Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brandon Wade Kurns, a convicted felon, began working at Modern Pawn & Consignment in Helena, Montana, in June 2021, where he sold firearms and ammunition. In July 2021, after an investigation linked stolen gunpowder to the shop, ATF agents searched Modern Pawn and found evidence that Kurns had possessed several firearms. Kurns was indicted and pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the District of Montana sentenced Kurns to 36 months in prison, applying a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(I) for possessing a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, and a four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) for possessing eight or more firearms. Kurns objected, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support these enhancements and that the court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by drawing an adverse inference from his silence during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the evidence, including surveillance footage and ATF transfer forms, supported the finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Kurns possessed a semiautomatic firearm with a large capacity magazine and at least eight firearms. The court also found no Fifth Amendment violation, as there was no indication that the district court drew an adverse inference from Kurns' silence. Additionally, the court declined to consider Kurns' Second Amendment challenge based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, as it was raised for the first time after the completion of appellate briefing. View "USA V. KURNS" on Justia Law

Gregory W. Pheasant was charged with driving an off-road vehicle on public lands at night without a taillight, violating 43 C.F.R. § 8341.1(f)(5). This regulation was issued by the Secretary of the Interior under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Pheasant allegedly refused to stop for Bureau of Land Management rangers, made obscene gestures, and sped away before being apprehended. He was indicted on three counts, including the taillight violation.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the taillight count, ruling that section 303(a) of the FLPMA was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court held that the statute gave the Secretary of the Interior too much authority without sufficient guidance or restraint, violating Article I of the Constitution, which vests all legislative powers in Congress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that section 303(a) of the FLPMA satisfies the "intelligible principle" test established by the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit found that the FLPMA provides clear guidance by requiring the Secretary to manage public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield, ensuring the land's value is realized sustainably. The court concluded that these constraints are sufficient to meet constitutional requirements, and thus, section 303(a) does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "USA V. PHEASANT" on Justia Law

A high school student, K.J., was involved in a fight on campus and was initially suspended for three days. After reviewing surveillance footage and learning about injuries sustained during the fight, school officials extended K.J.'s suspension and recommended his expulsion, without informing him of the new charges or evidence. K.J. was not given an opportunity to respond to these new allegations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found that the school officials violated K.J.'s procedural due process rights by not informing him of the new charges or evidence. However, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established regarding due process protections for suspension extensions. The court also held that K.J. lacked standing to seek expungement of his disciplinary record, as it was speculative that the record would harm his reputation or future prospects.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit agreed that K.J.'s due process rights were violated, as he was not given notice of the new charges or an opportunity to respond. The court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because the requirements for due process in school suspensions were clearly established in Goss v. Lopez. The court also held that K.J. had standing to seek expungement of his disciplinary record and that such relief was not barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The case was remanded to the district court to consider K.J.'s claims for damages and expungement. View "K. J. V. JACKSON" on Justia Law

Haley Olson was arrested in Idaho for marijuana possession and consented to a search of her phone by Idaho police, who created a copy of its contents. Glenn Palmer, then-Sheriff of Grant County, Oregon, learned of the arrest and, curious about Olson's relationship with Grant County Deputy Tyler Smith, asked County Attorney Jim Carpenter to request the phone extraction from the Idaho prosecutor. Carpenter obtained and reviewed the extraction, allegedly deleting it afterward. However, Olson later heard gossip about the contents of her phone, including nude photos, seemingly originating from the sheriff’s office. Olson sued Palmer, Carpenter, and Grant County, alleging Fourth Amendment violations.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment for Palmer, finding no supervisory liability, and for Carpenter, granting him qualified immunity as his actions did not violate clearly established law. Olson appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court agreed that Palmer was not liable due to lack of supervisory authority over Carpenter. The court also held that Carpenter was entitled to qualified immunity because Olson’s right to be free from Carpenter’s search was not clearly established at the time. However, the court concluded that Carpenter’s search did violate Olson’s Fourth Amendment rights, as it was conducted without a warrant, consent, or suspicion of criminal activity. The court emphasized the importance of developing constitutional precedent in this area, despite affirming the grant of qualified immunity to Carpenter. View "OLSON V. COUNTY OF GRANT" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to an Arizona law that requires criminal defense attorneys and their agents to initiate any contact with crime victims through the prosecutor’s office. The plaintiffs, a group of criminal defense attorneys and their association, argue that this law violates the First Amendment's Speech Clause by restricting their ability to communicate directly with victims.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona initially dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision, allowing the case to proceed. On remand, the district court held a bench trial and concluded that the law was unconstitutional on its face, issuing a permanent injunction against its enforcement. The district court found that the law's requirement for defense attorneys to communicate through the prosecutor's office was a content- and viewpoint-based regulation of speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' facial challenge failed because they did not challenge the law's primary application to victim-interview requests, which remain regulated under a similar Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure. The court noted that the unchallenged applications of the law, which include requests for victim interviews, are substantial and legitimate. Therefore, the challenged applications related to non-interview contacts are not substantial enough to render the entire statute unconstitutional.The Ninth Circuit vacated the permanent injunction and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the facial challenge to the Victim Contact Limit, as framed by the plaintiffs, must fail. View "ARIZONA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE V. MAYES" on Justia Law

