Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The en banc court reversed and remanded the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in an action challenging the City and County's Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Warning Ordinance. The Ordinance requires health warnings on advertisements for certain sugar-sweetened beverages.The en banc court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018), and held that plaintiffs will likely succeed on the merits of their claim that the Ordinance was an unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirement that might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech. The en banc court also held that the remaining injunction factors weighed in plaintiffs' favor. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction. View "American Beverage Assoc. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged California Air Resources Board regulations regarding the first Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), which went into effect in 2011; the LCFS as amended in 2012; and the LCFS which replaced the first LCFS in 2015. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs' challenges to previous versions of the LCFS have been made moot by their repeal. The panel affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims against the present version of the LCFS as largely precluded by the panel's decision in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). The panel also held that plaintiffs' extraterritoriality claims against the 2015 LCFS were precluded by the law of the case and by recent circuit precedent in Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O'Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2018). Finally, the LCFS did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce in its treatment of ethanol and crude oil, and did not purposefully discriminate against out-of-state ethanol. View "Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the County and the City in state court, alleging violations of his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. In 1972, plaintiff was convicted of 28 counts of felony murder for causing a deadly fire at a Tucson hotel. In 2013, after plaintiff presented newly discovered evidence that arson did not cause the hotel fire, he entered into a plea agreement where the original convictions were vacated and he pleaded no contest to the same counts, was resentenced to time served, and released from prison. After the City removed the case to federal court, the district court granted in part and denied in part the County's motion to dismiss.The Ninth Circuit exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) to deny the County's application for permission to appeal the denial of qualified immunity; held that section 1291's collateral order doctrine did not apply to the County's appeal and thus the panel did not have jurisdiction over it; and dismissed the County's appeal.The panel held that a plaintiff in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action may not recover incarceration-related damages for any period of incarceration supported by a valid, unchallenged conviction and sentence. Exercising its discretion under section 1292(b), the panel held that plaintiff's valid 2013 conviction and sentence were the sole legal causes of his incarceration, and thus he could not recover damages for wrongful incarceration. View "Taylor v. County of Pima" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied as unnecessary petitioner's application to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. Petitioner argued that his petition was not second or successive, but rather a first petition challenging a new judgment that added credit for the time he served before sentencing.The panel held that Gonzalez v. Sherman, 873 F.3d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 2017), which held that, under California law, a state court's amended judgment awarding a defendant credit for time served constituted a new judgment, applied to Nevada law. Therefore, petitioner's habeas petition was the first petition challenging his amended judgment. View "Turner v. Baker" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action alleging that Domino's Pizza's website and mobile application were not fully accessible to a blind or visually impaired person, in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.The panel held that the ADA applied to Domino's website and app, a place of public accommodation, which connected customers to the goods and services of Domino's physical restaurants. The panel also held that imposing liability on Domino's under the ADA would not violate the company's Fourth Amendment right to due process where the statute was not impermissibly vague, Domino's had received fair notice of compliance, and plaintiff did not seek to impose liability on Domino's for failure to comply with the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.0, private industry standards for website accessibility. Furthermore, the lack of specific regulations did not eliminate Domino's statutory duty. Finally, the panel held that the district court erred by applying the prudential doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the district court's ruling unduly delayed the resolution of an issue that could be decided by the court. View "Robles v. Domino's Pizza, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an order withdrawing the prior opinion and filed a new opinion affirming the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner's guilt-phase claims regarding his first degree murder convictions.The panel held that, although trial counsel was constitutionally deficient by failing to present a diminished capacity defense based on mental illness, petitioner did not suffer any prejudice. In this case, the evidence of petitioner's specific intent to rape and kill both victims was overwhelming when compared to the relatively weak diminished capacity evidence that counsel could have presented, but failed to present. The panel also held that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to subpoena a specific witness nor was petitioner prejudiced. View "Hernandez v. Chappell" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the sheriff in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the sheriff violated plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to provide him with a bed during his three-and-a-half day stay at an inmate reception center (IRC). The panel held that the exigent circumstance of inmate disturbances and lockdowns justified denying plaintiff a bed for his three-and-a-half day stay.Even if a Fourteenth Amendment violation did occur, the district court correctly held that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity because the right asserted by plaintiff—not being forced to sleep on the floor during a jail lockdown—was not clearly established at the time of the events. Finally, plaintiff failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting his various ancillary claims. View "Olivier v. Baca" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against social workers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and DSHS for negligence after two young boys were murdered by their father during a social-worker-supervised visit during dependency proceedings brought by DSHS. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the social workers, holding that there was insufficient evidence to show that the social workers recognized, or should have recognized, an objective substantial risk that the father would physically harm his sons. In this case, the social workers did not act with deliberate indifference to the boys' liberty interests and they were entitled to qualified immunity.The panel reversed the district court's dismissal of the negligence claims against DSHS, holding that material issues of fact existed regarding whether DSHS used reasonable care to avoid placing the boys in harm's way and whether DSHS's actions proximately caused the boys to be placed in harm's way. View "Cox v. Washington" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possessing a firearm while being an alien unlawfully in the United States. The panel assumed without deciding that unlawful aliens in the United States held some degree of rights under the Second Amendment and held that 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5) is constitutional under intermediate scrutiny. The panel held that the government's interests in controlling crime and ensuring public safety are promoted by keeping firearms out of the hands of unlawful aliens—who are subject to removal, are difficult to monitor due to an inherent incentive to falsify information and evade law enforcement, and have already shown they are unable or unwilling to conform their conduct to the laws of this country. View "United States v. Manuel Torres" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the state in an action brought by LL Liquor, claiming that Montana's Senate Bill 193 impaired the company's contract to purchase liquor with the Montana Department of Revenue, in violation of the Contracts Clause. Montana's Senate Bill 193 restructured the formula for calculating the rate at which state-approved agency franchise stores could purchase liquor from the state.The panel held that Montana's Senate Bill 193, which applied a uniform commission structure to all franchise stores in the state, did not give rise to a Contracts Clause claim by LL Liquor against the state. In this case, the state did not impair its contractual obligation within the meaning of the Contracts Clause because it did not eliminate LL Liquor's remedy for breach of its contract with the state. View "LL Liquor, Inc. v. Montana" on Justia Law