Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves individual falconers and the American Falconry Conservancy challenging state and federal regulations that require them to consent to unannounced, warrantless inspections as a condition for obtaining a falconry license. The plaintiffs argue that these regulations impose unconstitutional conditions on their right to obtain a license and violate the Fourth Amendment and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate injury in fact because they had not been subjected to a warrantless inspection under the challenged regulations and had not shown that future inspections were imminent. The district court also found that the American Falconry Conservancy lacked associational standing because it did not allege that its members faced immediate or threatened injury from unannounced inspections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs' unconstitutional-conditions claim against the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW), holding that the plaintiffs had standing because they were forced to choose between retaining their Fourth Amendment rights and obtaining a falconry license. The court affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims against CDFW and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), finding that the plaintiffs' claims against FWS were unripe and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of future injury to support their Fourth Amendment claims. The court also concluded that the American Falconry Conservancy had standing for its unconstitutional-conditions claim but not for its unannounced-inspection claim.The Ninth Circuit's main holding was that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the unconstitutional conditions imposed by CDFW but lacked standing for their other claims. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "PETER STAVRIANOUDAKIS V. USFWS" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Paul Rundo and Robert Boman, who were charged with conspiracy to violate the Anti-Riot Act and with substantively violating the Act. The indictment alleges that Rundo is a founding member of the "Rise Above Movement" (RAM), a militant white supremacist group. Rundo and Boman, along with other RAM members, attended several political rallies where they violently attacked counter-protesters. The indictment details their involvement in rallies in Huntington Beach, Berkeley, San Bernardino, and Charlottesville, where they engaged in organized violence and later boasted about their actions online.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed the indictment, finding the Anti-Riot Act unconstitutional due to facial overbreadth under the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the Act was not facially overbroad except for certain severable portions. On remand, the district court dismissed the indictment again, this time based on a claim of selective prosecution. The district court concluded that the government selectively prosecuted RAM members while ignoring the violence of Antifa and related far-left groups, suggesting that the prosecution was based on the offensive nature of RAM's speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that Rundo did not meet his burden to demonstrate that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted and that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive. The court found that the district court erred by comparing collective conduct to individual conduct and by holding that individual Antifa members were similarly situated to Rundo. The Ninth Circuit also held that Rundo failed to show that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive, noting that timing and other factors cited by the district court were insufficient. The court reinstated the indictment and remanded the case for trial. View "USA V. RUNDO" on Justia Law

Alexander Behrend, a Work Practice Apprentice (WPA) at the San Francisco Zen Center, filed an employment discrimination lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Behrend, who lived and worked at the Center, performed various tasks including meditation, cleaning, cooking, and maintenance. He argued that his role was not ministerial because it involved mostly menial work and did not include teaching or leading the faith.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the San Francisco Zen Center. The court found that Behrend's role fell within the First Amendment’s ministerial exception, which exempts religious organizations from certain employment laws in relation to their ministers. The court determined that Behrend’s duties, although menial, were integral to the Center’s religious mission and practice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception applied to Behrend’s role as a WPA. The court emphasized that the exception is broad and includes roles that are essential to carrying out a religious organization’s mission, even if they do not involve teaching or leadership. The court concluded that Behrend’s work was a vital part of Zen training and practice, thus fitting within the ministerial exception. The court rejected Behrend’s argument that only those with key roles in preaching and transmitting the faith qualify for the exception, noting that precedent supports a broader application. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, upholding the application of the ministerial exception. View "BEHREND V. SAN FRANCISCO ZEN CENTER, INC." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, including Palestinian NGOs, Gaza residents, and Palestinian-Americans, sought to enjoin the U.S. President and senior officials from providing military, diplomatic, and financial support to Israel in its operations in Gaza. They alleged that the U.S. violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention by being complicit in genocide through its support of Israel. The plaintiffs requested wide-ranging injunctive and declaratory relief to stop U.S. assistance to Israel and to influence Israel to cease its military actions in Gaza.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the complaint, ruling that the claims raised non-justiciable political questions. The court found that the issues were fundamentally political and not suitable for judicial resolution, as they involved decisions constitutionally committed to the political branches of government.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs' claims presented non-justiciable political questions under the political question doctrine. The court emphasized that decisions regarding military and diplomatic support to foreign nations are constitutionally committed to the executive and legislative branches, not the judiciary. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that framing their claims as violations of legal duties circumvented the political question doctrine. The court concluded that the judiciary does not have the authority to make decisions on national security and foreign policy matters, which are the prerogatives of the political branches. The request for declaratory relief was also found to be non-justiciable for the same reasons. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "DEFENSE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL-PALESTINE V. BIDEN" on Justia Law

The case involves Keith Atherton, who pleaded guilty to one count of using or attempting to use a minor to produce a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct. His plea agreement contained an appeal waiver with certain exceptions. Atherton was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 30 years. He appealed, arguing that the district court violated his due process rights during sentencing by relying on false or unreliable information.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court held that a due process challenge to sentencing, like Atherton’s, falls within the appeal waiver limitation set forth in United States v. Wells, for “a challenge that the sentence violates the Constitution.” The court rejected the government’s contention that the Wells exception is limited to constitutional claims targeting the substantive terms of the sentence.Reviewing for plain error, the court held that Atherton’s due process rights were not violated. The court concluded that Atherton did not demonstrate that it is clear or obvious that the challenged information was patently false or unreliable or that the court relied upon the information in imposing sentence. View "United States v. Atherton" on Justia Law

