Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Class Action
Watkins v. Vital Pharmaceuticals
Plaintiff filed a class action suit against Vital for its distribution of ZERO IMPACT protein bars that were erroneously marketed and labeled as having little to no impact on blood sugar. On appeal, Vital challenged the district court's sua sponte order remanding the suit to state court for failure to establish the amount in controversy requirement under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1). The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the undisputed Cimino declarations were sufficient to establish that CAFA's $5 million amount in controversy requirement was met. View "Watkins v. Vital Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law
Roth, et al. v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, et al.
This case arose when plaintiff filed a state-law wage-and-hour class action naming CHA as a defendant. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's remand to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 153(c)(1). At issue was whether the two thirty-day periods described in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) were the only periods during which the defendant could remove, or if they were merely periods during which a defendant must remove if one of the thirty-day time limits was triggered. The court concluded that sections 1441 and 1446, read together, permitted a defendant to remove outside the thirty-day periods on the basis of its own information, provided that it had not run afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines. Accordingly, the court held that removal was not barred in this case and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Roth, et al. v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, et al." on Justia Law
Lopez-Valenzuela v. County of Maricopa
Plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of Arizona's Proposition 100. Proposition 100 commands that Arizona state courts could not set bail for serious felony offenses as prescribed by the legislature if the person charged has entered or remained in the United States illegally and if the proof was evident or the presumption great as to the charge. After reviewing the record, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and partial dismissal, concluding that plaintiffs have not raised triable issues of fact as to whether Proposition 100 and its implementing procedures violated the substantive and procedural due process guarantees of the United State's Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, nor whether the Proposition 100 laws were preempted by federal immigration law. The court concluded that the Arizona Legislature and Arizona voters passed the Proposition 100 laws to further the state's legitimate and compelling interest in seeing that those accused of serious state-law crimes were brought to trial. View "Lopez-Valenzuela v. County of Maricopa" on Justia Law
Harris v. Amgen
Plaintiffs, current and former employees of Amgen and AML, participated in two employer-sponsored pension plans, the Amgen Plan and the AML Plan. The Plans were employee stock-ownership plans that qualified as "eligible individual account plans" (EIAPs) under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1107(d)(3)(A). Plaintiffs filed an ERISA class action against Amgen, AML, and others after the value of Amgen common stock fell, alleging that defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA. The court concluded that defendants were not entitled to a presumption of prudence under Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., that plaintiffs have stated claims under ERISA in Counts II through VI, and that Amgen was a properly named fiduciary under the Amgen Plan. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harris v. Amgen" on Justia Law
Leyva v. Medline Industries, Inc.
Plaintiff, seeking to represent approximately 538 employees of Medline, appealed the district court's denial of class certification. The complaint asserted claims against Medline for violating California labor laws. The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong legal standard and abused its discretion when it denied class certification on the grounds that damages calculations would be individual. The district court also abused its discretion by finding that the class would be unmanageable despite the record's demonstration to the contrary. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order granting plaintiff's motion for class certification. View "Leyva v. Medline Industries, Inc." on Justia Law
In re: HP Inkjet Printer Litigation
Objectors appealed the district court's orders granting final approval to a class action settlement between HP and a nationwide class of consumers who purchased certain HP inkjet printers between certain dates. Under section 1712 of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1712(a)-(c), a district court could not award attorneys' fees to class counsel that were "attributable to" an award of coupons without first considering the redemption value of the coupons. A district court could, however, award lodestar fees to compensate class counsel for any non-coupon relief they obtained, such as injunctive relief. Because the attorneys' fees award in this case violated section 1712, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re: HP Inkjet Printer Litigation" on Justia Law
Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions
This case stemmed from plaintiffs' allegations that defendants issued consumer credit reports with negative entries for debts already discharged in bankruptcy. On appeal, plaintiffs and objectors challenged the district court's approval of a class-action settlement that granted incentive awards to the class representatives for their services to the class. The settlement agreement conditioned payment of incentive awards on the class representatives' support for the settlement. These conditional incentive awards caused the interests of the class representatives to diverge from the interests of the class because the settlement agreement told class representatives that they would not receive incentive awards unless they supported the settlement. Moreover, the conditional incentive awards significantly exceeded in amount what absent class members could expect to get upon settlement approval. Because these circumstances created a patent divergence of interests between the named representatives and the class, the court concluded that the class representatives and class counsel did not adequately represent the absent class members. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's approval of the settlement. View "Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions" on Justia Law
McDaniel, et al v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC, et al
Plaintiffs, former employees of brokerage firms, filed four class actions challenging California's forced-patronage statute, section 450(a) of the California Labor Code. At issue was whether federal securities law preempted the enforcement of California's forced-patronage statute against brokerage houses that forbid their employees from opening outside trading accounts. The court affirmed the judgment and concluded that the district court correctly determined that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78o(g), and related self-regulatory organizations (SROs) rules preempted plaintiffs' forced-patronage suits. View "McDaniel, et al v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC, et al" on Justia Law
Kuxhausen v. BMW Financial Services NA LLC
This case arose when plaintiff filed a class action complaint against Crevier Motors and BMW, asserting ten California causes of action. At issue was whether BMW timely removed this proposed class action involving Crevier, a California automobile dealership, to federal court by invoking the diversity jurisdiction provision of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). Because nothing in plaintiff's complaint indicated that the amount demanded by each putative class member exceeded $25,000, it fell short of triggering the removal clock under 28 U.S.C. 1446(b). The court rejected plaintiff's remaining arguments. Because BMW timely removed under section 1446(b), the court reversed the district court's remand of plaintiff's proposed class action to Orange County Superior Court. In light of that conclusion, the court did not decide whether to join the other circuits in recognizing a "revival exception," which according to BMW gave it another thirty days to remove when plaintiff expanded her suit from one strictly against Crevier to one against all California-BMW dealerships. View "Kuxhausen v. BMW Financial Services NA LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Class Action, U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
Faulkner v. ADT Security Services, Inc., et al
Plaintiff, a California resident, brought a putative class action against ADT in California Superior Court, alleging that ADT recorded his telephone conversation with an ADT representative without his consent in violation of Section 632 of California's invasion of privacy law, Cal. Penal Code 632. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on diversity grounds. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff's pleadings failed to state a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted. The court remanded, however, in order to give plaintiff an opportunity to seek to amend his complaint to successfully plead a cause of action under the federal standards set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. View "Faulkner v. ADT Security Services, Inc., et al" on Justia Law