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) brought an action against CashCall, Inc., alleging that CashCall engaged in unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices by attempting to collect interest and fees it was not legally entitled to. The CFPB sought legal restitution for the affected consumers. CashCall argued that the restitution order triggered its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially granted partial summary judgment to the CFPB on liability and conducted a bench trial to determine the appropriate remedy. The court imposed a civil penalty but declined to order restitution. Both parties appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of liability but vacated the civil penalty and remanded for further proceedings regarding restitution.On remand, the district court ordered CashCall to pay over $134 million in legal restitution. CashCall appealed again, contending that the restitution order violated its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that CashCall had a right to a jury trial but concluded that CashCall had waived that right by voluntarily participating in the initial bench trial and not objecting to the second bench trial. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the doctrines of judicial estoppel and waiver did not preclude the CFPB from seeking legal restitution. Additionally, the court found that the district court did not overstate CashCall’s unjust gains and properly used CashCall’s net revenues as a basis for measuring unjust gains. Finally, the court rejected CashCall’s argument that the CFPB’s funding mechanism violated the Appropriations Clause.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU V. CASHCALL, INC." on Justia Law

Andrew Grimm parked his car on a downtown street in Portland, Oregon, and paid for parking through a mobile app for a limited time. He left the car there for seven days, during which City parking enforcement officers issued multiple parking citations and placed them on the car’s windshield. After five days, an officer added a red slip warning that the car would be towed if not moved. Grimm did not move the car, and two days later, the car was towed.Grimm sued the City of Portland, claiming that the City’s procedures for notifying him of the impending tow were deficient under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the City’s notice procedures were reasonable. The court found that although the accumulation of citations might have indicated that Grimm did not receive notice, no other form of notice was practicable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the City’s notice, which included a red warning slip placed on the car’s windshield two days before the tow, was reasonably calculated to inform Grimm of the impending tow, satisfying the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court further held that the City did not have actual knowledge that its attempt to provide notice had failed simply because the citations and warning slip remained undisturbed on the car’s windshield. Therefore, the City was not required to take additional steps to notify Grimm. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City. View "GRIMM V. CITY OF PORTLAND" on Justia Law

Shawn Sheltra, an inmate with the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC), filed a formal grievance in March, identifying safety concerns and threats from other inmates in his housing unit. He warned that he would be attacked in April if he did not make an extortion payment. Despite being briefly isolated, Sheltra was returned to his housing unit and was attacked by another inmate in April. He subsequently filed a lawsuit, asserting violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments due to the defendants' failure to protect him from a known harm.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because Sheltra did not file a formal grievance after the April attack. The court also granted summary judgment for the defendants on Sheltra's official-capacity claims, as they were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and adopted the continuing-violations doctrine for purposes of administrative exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court held that a properly exhausted prison grievance asserting one continuing harm or a single course of conduct can exhaust events arising out of the same alleged violation that occur after the grievance was made. Applying this doctrine, the court concluded that Sheltra's attack was part of the same continuing harm or course of conduct described in his prison grievance before the attack. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment on Sheltra's individual-capacity claims against the defendants. However, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants on Sheltra's official-capacity claims due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. View "SHELTRA V. CHRISTENSEN" on Justia Law

Yaakov Markel, an Orthodox Jewish man, worked as a mashgiach for the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (OU) from 2011 to 2018. His role involved supervising food preparation to ensure kosher compliance, particularly for grape products. Markel claimed that his supervisor, Rabbi Nachum Rabinowitz, promised him a promotion and a raise, which he did not receive, and that OU withheld certain overtime compensation. Markel resigned and filed suit, bringing wage and hour and fraud and misrepresentation claims against OU and Rabbi Rabinowitz.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the First Amendment’s ministerial exception barred Markel’s employment-related claims. The court determined that OU is a religious organization and that a mashgiach is considered a minister within Orthodox Judaism, thus invoking the ministerial exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception categorically barred Markel’s claims because OU is a religious organization and a mashgiach is a minister. The court emphasized that the acceptance of revenue does not deprive an organization with a religious mission of First Amendment protections. The court also rejected Markel’s argument that the ministerial exception was inapplicable because his dispute involved only secular issues, noting that a religious institution’s decisions, even if facially secular, are often intertwined with religious doctrine. The court further held that the ministerial exception protects both religious organizations and their leaders from claims brought by ministerial employees. View "MARKEL V. UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA" on Justia Law

Michael Blake DeFrance was convicted of assaulting his girlfriend in 2013 under Montana Code Annotated section 45-5-206(1)(a), a misdemeanor. In 2018, he was found in possession of three firearms, leading to a federal indictment for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied DeFrance's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the Montana statute could be violated without the use of physical force. DeFrance was subsequently convicted and appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the categorical approach to determine whether a conviction under Montana's PFMA statute qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The court concluded that because the Montana statute can be violated by inflicting emotional distress rather than physical injury, it does not have, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force as required by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Consequently, the court held that DeFrance's conviction under the Montana statute does not qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.The Ninth Circuit reversed DeFrance's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing or other proceedings consistent with their opinion. View "USA V. DEFRANCE" on Justia Law