Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of petitioner's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion to reopen proceedings on his habeas corpus petition. Petitioner sought to invalidate his plea of "guilty but mentally ill." Three years after Nevada eliminated the insanity defense, petitioner pleaded guilty but mentally ill to lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen.The panel held that petitioner's motion was timely under Rule 60(b)(6) rather than any of Rule 60(b)'s other grounds for relief. Furthermore, in Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2016), the panel clarified that district courts can indeed stay and abey entirely unexhausted habeas petitions. The panel also held that petitioner presented extraordinary circumstances warranting re-opening the final judgment. In this case, the six Phelps factors supported reconsideration of the district court's 2009 judgment and the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. On remand, petitioner may request the district court to stay his petition while he returns to state court to exhaust his federal constitutional claims. View "Bynoe v. Baca" on Justia Law

Scafidi was charged with sexual assault. During the proceedings, state courts suppressed evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant and determined that the police failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence. Charges were dismissed on the state’s motion. Scafidi brought a federal civil rights claim against the Las Vegas Metro Police Department, officers, a crime scene investigator, and the nurse who performed a sexual assault exam on the alleged victim. He contends that the officers staged an incriminating crime scene photo by moving his sleeping medications from the hotel bathroom drawer into a mint container by his clothes in the bedroom; falsely stated in a warrant application that the alleged victim’s sexual assault exam revealed sexual assault when it only revealed sexual intercourse; threatened him for asserting his constitutional rights; and made racially derogatory remarks. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that Scafidi was precluded from relitigating the state justice of the peace’s determination at a preliminary hearing that there was probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The district court erred by concluding that the probable cause determination precluded Scafidi from asserting in his federal suit that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest and detain him. His allegations that the defendants fabricated evidence or undertook other wrongful conduct in bad faith created a triable issue of material fact concerning probable cause, pursuant to Nevada and Ninth Circuit precedent. View "Scafidi v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action alleging that police officers used unreasonable deadly force when they shot and killed Junef Monzon following a high-speed chase. The panel held that the officers' use of deadly force was objectively reasonable in this dynamic and urgent situation, where officers were faced with the immediate threat of significant physical harm. The panel explained that the severity of Monzon's crime weighed in favor of the use of force; Monzon posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers when he ignored commands to stop the van and drove near, toward, and amongst the officers on foot; and Monzon's driving endangered the officers and left them with only seconds to consider less severe alternatives.The panel also held that a reasonable officer in the position of the individual defendant officers would have probable cause to believe that Monzon posed an immediate threat to the safety of one or more of the other officers or himself. Furthermore, even if the officers' use of deadly force was unreasonable, the officers did not violate a clearly established right. The panel rejected claims of failure to train and state law claims. View "Monzon v. City of Murrieta" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action challenging a Los Angeles parking ordinance as violating the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. Under the ordinance, a person who overstays a metered parking spot faces a fine of anywhere from $63 to $181, depending on her promptness of payment.The Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies to municipal parking fines. The panel extended the four-factor analysis in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336–37 (1998), to govern municipal fines. Applying the Bajakajian factors, the panel held that the City's initial parking fine of $63 is not grossly disproportional to the underlying offense of overstaying the time at a parking space. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on this issue. However, the panel held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the City to the late payment penalty of $63. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded for the district court to determine under Bajakajian whether the City's late fee runs afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause. View "Pimental v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Arizona's Governor appealed the district court's declaratory judgment interpreting the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act of 1910. The district court declared that even after a 1999 amendment, the Enabling Act continues to require congressional consent to any changes to the state constitution affecting the investment or distribution of assets in Arizona's land trust for public schools.The Ninth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter this judgment. The panel held that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge either past or future changes to the distribution formula. In this case, plaintiff stipulated that the only injury particular to him is his individual belief that the state is not obeying federal law, but such an injury is not concrete for Article III standing. The panel also held that, even if this case had initially presented a justiciable controversy, that controversy ended when Congress consented to the distribution formula in Proposition 123. View "Pierce v. Ducey" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and of state law arising from the suspension and termination of his employment. In this case, plaintiff was terminated from his position as an economics professor after the university concluded that plaintiff had sexually harassed his former student.The panel held that SCU, as a private university, does not become a state actor merely by virtue of being required by generally applicable civil rights laws to ameliorate sex (or any other form of) discrimination in educational activities as a condition of receiving state funding. Furthermore, the receipt of federal and state funds conditioned on compliance with anti-discrimination laws is insufficient to convert private conduct into state action. View "Heineke v. Santa Clara University" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's judgment in favor of the United States, the FBI, and federal officials in a putative class action alleging that an FBI investigation involved unlawful searches and anti-Muslim discrimination; denied a petition for panel rehearing; and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc.Plaintiffs, three Muslim residents of California, filed a putative class action against Government Defendants and Agent Defendants, alleging that the FBI paid a confidential informant to conduct a covert surveillance program that gathered information about Muslims based solely on their religious identity. Plaintiffs argued that the investigation involved unlawful searches and anti-Muslim discrimination, in violation of eleven constitutional and statutory causes of action.The panel held that some of the claims dismissed on state secrets grounds should not have been dismissed outright. Rather, the district court should have reviewed any state secrets evidence necessary for a determination of whether the alleged surveillance was unlawful following the secrecy protective procedure in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The panel held that the Fourth Amendment injunctive relief claim against the official-capacity defendants should not have been dismissed, because expungement relief was available under the Constitution to remedy the alleged constitutional violations. The panel declined to address whether plaintiffs' Bivens claim remained available after the Supreme Court's decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), and thus remanded for the district court to determine whether a Bivens remedy was appropriate for any Fourth Amendment claim against the Agent Defendants. The panel held that some of plaintiffs' remaining allegations state a claim while others do not. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the substantively stated claims. View "Fazaga v. FBI" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of first degree murder. Petitioner moved for a new trial based on his discovery that a juror had made a false representation during voir dire.The panel applied review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), holding that it was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude that McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984), which permits a new trial where a juror's lies during voir dire hide a fact that would have permitted the juror to be stricken for cause, accommodates a prejudice analysis. Because the Supreme Court has not given explicit direction as to whether McDonough requires a criminal defendant to show prejudice to obtain a new trial, and because the state court's interpretation is consistent with many other courts' interpretations, the panel cannot hold that the state court's interpretation was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. View "Scott v. Arnold" on Justia Law

IMDb filed suit challenging Assembly Bill 1687, which prohibits a specified category of websites from publishing the ages and dates of birth of entertainment industry professionals. The district court concluded that the statute violated IMDb's First Amendment speech rights and other constitutional and statutory provisions, and enjoined California's enforcement of the statute.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that, on its face, AB 1687 prohibits the publication of specific content, by specific speakers. Therefore, the panel held that it is a content-based restriction on speech that is subject to strict scrutiny. In this case, California and the Screen Actors Guild failed to demonstrate that AB 1687 is the least restrictive means and narrowly tailored to accomplish the goal of reducing incidents of age discrimination. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the parties’ discovery requests. View "IMDb.com, Inc. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

An order denying a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70(a) motion to enforce a conditional writ of habeas corpus pertains to the district court's adjudication of the habeas petition, and 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(A) therefore requires a habeas petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) in order to appeal the district court's order.The Ninth Circuit denied petitioner a COA and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his appeal from the district court's order denying his motion under Rule 70(a) to enforce the district court's conditional writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner was convicted, after a jury trial, of aggravated kidnapping, assault with a weapon, and assault on a peace officer, and sentenced to 100 years in prison with 20 years suspended. In this case, petitioner failed to make the requisite showing that reasonable jurists would debate whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that the State complied with the conditional writ and thus in denying petitioner's Rule 70(a) motion. Consequently, petitioner failed to make a substantial showing under section 2253(c)(2) to permit the issuance of a COA. View "Rose v. Guyer" on Justia Law