Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A prison inmate with a documented history of mobility impairments and medical accommodations, including the use of a wheelchair and a transportation code requiring wheelchair-accessible vehicles, was scheduled for transfer between two facilities. On the day of the transport, he arrived in his wheelchair but was not provided with an accessible van. Instead, prison officials attempted to move him onto a standard bus. The inmate protested, stating he could not board without proper accommodations, but officials treated his protest as a refusal. After a crisis negotiator was called and negotiations failed, prison staff physically moved him onto the bus, allegedly causing him injury.A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the officials’ awareness of the inmate’s needs, the transportation code in effect, the extent of force used, and the resulting injuries. The magistrate recommended denying summary judgment and qualified immunity for most defendants. However, the district court rejected these recommendations, granted summary judgment for the State of Washington and the individual prison officials, and found that qualified immunity shielded the officials, reasoning that the mistaken transportation code did not amount to deliberate indifference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because material factual disputes remained regarding whether officials had notice of the inmate’s need for accommodation and the extent of their investigation into those needs. The Ninth Circuit also found that these disputes precluded summary judgment on Eighth Amendment claims alleging deliberate indifference and excessive force, and that qualified immunity was improperly granted at this stage. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

A computer science teaching professor at a public university included a statement in his course syllabus that parodied the university’s recommended indigenous land acknowledgment. This statement, which challenged the university’s view regarding the ownership of campus land, drew complaints from students and staff, particularly those involved in diversity and indigenous advocacy. The professor refused to remove the statement when asked, prompting university administrators to replace his syllabus, publicly condemn his remarks, and encourage official complaints from students. The university then initiated a lengthy disciplinary investigation, withheld a merit pay increase during this period, issued a reprimand, and warned of potential future discipline if the professor continued similar conduct. The university’s actions were based on the disruption and distress reported by students and concerns about creating an unwelcome environment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington found that the professor’s speech was protected and addressed a matter of public concern. However, applying the balancing test from Pickering v. Board of Education, it granted summary judgment to the university, finding that the institution’s interest in preventing disruption and maintaining an inclusive learning environment outweighed the professor’s First Amendment rights. The district court also dismissed the professor’s facial challenges to the university’s nondiscrimination policy, interpreting it narrowly to apply only to conduct resembling unlawful discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the university and directed that summary judgment be entered for the professor on his First Amendment retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims. The appellate court held that the professor’s syllabus statement was protected academic speech on a matter of public concern, and that student or community offense or discomfort could not justify university retaliation or discipline under the First Amendment. The panel also ruled that the district court improperly construed the university’s nondiscrimination policy and remanded for further proceedings on the policy’s facial constitutionality. View "REGES V. CAUCE" on Justia Law

A non-profit publisher mailed its legal resource book, The Habeas Citebook, to prisoners at a Washington state correctional facility. In 2018, the state's Department of Corrections implemented two policies: one prohibited inmates from possessing case law documents unless approved, and another barred possession of legal materials containing information about other Washington state inmates. Relying on these policies, prison officials at Coyote Ridge Corrections Center rejected and delayed delivery of the book. Although the Department’s Publication Review Committee later found the book permissible, the publisher was not notified of this reversal, and delivery to prisoners was significantly delayed—sometimes by over a year.The Human Rights Defense Center sued the prison superintendent and mailroom sergeant in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and seeking damages and injunctive relief. The district court initially granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims, holding that the claims were either moot, failed on the merits, or did not establish personal liability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding genuine disputes of material fact and instructing the district court to reconsider standing and liability issues. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment for the defendants and denied requests for injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity against damages on the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding the mail policies and lack of notice, as there was no clearly established precedent finding such policies unconstitutional. However, it reversed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief related to both the mail policy and notice procedures, finding that the appropriate legal standards had not been applied. The court also reversed the grant of qualified immunity on the delayed delivery claim, finding the right at issue clearly established, and remanded for further proceedings. View "HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, INC. V. UTTECHT" on Justia Law

