Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs in an action challenging California Health and Safety Code 25982. Section 25982 bans the sale of products made from force-fed birds, such as foie gras. The panel held that section 25982 is not expressly preempted by the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), because the PPIA prohibited states from imposing "ingredient requirements" that were "in addition to, or different than" the federal law. In this case, the ordinary meaning of "ingredient" and the purpose and scope of the PPIA together made clear that "ingredient requirements" pertain to the physical components that comprise a poultry product, not animal husbandry or feeding practices. The panel also held that the PPIA impliedly preempted section 25982 under the doctrines of field and obstacle preemption. Accordingly, the panel vacated the district court's permanent injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief in petitioner's death penalty case where he was convicted of kidnapping and first degree murder. The panel rejected petitioner's argument that the Arizona Supreme Court's adjudication of his Eighth Amendment claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court; law enforcement misconduct claim; and two ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding the failure to develop information regarding the victim's bones and the failure to present evidence from mental health experts. View "Atwood v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment in favor of DOE in a suit filed under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Plaintiff, the parent of J.B., filed suit individually and on behalf of J.B., challenging J.B.'s individualized education plan (IEP). The panel held that the case was not moot; DOE violated the IDEA by failing to address transition services in the proposed IEP; DOE violated the IDEA by failing to specify in the IEP the Least Restrictive Environment during the regular and extended school year, and the IEP did not detail the anticipated frequency, location, and duration of the proposed specialized instruction in J.B.'s Science and Social Studies activities; nothing in 20 U.S.C. 1414(d) indicates that an IEP must specify the qualifications or training of service providers nor was it established in the record that DOE agreed to provide such an aide at the IEP meeting; and DOE violated the IDEA by failing to specify Applied Behavioral Analysis as a methodology in the IEP. View "R. B. v. Hawaii Department of Education" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief for petitioner in this death penalty case. The panel held that the California Supreme Court reasonably concluded that petitioner received adequate notice of the attempted rape special circumstance and petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated when the prosecutor presented the special circumstance to the jury. In this case, the amended information specifically alleged a special circumstance premised on Cal. Penal Code 190.2(a)(17), which encompassed attempted rape. Furthermore, defense counsel also acknowledged that petitioner received adequate notice of the special circumstance and that petitioner was not prejudiced by the prosecution's arguments premised on attempted rape. After expanding the certificate of appealability to include previously uncertified claims, the panel concluded that, upon further consideration, these claims lacked merit. View "Cain v. Chappell" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's habeas petition as time-barred. In this case, the state trial court entered a second Amended Judgment reinstating petitioner's murder and attempted murder convictions after the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the state trial court's amended judgment overturning and vacating the convictions. The panel held that petitioner's habeas petition was timely filed because "the judgment" under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1) can only refer to the state judgment pursuant to which the petitioner was being held because that was the only judgment identified in the statute-of-limitations provision. Therefore, the statute of limitations must run from the judgment pursuant to which the petitioner was being held. In this case, the Second Amended Judgment started a new one-year statute of limitations, and thus the petition was timely. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Smith v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order modifying a preliminary injunction, which enjoins the Government from enforcing Executive Order 13780 against (1) grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the United States; and (2) refugees who have formal assurances from resettlement agencies or are in the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) through the Lautenberg Amendment. The panel held that, in modifying the preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo, the district court carefully and correctly balanced the hardships and the equitable considerations as directed by the Supreme Court in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017), and did not abuse its discretion. The district court did not err in rejecting the Government's restricted reading of the Supreme Court's June 26, 2017 stay ruling and in modifying the injunction to prohibit enforcement of the Executive Order against grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the United States. The panel affirmed the district court's holding that formally assured refugees have bona fide relationships with resettlement agencies and are covered by the injunction because the assurance is formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course rather than to evade the Executive Order. The panel explained that it considered the individualized screening process necessary to obtain a formal assurance and the concrete harms faced by a resettlement agency because of that refugee's exclusion. View "Hawaii v. Trump" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for plaintiff in an action filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law alleging that a police officer used excessive force when she shot plaintiff. Plaintiff was shot in the back during the officer's response to a 911 call and plaintiff was rendered a paraplegic. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the officer's motion for a new trial, because the evidence presented at trial provided a reasonable basis to support the jury's verdict; the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to give to the jury special interrogatories, a deadly force instruction, or an instruction regarding officer tactics; the district court has broad discretion in the formulation of jury instructions, and the instructions adequately covered the issues presented, correctly stated the law, and were not misleading; and the panel did not reach the officer's argument relating to qualified immunity because she failed to preserve the defense for appeal. View "Lam v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Petitioner claimed that he was categorically exempt from the death penalty because he was intellectually disabled pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Nevada Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim of intellectual disability on the merits. The district court then deferred to its determination under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Ninth Circuit did not decide whether petitioner was intellectually disabled, nor whether the Nevada Supreme Court made a reasonable or an unreasonable determination of fact when it concluded that he is not. Instead, panel decided only that the district court erred in its analysis under AEDPA, and thus the panel remanded for reconsideration in light of Bromfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015), and in light of a doctor's report concluding that petitioner was intellectually disabled. The panel affirmed the district court's order holding that petitioner's Hurst-based Rule 60(b) motion was disguised as an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition. Finally, the panel held that Hurst did not apply retroactively and thus denied petitioner's application for leave to file a second or successive habeas petition. View "Ybarra v. Filson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who has been deaf since birth and uses American Sign Language (ASL) as his primary language, filed suit against the State and County, alleging violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101–12213, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. 701–796I, negligence, and false arrest. Plaintiff alleged that defendants did not provide him with an ASL interpreter at his arraignment on criminal charges, and that the County did not provide him with an ASL interpreter and other auxiliary aids in order for plaintiff to effectively communicate while he was in pretrial detainment and under pretrial supervision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the State; affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his claims for injunctive relief; reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County on plaintiff's ADA and Section 504 claims for compensatory damages; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Updike v. Multnomah County" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal on summary judgment of plaintiff's action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as a "prisoner" under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The panel held, however, that a plaintiff, like the one here, who was in custody at the time he initiated his suit but was free when he filed his amended operative complaint was not a "prisoner" subject to a PLRA exhaustion defense. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Fong" on Justia Law