Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, and drivers similarly situated, filed a class action against Affinity alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and California laws, including failure to pay overtime, failure to pay wages, improper charges for workers' compensation insurance, and the unfair business practice of wrongfully classifying California drivers. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court, after applying California's choice of law framework, erred when it concluded that Georgia law applied. The district court concluded that under Georgia law there was a presumption of independent contractor status and to rebut this presumption, plaintiff must establish that an employer-employee relationship existed. The district court found that plaintiff was unable to establish such a relationship and failed to rebut Georgia's presumption. The court held that the parties' choice of Georgia law was unenforceable in California. The court also held that under California's choice of law framework, the law of California applied. Accordingly, on remand, the district court shall apply California law to determine whether the drivers were employees or independent contractors.

Honda appealed the district court's decision to certify a nationwide class of all consumers who purchased or leased Acura RLs equipped with a Collision Mitigation Braking System (CMBS) during a 3 year period under Rule 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs alleged that certain advertisements misrepresented the characteristics of the CMBS and omitted material information on its limitations. The court held that the district court erred because it erroneously concluded that California law could be applied to the entire nationwide class, and because it erroneously concluded that all consumers who purchased or leased the Acura RL could be presumed to have relied on defendant's advertisements, which allegedly were misleading and omitted material information. Accordingly, the court vacated the class certification order.

This case involved a proposed class action settlement between AOL and plaintiffs where the parties agreed that AOL would make a series of charitable donations. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in approving the proposed class action settlement, including a proposed cy pres settlement distribution. The court held that the cy pres distributions here did not comport with the court's cy pres standards. While the donations were made on behalf of a nationwide plaintiff class, they were distributed to geographically isolated and substantively unrelated charities. The court concluded that the district court judge did not have to recuse herself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(a) or (b)(4), 5(iii). The court declined to address the issue of whether the class notice was sufficient. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Plaintiff brought this securities fraud action against defendant, a biotechnology company and several of its officers, alleging that, by misstating and failing to disclose safety information about two of the company's products used to treat anemia, they violated the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. At issue was what a plaintiff must do to invoke a fraud-on-the-market presumption in aid of class certification. The court joined the Third and Seventh Circuits in holding that plaintiff must (1) show that the security in question was traded in an efficient market, and (2) show that the alleged misrepresentation were public. As for the element of materiality, plaintiff must plausibly allege that the claimed misrepresentations were material. In this case, plaintiff plausibly alleged that several of defendants' public statements about its pharmaceutical products were false and material. Coupled with the concession that the company's stock traded in an efficient market, this was sufficient to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class.

Plaintiffs, current or former "franchisee" shuttle van drivers for SuperShuttle in various parts of California, filed a putative class action alleging that plaintiffs were misclassified as "independent contractors" when, in truth, they were "employees" under California law. Plaintiffs alleged that they had consequently been deprived of the full protections provided to employees under the California Labor Code, including overtime and minimum wages, reimbursement of business expenses and deductions wrongfully taken from wages, and meal period pay. The district court granted SuperShuttle's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the third prong in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (Covalt) was not satisfied, the California Public Utilities Code 1759 was not implicated, and the district court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the case. On remand, the district court could determine whether the SuperShuttle drivers were employees or independent contractors under California law without hindering or interfering with PUC decisions or policies.

This case arose when plaintiffs voluntarily filed applications for adjustment of status in reliance on the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, wherein the court purportedly held that individuals like plaintiffs were eligible for relief. The court held that plaintiffs' request for relief from the retroactive application of Duran Gonzales II to their applications for adjustment of status must be denied because (1) Duran Gonzales II itself applied its rulings to plaintiffs, thus giving the opinion retroactive application; and (2) another three-judge panel had reaffirmed that Duran Gonzales II applied retroactively and that, accordingly, plaintiffs were ineligible to receive I-212 waivers. Therefore, the district court's orders denying plaintiffs' motions to amend class certification and to file an amended complaint, and dismissing the action, were affirmed.

Plaintiffs, representing a putative class of purchasers of contact lens solutions, appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that defendant violated California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq., and False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500 et seq., by marketing Complete MoisturePlus as a product that cleaned and disinfected lenses. The district court ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing. Defendant argued that the ruling was not in error and that even if it was, the suit was properly dismissed because the class' claims were preempted by 21 U.S.C. 360k(a) of the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976 (MDA), 21 U.S.C. 360(c) et seq. The court held that the district court was incorrect to conclude that this class of plaintiffs lacked standing where they had demonstrated economic harm, but the court held that it could affirm the district court's summary judgment on any ground supported by the record. Therefore, the court held that the record demonstrated that the class' claims were preempted, so the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

Costco appealed the district court's order granting class certification in a class action brought by Shirley Ellis, Leah Horstman, and Elaine Sasaki (plaintiffs), alleging that Costco's promotional practices discriminated based on gender. The court held that at least one plaintiff (Sasaki) had standing to bring suit. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard in its analyses of commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a). Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's findings on those issues and remanded for application of the correct standard. The court further held that, although the district court correctly determined that Sasaki was an adequate class representative, the court held that Ellis and Horstman were inadequate representatives for pursuing injunctive relief, given that they were former employees, and remanded for the district court to consider whether they were adequate representatives if a (b)(3) class was certified. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and remanded for reconsideration.

Plaintiff foster children appeal the dismissal of their class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which they alleged that the caseloads of the Sacramento County Dependency Court and court-appointed attorneys were so excessive as to violate federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions. The district court abstained from adjudicating plaintiff's claims. The court held that the district court properly abstained from consideration of the claims plaintiff raised here based on O'Shea v. Littleton. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

This case stemmed from a putative class action challenging origination and foreclosure procedures for home loans maintained within the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS). Plaintiffs appealed from the dismissal of their First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. The court was unpersuaded that plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to support their claims. Although plaintiffs alleged that aspects of the MERS system were fraudulent, they could not establish that they were misinformed about the MERS system, relied on any misinformation in entering into their home loans, or were injured as a result of the misinformation. Although plaintiffs contended that they could state a claim for wrongful foreclosure, Arizona state law did not recognize this cause of action and their claim was without a basis. Plaintiffs' claim depended upon the conclusion that any home loan within the MERS system was unenforceable through a foreclosure sale, but that conclusion was unsupported by the facts and law on which they relied. Therefore, because plaintiffs failed to establish a plausible basis for relief on these and their other claims raised on appeal, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend.