decision finding no due process violation was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The panel also held that the admission of the evidence constituted a due process violation that prejudiced petitioner. Accordingly, the panel remanded with instructions to issue a conditional writ of habeas corpus. View "Kipp v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas corpus relief challenging petitioners' conviction and death sentence for first-degree murder, forcible rape, and robbery.The panel held that any constitutional error in admitting petitioner's reference to "Satan" was harmless at both the guilt and penalty phases, and thus rejected petitioner's First Amendment argument under Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S 159 (1992). The panel also held that because the admission of the Satan references could not have had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, petitioner cannot meet the higher Strickland standard of prejudice on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Furthermore, the district court properly denied petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence regarding his life. Finally, weighing the overwhelming weight of the aggravating evidence against the purported juror misconduct, the panel held that any misconduct was harmless. View "Kipp v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of petitioner's federal habeas petition and his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment and amend his habeas petition to add a new claim. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and street terrorism.In regard to the habeas petition, the panel applied the deferential standard in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and held that the state court's conclusion that petitioner's statements were voluntary was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Under the totality of the circumstances, petitioner was advised of his Miranda rights; the state court did not unreasonably conclude that petitioner was sixteen years old and considered his age, experience, and maturity as part of the totality of the circumstances of his confession; and the state court did not unreasonably conclude that the circumstances of the interview were not coercive. Furthermore, the video recording of the interview refutes petitioner's argument that those tactics overbore his will and rendered his confession involuntary. In regard to the Rule 60(b) motion, the panel held that the district court properly denied that motion as an unauthorized second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). View "Balbuena v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

California Government Code 32310, which bans possession of large capacity magazines (LCMs) that hold more than ten rounds of ammunition, violates the Second Amendment.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs who brought suit challenging section 32310. The panel applied a two-prong test to determine whether firearm regulations violate the Second Amendment. First, the panel held that section 32310 burdens protected conduct because firearm magazines are protected arms under the Second Amendment; LCMs are not unusual arms; LCM prohibitions are not longstanding regulations and do not enjoy a presumption of lawfulness; and there is no persuasive historical evidence in the record showing LCM possession falls outside the ambit of Second Amendment protection.Second, the panel held that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard to apply where section 32310 strikes at the core right of law-abiding citizens to self-defend by banning LCM possession within the home; section 32310 substantially burdens core Second Amendment rights; decisions in other circuits are distinguishable; and Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale does not obligate the panel to apply intermediate scrutiny. Although the state has compelling interests in preventing and mitigating gun violence, the panel held that section 32310 was not narrowly tailored to achieve such interests. Finally, even if intermediate scrutiny applied, section 32310 would still fail under the more lenient standard. View "Duncan v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment against plaintiff's Title VII lawsuit. The panel held that the undisputed facts clearly show that plaintiff was Castle's independent contractor and thus not entitled to Title VII protections. In this case, plaintiff was paid, taxed, and received benefits like an independent contractor; plaintiff's obligations to Castle were limited, providing him the freedom to run his own private practice; the contracts between Castle and plaintiff described him as an independent contractor. The panel stated that other factors also weighed in favor of plaintiff being an independent contractor. View "Henry v. Adventist Health Castle Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a police officer and a Justice of the Peace under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating his Fourth Amendment rights. In 2017, when plaintiff was a witness in a courtroom, another witness testified that plaintiff was "not a legal citizen." Based on that statement, the Justice of the Peace presiding over the hearing spoke with the officer and the officer placed plaintiff in handcuffs, searched plaintiff's person, and escorted him to a patrol car outside the courthouse. While plaintiff was waiting in the back of the patrol car, the officer ran a warrants check on plaintiff that came back clean. The officer then contacted ICE officials and plaintiff was taken to an ICE facility, where he remained in custody for three months.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Under Martinez-Medina v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011), the panel held that, unlike entry into the United States -- which is a crime under 8 U.S.C. 1325 -- illegal presence is not a crime. Under Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2012), the panel held that because mere unauthorized presence is not a criminal matter, suspicion of unauthorized presence alone does not give rise to an inference that criminal activity is afoot. In this case, the officer stopped and arrested plaintiff without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, respectively, and the Justice of the Peace integrally participated in his actions. Furthermore, plaintiff's right to be free from unlawful stops in this circumstance has been established since at least 2012, by which time both Melendres and Martinez-Medina were law of the circuit. View "Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit dismissed, based on lack of appellate jurisdiction, defendants' appeal of the district court's denial of summary judgment, which resulted in a denial of qualified immunity, and the district court's denial to reconsider the summary judgment order. In this case, defendants grounded their motion for reconsideration in the district court ostensibly on both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). At oral argument, defendants acknowledged that their motion for reconsideration was brought under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment.The panel held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal of the summary judgment order in this case, because it is untimely where there is no dispute that the appeal was filed nearly a year after the underlying summary judgment order. Furthermore, the filing of an untimely motion will not toll the running of the appeal period. The panel also held that it lacked jurisdiction over the order denying the Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration of a denial of qualified immunity, where it did not have jurisdiction over the appeal of the underlying order. Finally, the panel declined to exercise its discretion to award plaintiff attorney's fees for this appeal. View "Hanson v. Shubert" on Justia Law