Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A class of Netflix DVD subscribers filed a consolidated amended class action against Netflix and Walmart, claiming that a promotion agreement whereby Walmart transferred its online DVD-rental subscribers to Netflix and Netflix agreed to promote Walmart’s DVD sales business was anti-competitive. The district court approved of a settlement between Walmart and the class of Netflix subscribers whereby Walmart agreed to pay a total amount of $27,250,000. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) approving the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (2) certifying the settlement class; and (3) awarding attorneys’ fees of twenty-five percent of the overall settlement fund. View "Frank v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals representing a class of Netflix subscribers, contended that a promotion agreement whereby Walmart transferred its online DVD-rental subscribers to Netflix and Netflix agreed to promote Walmart’s DVD sales business violated the Sherman Act by illegally allocating and monopolizing the online DVD rental market. The district court granted summary judgment for Netflix and awarded Netflix $710,194 in costs. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether they suffered antitrust in-jury-in-fact on a theory that they paid supracompetitive prices for their DVD-rental subscriptions because Netflix would have reduced its subscription price but for its allegedly anticompetitive product; and (2) affirmed in part and reversed in part the award of costs, holding that certain charges for “data upload” and “keywording” were not recoverable as costs for making copies under 28 U.S.C. 1920(4). Remanded for consideration of whether costs were properly awarded for “professional services.” View "Resnick v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), against Knight, alleging that Knight misclassified them as independent contractors and asserting other labor law violations. Knight removed to federal court, but the district court granted plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court. The district court concluded that Knight did not meet its burden of proof to establish the amount in controversy because all of Knight's calculations relied on a flawed assumption that all drivers worked 50 weeks a year. The court held in Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., filed simultaneously with this opinion, that when the defendant relies on a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions to satisfy its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, the chain of reasoning and its underlying assumptions must be reasonable. Applying Ibarra, the court concluded that because defendants relied on a reasonable chain of logic and presented sufficient evidence to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, defendants have met their burden of proof. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "LaCross v. Knight Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against his former employer, Manheim, alleging violations of the California Labor Code. Manheim removed the case to federal court and the district court remanded to state court, concluding that Manheim's proof of the $5 million amount in controversy requirement was inadequate. At issue was what a defendant seeking removal must produce to prove the amount-in-controversy requirement under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), when the complaint does not include a facially apparent amount in controversy or the plaintiff may have understated the true amount in controversy. The court concluded that when " a defendant's assertion of the amount in controversy is challenged... both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied." A damages assessment may require a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions and such assumptions must be based on reasonable ground. Because the complaint does not allege that Manheim universally, on each and every shift, violates labor laws by not giving rest and meal breaks, Manheim bears the burden to show that its estimated amount in controversy relied on reasonable assumptions. A remand is necessary to allow both sides to submit evidence related to the contested amount in controversy. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ibarra v. Manheim Investment, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit against Old Republic, a company that sells home warranty plans, alleging that Old Republic arbitrarily denied claims made by him and a putative class of similarly situated policyholders of Old Republic plans, or otherwise cheated him and this class out of benefits owed under their policies. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's orders denying his motion for class certification, denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint, and granting Old Republic's motion for partial summary judgment. The court did not reach the merits of the district court's order because the appeal is moot. The parties settled all of plaintiff's claims and plaintiff expressly released all of his claims against Old Republic. Applying Narouz v. Charter Commc'sn, the court concluded that the appeal is moot because plaintiff has no financial interest or other personal interest whatsoever in class certification. View "Campion v. Old Republic Protection Co." on Justia Law

IntelliGender sold and advertised the IntelliGender Prediction Test as an accurate predictor of a fetus's gender using the mother's urine sample. The district court approved a Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), settlement between a nationwide certified class of purchasers of the Test and IntelliGender. The State subsequently filed an enforcement action against IntelliGender under the State's Unfair Competition and False Advertising Laws, largely based on the same claims as the class action. The court concluded that the district court correctly denied IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's enforcement action in its entirety where IntelliGender had not met its burden of showing that the CAFA class action settlement could bind the State in its sovereign capacity, where it asserted both public and private interests. The court agreed that a CAFA class action settlement, though approved by the district court, does not act as res judicata against the State in its sovereign capacity, even though many of the same claims are included in both actions. Because the State action is brought on behalf of the people, it implicates the public's interests as well as private interests, and therefore the remedial provisions sweep much more broadly. The court concluded, however, that the State is precluded from seeking the same relief sought in the CAFA class action where IntelliGender provided notice to the appropriate parties of the class action and the State chose not to participate. Therefore, the district court erred in denying IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's claims for restitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "State of California v. IntelliGender" on Justia Law

Allstate appealed the district court's grant of class certification to plaintiff and 800 other Allstate employees in California who alleged that Allstate has a practice or unofficial policy of requiring its claims adjusters to work unpaid off-the-clock overtime in violation of California law. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion determining that three common questions contained the "glue" necessary to say that "examination of all the class members' claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question[s]" raised by the plaintiffs' complaint. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering the class certification order and did not violate Allstate's due process rights where the order preserved Allstate's opportunity to present individualized defenses to damages claims and the district court's approval of statistical sampling among class members to determine liability did not violate Allstate's due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs, former FedEx drivers, represented two classes of plaintiffs comprising approximately 363 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in Oregon at any time between 1999 and 2009. Plaintiff class members worked for FedEx's two operating divisions, FedEx Ground and FedEx Home Delivery. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under Oregon law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. In a consolidated appeal, plaintiffs claimed that "FedEx improperly classified its drivers as independent contractors, thereby forcing them to incur business expenses and depriving them of benefits otherwise owed to employees" under Oregon law. The Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs, and reversed the Multidistrict Litigation Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx Ground, its denial of plaintiff FedEx drivers' motion for partial summary judgment, and its certification of plaintiffs' classes insofar as they sought prospective relief. View "Slayman, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs represented a class comprising approximately 2300 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in California between 2000 and 2007. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under California law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. This appeal involved a class action originally filed in the California Superior Court in December 2005 on behalf of a class of California FedEx drivers, asserting claims for employment expenses and unpaid wages under the California Labor Code on the ground that FedEx had improperly classified the drivers as independent contractors. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), which similarly turned on the drivers' employment status. FedEx removed to the Northern District of California based on diversity. Between 2003 and 2009, similar cases were filed against FedEx in approximately forty states. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these FedEx cases for multidistrict litigation ("MDL") proceedings in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana ("the MDL Court"). Plaintiffs moved for class certification. The MDL Court certified a class for plaintiffs' claims under California law. It declined to certify plaintiffs' proposed national FMLA class. Plaintiffs in all the MDL cases moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to establish their status as employees as a matter of law. In this case, FedEx cross-moved for summary judgment. The MDL Court denied nearly all of the MDL plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and granted nearly all of FedEx's motions, holding that plaintiffs were independent contractors as a matter of law in each state where employment status was governed by common-law agency principles. The MDL Court remanded this case to the district court to resolve the drivers' claims under the FMLA. Those claims were settled, and the district court entered final judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx on the employment status issue. FedEx conditionally cross-appealed, arguing that if we reverse the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx, we should also reverse the MDL Court's class certification decision. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs were employees as a matter of law under California's right-to-control test. Accordingly, the Court reversed both the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx and its denial of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to enter summary judgment for plaintiffs on the question of employment status. View "Alexander, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Kuda Mujeyi filed a class action suit in state court asserting claims against several defendants. The case was removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). Mujeyi's claims were severed and transferred to the District of Arizona. The district court ordered plaintiff to amend her complaint to reflect the severance and she did, then she moved to remand the action to state court under one of the exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction under section 1332(d)(4). The district court granted plaintiff's motion under section 1332(d)(3), determining the citizenship of the plaintiff class by considering the class as pleaded in plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (SAC). The court concluded that, for the purpose of considering the applicability of the exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction, the district court should have determined the citizenship of the proposed plaintiff class based on plaintiff's complaint as of the date the case became removable. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.View "Doyle v. OneWest Bank, FSB" on Justia Law