Federal agents learned that a previously convicted felon arranged the sale of a World War II-era Russian machinegun, which he acknowledged could not be lawfully transferred. The defendant, though not in physical possession of the weapon, set up the transaction between an undercover federal agent—posing as a firearms and drug trafficker—and a third party who actually had the gun. The agent and the defendant traveled together to complete the purchase, and the defendant was later arrested.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the prosecution. A grand jury indicted the defendant for both possessing or transferring a machinegun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) and for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the machinegun charge, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen required invalidation of the statute, and also that the statutory exemption in § 922(o)(2)(A) applied since the transfer was to a federal agent. The district court denied the motion, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent in United States v. Henry, which held that machineguns are not protected by the Second Amendment, and on earlier cases interpreting the statutory exemption narrowly. At trial, the jury acquitted on the felon-in-possession count but convicted on the possession or transfer count, and the district court sentenced the defendant to twenty-seven months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the exemption in § 922(o)(2)(A) for transfers to the United States does not apply to transfers to undercover agents unless the transfer is authorized by the government for its benefit. The court also held that its prior decision in Henry remains binding, and that § 922(o) does not violate the Second Amendment. View "USA V. KITTSON" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, a Nevada prisoner sentenced to death, challenged his conviction and sentence based on the claim that the prosecutor impermissibly used peremptory strikes to exclude three Black prospective jurors during jury selection. The underlying facts involve the murder of Ebony Mason in 1994, for which the petitioner was charged after being linked to the crime through witness statements and physical evidence. He was ultimately convicted of murder and related charges after a trial in which three of four Black prospective jurors were excluded by the prosecution.The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the petitioner’s Batson v. Kentucky claims on direct appeal. It found the prosecutor’s reasons for striking two jurors—Emma Jean Samuels and Angela Smith—were race-neutral, as both had close family members with criminal convictions. The court concluded that, once these two strikes were deemed nondiscriminatory, they did not factor into whether there was a pattern of discrimination, and thus, the exclusion of the first Black juror, Gwendolyn Velasquez, was viewed in isolation, with no prima facie case found. The Nevada Supreme Court therefore did not require the prosecution to provide a race-neutral reason for striking Velasquez.On federal habeas review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on the Batson claims regarding Samuels and Smith, finding no unreasonable application of federal law. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably applied Batson by excluding from consideration the strikes of Samuels and Smith when assessing whether a prima facie case was established as to Velasquez. The appellate court vacated the denial of relief as to Velasquez and remanded for an evidentiary hearing requiring the State to explain its strike. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of equitable tolling for additional untimely claims and declined to expand the certificate of appealability. View "DOYLE V. ROYAL" on Justia Law

Robert Hutton secretly installed a hidden camera in the bathroom of his home and, over the course of about a year, recorded several nude videos and images of his 14-year-old stepdaughter without her knowledge. He edited some of the footage to focus on moments when the victim was visibly nude. The victim discovered the existence of these files after seeing a suspicious file name on Hutton’s phone and subsequently reported the matter to the police. A search of Hutton’s residence uncovered additional child pornography, including images of other minors.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over a bench trial based on stipulated facts. Hutton was charged with sexually exploiting a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). He moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the images were not “lascivious,” that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied, and that he did not “use” the victim within the meaning of the statute. The district court denied these motions, found Hutton guilty, and sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Hutton’s arguments de novo where appropriate and for clear error regarding factual findings. The court held that existing Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed Hutton’s arguments on all grounds. Specifically, the court found that the district court did not clearly err in determining the images were “lascivious” under the Dost factors, that § 2251(a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied, and that Hutton’s conduct constituted “use” of a minor under the statute. The court also held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Dubin v. United States, which interpreted the term “use” in a different statutory context, did not undermine the Ninth Circuit’s precedent regarding § 2251(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "USA V. HUTTON" on Justia Law

A 12-year-old boy was killed by police officers during an attempt to rescue him from a neighbor who had already killed the boy’s mother and housekeeper, gravely wounded his sister, and was holding the boy hostage in a vehicle. The officers responded to multiple 911 calls, surrounded the vehicle, and attempted to negotiate with the hostage-taker, who was armed and making threats against the child’s life. After the hostage-taker was shot and killed by an officer, other officers fired additional shots, which resulted in the boy’s death.The boy’s father, siblings, and estate filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada against the city, police department, and individual officers. They alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment (excessive force), Fourteenth Amendment (substantive due process), a Monell claim for failure to train, and state law claims. The district court dismissed the federal claims with prejudice, finding that the officers had not seized the boy for Fourth Amendment purposes, had not acted with deliberate indifference or intent to harm for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, and that the Monell claim failed in the absence of a constitutional violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the officers did not violate the boy’s Fourth Amendment rights because their actions during the active hostage situation did not constitute a seizure, and even if a violation had occurred, qualified immunity would apply as the right was not clearly established. The court also found no Fourteenth Amendment violation, as the officers’ actions did not shock the conscience or demonstrate deliberate indifference, and qualified immunity would apply. The Monell claim failed due to the absence of an underlying constitutional violation. View "HAWATMEH V. CITY OF HENDERSON" on Justia Law

An armed fugitive fleeing law enforcement entered a print shop owned by the plaintiff, forcibly removed him, and barricaded himself inside. After a thirteen-hour standoff, Los Angeles Police Department SWAT officers used dozens of tear gas canisters to subdue the fugitive, causing significant damage to the shop and its contents. The parties agreed that the officers’ actions were authorized, reasonable, and lawful. The plaintiff alleged that the damages, which exceeded $60,000, were caused exclusively by the police.The plaintiff initially sought compensation from the United States Marshals Service, which denied the claim and referred him to the City of Los Angeles. After the City did not respond to his claims or his attorney’s letter, the plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The City moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Takings Clause does not require compensation for property destroyed by police acting reasonably in an emergency. The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the City’s initial motion but later granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the destruction was a valid exercise of police power and not a compensable taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the government’s destruction of private property, when necessary and reasonable for public safety, is exempt from the Takings Clause. The court relied on historical understanding and longstanding precedent, concluding that such actions fall outside the scope of the Takings Clause. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. View "PENA V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

An Oregon nonprofit organization, whose board members are guided by sincerely held religious beliefs, challenged a state law requiring most employers to provide insurance coverage for abortion and contraceptive services. The organization’s governing documents and public statements reflect a commitment to traditional Judeo-Christian ethics, including opposition to abortion based on religious grounds. Although the law contains exemptions for certain religious employers, the organization does not qualify for any of these exceptions, a point not disputed by the state. The organization sought relief, arguing that being compelled to provide such coverage violates its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied the organization’s request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed its complaint. The district court found there was doubt as to whether the organization’s opposition to abortion was genuinely religious in nature. It further concluded that the law was neutral and generally applicable, subject only to rational basis review, which it satisfied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and vacated the denial of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that the organization’s beliefs are religious and sincerely held, and that the district court erred by not accepting these allegations as true at the motion to dismiss stage. The appellate court remanded the case for the district court to reconsider, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission, whether the selective denial of a religious exemption to the organization violates the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit expressed no opinion on the ultimate constitutional question, leaving it for the district court to address in the first instance. View "OREGON RIGHT TO LIFE V. STOLFI" on Justia Law

Ryan VanDyke was subject to a civil protection order and a no-contact order in Idaho after persistently harassing a woman, violating both probation conditions for a prior telephone-harassment conviction and earlier court-ordered protections. In October 2022, after being charged with felony stalking for continued unwanted contact and harassment, a state court issued a no-contact order that explicitly prohibited VanDyke from using, attempting to use, or threatening physical force against the victim. In May 2023, while still under these orders, VanDyke entered a courthouse carrying a loaded revolver.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed the federal indictment against VanDyke, which charged him with illegal firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). The district court found that, as applied to VanDyke, this statute did not fit within the historical tradition of firearm regulation required by the Second Amendment, and therefore held the statute unconstitutional in this context.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). The Ninth Circuit held that § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is constitutional as applied to VanDyke. The court reasoned that there is a historical tradition of both individualized and categorical disarmament of persons deemed dangerous, including those subject to judicial findings of threat or facing serious criminal charges. The court found that the procedures and justifications for VanDyke’s disarmament were analogous to those recognized in Rahimi and related precedent. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. VANDYKE" on Justia Law