The case involves Angelo Corey Stackhouse, who was convicted of kidnapping a minor and transporting a person across state lines with the intent to engage in illegal sexual activity. Stackhouse kidnapped a 10-year-old girl, using a cellphone during the crime, and transported a 19-year-old woman from Montana to Denver, where he sexually assaulted her.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Montana convicted Stackhouse on all seven charges. He appealed his convictions for kidnapping a person under the age of 18 using a means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, and for the transportation of a person across state lines with intent to engage in illegal sexual activity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed Stackhouse’s convictions. The court held that the application of the federal kidnapping statute to an intrastate kidnapping is constitutional where the defendant uses a cellphone—an instrumentality of interstate commerce—in furtherance of the offense. The court also held that the government presented sufficient evidence of Stackhouse’s intent to commit sexual assault when he transported the victim of his assault across state lines. The court concluded that the application of the federal kidnapping statute to an intrastate kidnapping is constitutional where the defendant uses a cellphone in furtherance of the offense, and that Stackhouse’s actions leading up to and during the trip to Denver established that he had the intent to commit illegal sexual activity when he transported the victim interstate. View "USA V. STACKHOUSE" on Justia Law

Christopher Grimes, a California state inmate, was convicted of second-degree murder. The conviction was based, in part, on statements Grimes made to an undercover jailhouse informant after he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Grimes appealed his conviction, arguing that his statements to the informant should have been suppressed because they were obtained in violation of his right to counsel.The California Court of Appeal affirmed Grimes' conviction. It held that the statements were admissible because law enforcement is not required to give Miranda warnings to a suspect before placing them in a jail cell with an undercover informant. This decision was based on the U.S. Supreme Court case Illinois v. Perkins, which held that the policy underlying Miranda is not implicated when a suspect makes statements to an individual they believe is a fellow inmate. Grimes' petition for review before the California Supreme Court was denied without comment.Grimes then filed a federal habeas petition, arguing that the California Court of Appeal misapplied Edwards v. Arizona, which held that law enforcement must cease custodial interrogation when a suspect invokes their right to counsel unless they subsequently waive that right. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Grimes' habeas petition. The court held that because the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether the Fifth Amendment precludes an undercover jailhouse informant posing as an inmate to question an incarcerated suspect who has previously invoked his right to counsel, the California Court of Appeal’s decision is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as defined by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. View "Grimes v. Phillips" on Justia Law

A group of firefighters from the City of Spokane filed a lawsuit against the city and state officials, alleging that a COVID-19 vaccination mandate violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The mandate, issued by Washington Governor Jay Inslee, required all state agency workers to be fully vaccinated, but the firefighters claimed that their requests for religious exemptions were denied. They were subsequently terminated for failing to get vaccinated. The firefighters also alleged that the city used firefighters from neighboring departments, who were granted religious exemptions by their respective departments, to fill the gaps left by their termination.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington granted judgment on the pleadings to the city and state defendants, dismissing the firefighters' claims. The court held that the city's vaccination requirement survived both strict scrutiny and rational basis review, and that accommodating unvaccinated firefighters would impose an undue hardship.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the firefighters' claims for retrospective and prospective relief were not moot, despite the rescission of the Proclamation. The court found that the city's implementation of the vaccination policy was not generally applicable, as it exempted certain firefighters based on a secular criterion while holding firefighters who objected to vaccination on religious grounds to a higher standard. The court also held that the city's application of the Proclamation was not narrowly tailored to advance the government's compelling interest in stemming the spread of COVID-19. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bacon v. Woodward" on Justia Law

The case involves Leopoldo Rivera-Valdes, a Mexican citizen who unlawfully entered the United States in 1992. In 1994, Rivera-Valdes failed to appear at his deportation hearing and was ordered deported in absentia. He was finally deported in 2006 after being apprehended. After being deported, Rivera-Valdes again unlawfully entered the United States. In 2019, he was charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He challenged the indictment, alleging that his 1994 in absentia deportation order violated due process. The district court denied the motion, and Rivera-Valdes entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal the constitutional challenge to his deportation.The district court denied Rivera-Valdes's motion to dismiss the indictment, ruling that his 1994 in absentia deportation order did not violate due process. Rivera-Valdes had argued that immigration authorities violated his due process rights by ordering him deported in absentia despite the notice of the deportation hearing being returned as undeliverable or unclaimed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the deportation in absentia did not violate due process. The court found that whether Rivera-Valdes actually received the notice, the government followed its statutory obligations and reasonably attempted to inform him of the hearing by mailing notice to his last (and only) provided address. The court rejected Rivera-Valdes's argument that additional steps to notify him of his deportation hearing were required under Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006). The court concluded that even if Jones's "additional reasonable steps" standard did supersede the constitutional adequacy of notice as recognized in this court’s cases, the government still satisfied due process because no additional reasonable steps existed that were practicable for it to take. View "USA V. RIVERA-VALDES" on Justia Law

John Russell Howald was convicted for a federal hate crime under 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) and discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Howald had fired shots at a local woman's house in Basin, Montana, with the intent to "rid" the town of "lesbians and gays." The firearms and ammunition used in the offense had traveled across state lines.In the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Howald moved to dismiss both counts of the indictment, arguing that § 249(a)(2) exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power and that his § 249(a)(2) hate crime conviction was not a predicate crime of violence for § 924(c)(1)(A). The district court upheld the charges and rejected Howald's arguments.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Howald reiterated his arguments. The appellate court held that the jurisdictional element in § 249(a)(2)(B)(iii) defeated the facial challenge to the statute's constitutionality. The court also rejected the as-applied challenge because the government had proven that the firearms and ammunition used in the offense had traveled across state lines. Furthermore, the court held that § 249(a)(2) is divisible, and that Howald’s offense is categorically a crime of violence because an attempt to kill in violation of § 249(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another per § 924(c)(3)(A). Therefore, the court affirmed Howald's convictions. View "United States v. Howald" on Justia Law