Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a man convicted of the 1989 murders of his girlfriend and her daughter in Arizona. He was found guilty by a jury and subsequently sentenced to death by a judge. The sentencing judge identified multiple aggravating factors, including the especially cruel nature of the crimes, multiple victims, and prior violent felonies. The judge also found statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors, such as the defendant’s impaired capacity, troubled childhood, and psychological issues. After his conviction and sentencing were affirmed on direct appeal by the Arizona Supreme Court, the defendant sought postconviction relief in state court through three separate petitions. His first petition did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim and was handled by counsel later conceded to be ineffective. A second petition, raising the IAC claim, was denied as untimely. A third petition argued he was intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for execution, but that claim was rejected after an evidentiary hearing.In federal court, the petitioner’s IAC claim was initially deemed procedurally defaulted by the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Subsequent Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions, including Martinez v. Ryan, allowed for the possibility that ineffective postconviction counsel could excuse such defaults. The Ninth Circuit originally remanded for an evidentiary hearing, but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal courts may not expand the state court record based on ineffective state postconviction counsel.On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered only evidence properly submitted in state court under procedural rules. The Ninth Circuit found the petitioner demonstrated “cause” to excuse the procedural default but failed to show “prejudice,” as his underlying IAC claim was not “substantial.” Although counsel’s performance was deficient, the new mitigating evidence was unlikely to have changed the sentencing outcome, given the weight of aggravating factors and Arizona precedent. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "RAMIREZ V. THORNELL" on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations, Native tribes, and individual plaintiffs sought to prevent a land exchange in Southeast Arizona’s Tonto National Forest, mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act. This exchange would transfer nearly 2,500 acres of federal land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—and a large copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC. In return, the company would provide over 5,000 acres of equally appraised land to the federal government. Plaintiffs raised concerns under several statutes, including the Land Exchange Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive flaws in the exchange.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied motions for preliminary injunctions, finding that plaintiffs failed to show likely success or serious questions on the merits of their claims relating to appraisal, NEPA compliance, tribal consultation, and religious liberty. In a related case, Apache Stronghold v. United States, the district court’s denial of an injunction on religious liberty grounds was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and not disturbed by the Supreme Court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing and that their NEPA claims were justiciable as “final agency action.” However, it concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their appraisal, NEPA, consultation, or religious liberty claims. The court further determined that existing precedent foreclosed the RFRA and Free Exercise arguments. The court did not address other injunction factors and dissolved the administrative stay. View "BROWN LOPEZ V. USA" on Justia Law

This case involves several dialysis providers, a nonprofit organization, and individual patients challenging a California law (AB 290) aimed at regulating relationships between dialysis providers and nonprofits that assist patients with health insurance premiums. The law was enacted due to concerns that providers were donating to nonprofits to help keep patients on private insurance, which led to higher reimbursements for providers compared to public insurance. Key provisions of the law included capping provider reimbursements if they had a financial relationship with a nonprofit offering patient assistance, requiring disclosure of patients receiving such assistance, restricting nonprofits from conditioning assistance on patient treatment choices, mandating disclosure to patients of all insurance options, and a safe harbor for seeking federal advisory opinions.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted in part and denied in part motions for summary judgment. It upheld the constitutionality of the reimbursement cap, coverage disclosure requirement, and safe harbor provision, but found the anti-steering, patient disclosure, and financial assistance restriction provisions unconstitutional. The district court also ruled that the unconstitutional parts were severable from the remainder of the statute and rejected claims that federal law preempted the state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the reimbursement cap, patient disclosure requirement, and financial assistance restriction violated the First Amendment because they burdened the rights of expressive association and were not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interests. The court found the coverage disclosure requirement constitutional under the standard for compelled commercial speech, as it required only factual, uncontroversial information reasonably related to a state interest. However, it concluded that the unconstitutional provisions were not severable from the coverage disclosure requirement. The court also held challenges to the safe harbor provision moot. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "DOE V. BONTA" on Justia Law

