Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Hawaii AG filed suit in state court against six credit card providers, alleging that each violated state law by deceptively marketing and improperly enrolling cardholders in add-on credit card products. The card providers removed to federal court and the AG moved to remand. The district court denied the motion to remand. The court concluded that the state law claims were not preempted by the National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. 85-86. The court joined the Fifth Circuit in holding that sections 85 and 86 did not completely preempt the claims, as there is a difference between alleging that certain customers are being charged too much, and alleging that they should have never been charged for the service in the first place. Therefore, the AG did not plead a completely preempted claim and the district court erred in finding federal question jurisdiction. The court agreed with its sister circuits in holding that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), does not completely preempt state law. Because the complaints unambiguously disclaimed class status, these actions cannot be removed under CAFA. There is no basis for federal jurisdiction and the cases should have been remanded to state court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "State of Hawaii v. HSBC Bank of Nevada" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit to recover unpaid overtime wages from her former employer, Bloomingdale's. The district court granted Bloomingdale's motion to compel arbitration, determining that shortly after being hired by Bloomingdale's, plaintiff entered into a valid, written arbitration agreement and that all of her claims fell within the scope of that agreement. The court concluded that plaintiff had the right to opt out of the arbitration agreement, and had she done so she would be free to pursue this class action in court. Having freely elected to arbitrate employment-related disputes on an individual basis, without interference from Bloomingdale's, she could not claim that enforcement of the agreement violated either the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. 101 et seq., or the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that the arbitration agreement was valid and, under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., it must be enforced according to its terms. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale's, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit alleging that Nordstrom violated various state and federal employment laws by precluding employees from bringing most class action lawsuits in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. Nordstrom, relying on the revised arbitration policy in its employee handbook, sought to compel plaintiff to submit to individual arbitration of her claims. The district court denied Nordstrom's motion to compel. The court concluded that Nordstrom satisfied the minimal requirements under California law for providing employees with reasonable notice of a change to its employee handbook, and Nordstrom was not bound to inform plaintiff that her continued employment after receiving the letter constituted acceptance of new terms of employment. Accordingly, the court concluded that Nordstrom and plaintiff entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate disputes on an individual basis. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to address the issue of unconscionably. View "Davis v. Nordstorm, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed an order certifying a class and a subclass of inmates in Arizona's prison system who claim that they are subject to systematic Eighth Amendment violations. Defendants argued that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs have demonstrated commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that plaintiffs' claims depend upon common questions of law or fact that are answerable in one stroke. Here, plaintiffs are all inmates in ADC custody and each declares that he or she is being exposed, like all other members of the putative class, to a substantial risk of serious harm by the challenged ADC policies. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not err in determining that plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality and typicality requirement of Rule 23(a). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a single injunction and declaratory judgment could provide relief to each member of the proposed class and subclass. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Parsons v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit against Coverall, a janitorial franchising company, alleging that Coverall misclassified its California franchises as independent contractors and that Coverall breached its franchise agreements. After the parties settled, a sole objector filed an objection to the proposed settlement. The court concluded that the objector presented no evidence that the district court abused its discretion in declining further adjustment from the lodestar amount; the district court acted within its proper discretion when it found that the settlement contained significant benefits for plaintiffs beyond the cash recovery, and that the award, at about the third of the lodestar amount, was reasonable; the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec. factors supported the conclusion that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate; the district court has no obligation to make explicit monetary valuations of injunctive remedies; the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement term that objectors be available for depositions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it approved the settlement agreement consistent with the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1715(b), notice requirement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's approval of the proposed class action settlement under Rule 23 and the award of attorneys' fees to the attorneys of the proposed class. View "Laguna v. Coverall North America" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, San Francisco police officers over the age of forty, performed well enough on an examination in 1998 to qualify for consideration for promotion to Assistant Inspector. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that a new policy of the Police Department abandoning the examination as basis for certain assignments worked a disparate impact based on age. The district court denied certification of a class composed of all San Francisco Police Department officers over forty who had qualified on the 1998 examination. The court reversed the district court's denial of certification for want of commonality, concluding that the district court abused its discretion because it disregarded the existence of common questions of law and fact and impermissibly addressed the merits of the class's claims. View "Stockwell v. City & Ctny. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in California state court under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Cal. Lab. Code 2698-2699.5, and then removed to district court. The issue presented on appeal was whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action. In Urbino v. Orkin Services, the court held that potential PAGA penalties against an employer may not be aggregated to meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). The remaining issue was whether a district court may instead exercise original jurisdiction over a PAGA action under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), 1453, 1711-15. The court held that PAGA was not sufficiently similar to Rule 23 to establish the original jurisdiction of a federal court under CAFA. Accordingly, the district court could not exercise jurisdiction over this removed PAGA action under CAFA. And because, in light of Urbino, there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under section 1332(a), plaintiff's motion to remand should have been granted. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the motion. View "Baumann v. Chase Investment Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Michaels on behalf of California store managers, alleging that Michaels had improperly classified the managers as exempt from overtime. After Michaels removed the case to federal district court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1453, the district court remanded back to state court. The district court concluded that the amount-in-controversy requirement was not met because plaintiffs expressly disclaimed any recovery for the class over $4,999,999.99. In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles, the Supreme Court held that attempted damages waivers, such as plaintiffs', were ineffective, and would not defeat removal under CAFA. Michaels then removed the case again under CAFA and the district court remanded on the basis that the removal ran afoul of CAFA's 30-day time limit. In the alternative, the district court held that Michaels failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that the amount-in-controversy exceeded $5,000,000. The court concluded that the case was not moot; because the two thirty-day removal periods were nonexclusive, Michael's second CAFA removal was timely; and the district court's finding that defendant failed to prove that the amount-in-controversey requirement was met was clearly erroneous under the preponderance of the evidence standard. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Rea v. Michaels Stores" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against Home Depot alleging violations of California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200; the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code 1770; and common-law theories of unjust enrichment and money had and received. Plaintiff alleged that Home Depot automatically imposed a ten percent surcharge for a damage waiver on tool rentals in California stores, and although that fee was to be optional, Home Depot failed to inform customers of their ability to decline the surcharge. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal despite plaintiff's stipulation on dismissal after the negative class action ruling. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification because the record did not show that the requirements of Rule 12(b)(3) were satisfied where common questions did not predominate over individual issues in any of plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of class certification. View "Berger v. Home Depot" on Justia Law

Capital One appealed the district court's order remanding a putative class action lawsuit to California state court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. The court concluded that there must ordinarily be facts in evidence to support a finding that two-thirds of putative class members were local state citizens, which was one of the local controversy exception's requirements, if that question was disputed before the district court. A pure inference regarding the citizenship of prospective class members may be sufficient if the class is defined as limited to citizens of the state in question, but otherwise such a finding should not be based on guesswork. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Finance, et al." on Justia Law