During the summer of 2025, protests erupted in Southern California in response to federal immigration raids. Protesters, legal observers, and journalists alleged that officers of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Protective Services, and Customs and Border Protection, used crowd control weapons indiscriminately against them. Multiple individuals, including members of the press and protesters, suffered significant physical injuries during these events, even when they were complying with police orders or were not near disruptive protest activity.Several individual journalists, legal observers, protesters, and two press organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. They alleged violations of their First Amendment rights, specifically the right to be free from retaliation for engaging in protected activities and the right of public access to protests. The district court issued a preliminary injunction to protect the rights of protesters, journalists, and legal observers, finding that the defendants’ conduct chilled First Amendment activity. The government appealed, arguing that the injunction was overly broad and legally unsound.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their First Amendment retaliation claims, that both individual and organizational plaintiffs had standing, and that the other requirements for a preliminary injunction were met. However, the court found that the scope of the injunction was overbroad because it extended relief to non-parties and included provisions not narrowly tailored to the specific harms alleged. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction but vacated and remanded the case for the district court to craft a narrower injunction consistent with its opinion. View "LOS ANGELES PRESS CLUB V. NOEM" on Justia Law

A Mexican national attempted to enter the United States in 2003 using fraudulent documents and was removed under an expedited order. After re-entering the country illegally, he was discovered in 2024 and his prior removal order was reinstated. During the reinstatement proceedings, he expressed fear of returning to Mexico and received a reasonable-fear interview, but the asylum officer determined he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. The immigration judge reviewed and affirmed this negative reasonable-fear determination, meaning he was not eligible for further proceedings to seek withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).After the immigration judge’s decision, the individual filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He did not challenge the original expedited removal order or the reinstated removal order, but instead sought review solely of the denial of CAT relief. The government did not argue that the petition was untimely, but the court requested additional briefing after the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. Bondi, which addressed jurisdiction over such petitions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review a petition challenging only an order denying CAT relief when the petitioner did not also seek review of a final order of removal. The court concluded that, under current statutes and Supreme Court precedent, only final orders of removal are reviewable, and an order denying CAT relief does not qualify as a final order of removal nor does it merge into such an order. The court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and denied the petitioner’s request to amend his petition to add a nominal challenge to the removal order, as any such challenge would be baseless and futile. View "NAVARRETE V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Three individuals were convicted under a federal law that prohibits those with prior misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition. Each had a history of violent conduct against intimate partners, and after their misdemeanor convictions under state law, they were later found in possession of firearms, leading to federal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).Prior to this appeal, each defendant was convicted in a United States District Court—one in the Northern District of California and two in the District of Alaska—of violating § 922(g)(9). The convictions were based on evidence that after their state-level domestic violence misdemeanor convictions, they knowingly possessed firearms. Following their convictions, the defendants appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court applied the framework established by New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, and concluded that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the appellants’ conduct but that the government demonstrated § 922(g)(9) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court rejected both the facial and as-applied constitutional challenges, holding that Congress may categorically disarm those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence without individualized findings of future dangerousness. The court further held that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to these appellants and affirmed the judgments of conviction. View "USA V. MARTINEZ" on Justia Law

A federal land exchange was mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, requiring the United States Forest Service to transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC, in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. The legislation included requirements for tribal consultation, land appraisal, and the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). Following the issuance of a revised Final EIS in 2025, several environmental and tribal groups, as well as individual Apache plaintiffs, challenged the exchange. Their claims spanned the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive deficiencies.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on any claims relating to the appraisal process, NEPA, consultation, or the National Forest Management Act. A separate group of Apache plaintiffs brought similar claims, including religious liberty challenges, which were also denied—particularly in light of circuit precedent established in Apache Stronghold v. United States. All plaintiff groups appealed and sought further injunctive relief pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The court held that plaintiffs had standing and their claims were justiciable, but that none of their arguments were likely to succeed on the merits or raised serious questions. The court specifically found the appraisals and environmental review sufficient, the agency’s tribal consultation adequate, and the religious liberty claims foreclosed by circuit precedent. The denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, and all related motions for injunctive relief were denied as moot. View "ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE" on Justia Law

A group composed of individuals, nonprofits, and businesses in Montana challenged the enforcement of a newly enacted state law, H.B. 359, which prohibited “drag story hours” and “sexually oriented performances” in various locations, including state-funded schools, libraries, public property, and certain businesses. The law imposed criminal, civil, and professional penalties, and also created a private right of action against violators. Plaintiffs contended that the statute violated their rights to freedom of speech under the First Amendment and to due process under the Fifth Amendment, both on its face and as applied to their speech.In the United States District Court for the District of Montana, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent state officials from enforcing H.B. 359 while their challenge was pending. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing, as at least one plaintiff demonstrated a credible threat of enforcement and self-censorship for each challenged provision. The district court then applied the Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council standard for preliminary injunctions and concluded that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claims. The court found H.B. 359 to be a content-based and viewpoint-based restriction on expressive activity that failed strict scrutiny, and further determined the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The court granted a preliminary injunction, barring enforcement of H.B. 359 by the state defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal by the Montana Attorney General and Superintendent of Public Instruction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The appellate court held that both the drag-story-hour and sexually-oriented-performance provisions are content-based restrictions on protected expressive activity and are not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction against enforcement of H.B. 359 was affirmed. View "IMPERIAL SOVEREIGN COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA V. KNUDSEN" on Justia Law

A national trade association representing large online businesses challenged a recently enacted California statute designed to protect minors’ privacy and well-being online. The law imposes specific requirements on businesses whose online services are likely to be accessed by children under eighteen, including obligations regarding data use, age estimation, and restrictions on certain user interface designs known as “dark patterns.” Before the law took effect, the association brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that several provisions were unconstitutional on First Amendment and vagueness grounds, and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement.The district court initially enjoined the entire statute, finding the association was likely to succeed on its facial First Amendment challenge. On the State’s appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated most of the injunction, affirming only as to a specific requirement regarding Data Protection Impact Assessments and related inseverable provisions, and remanded for the district court to analyze the association’s other facial challenges and the issue of severability under the Supreme Court’s clarified standards in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC. On remand, the district court again enjoined the entire statute and, in the alternative, seven specific provisions.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the association did not meet its burden for a facial challenge to the law’s coverage definition or its age estimation requirement, vacating the injunction as to those. However, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the law’s data use and dark patterns restrictions on vagueness grounds, finding the provisions failed to clearly delineate prohibited conduct. The court vacated the injunction as to the statute’s remainder and remanded for further proceedings on severability. View "NETCHOICE, LLC V. BONTA" on Justia Law

Two companies that operate app-based delivery platforms challenged a Seattle ordinance enacted in 2023, which aims to protect gig economy workers from unwarranted account deactivations. The law requires “network companies” to provide workers with written deactivation policies and mandates that these policies be “reasonably related” to the companies’ safe and efficient operations. The ordinance also delineates examples of impermissible deactivation grounds, such as those based solely on customer ratings or certain background checks. The companies did not contest the general bar on unwarranted deactivations but argued that the notice and deactivation policy requirements violate the First Amendment and that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the companies sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the ordinance from taking effect. The district court denied their motion. It found that the ordinance regulates conduct (the act of deactivating accounts) rather than speech, and that any impact on expression is incidental. The court also concluded that the use of “reasonable” in the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague, pointing to statutory context and specific examples for guidance.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. The court held that the ordinance regulates nonexpressive conduct, not speech, and thus does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Alternatively, if the ordinance were seen as regulating speech, that speech would be commercial in nature, and the law would satisfy the lower level of scrutiny applicable to compelled factual commercial disclosures. The court further held that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague, as it provides adequate notice of what is prohibited. The disposition by the Ninth Circuit was to affirm the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. View "MAPLEBEAR INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law