Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The discovery rule applies to a judicial deception claim. If a diligent plaintiff has pursued the underlying affidavit without success, accrual need not begin at the time of the search. Plaintiff filed suit against defendants for investigating him in connection with his wife's death, claiming that the search warrants for his home and computer were obtained through judicial deception. The Ninth Circuit held there was no question that plaintiff diligently pursued the facts underlying his judicial deception claim. Therefore, his claim for judicial deception was timely. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Klein v. City of Beverly Hills" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed on different grounds the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's putative class action against Maricopa County defendants. The panel held that plaintiff lacked Article III standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief on behalf of herself or a putative class, but that she has standing to pursue individual damages; Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3010(A), as applied by Maricopa County officials, was preempted by Title III, and that plaintiff's rights under 18 U.S.C. 2516(2) were violated because applications for wiretaps were not made by the "principal prosecuting attorney;" section 13-3010(H) was not preempted by Title III if it was construed to require that recordings of intercepted conversations be submitted to a court for sealing within ten days of the termination of the court's order authorizing a wiretap on each particular target line; plaintiff's rights under 18 U.S.C. 2518(8)(a) were violated because the recordings of her intercepted conversations were submitted for sealing more than a month after the termination of the order authorizing the wiretap on the target line on which her conversations were intercepted; and the law enforcement officials who violated sections 2516(2) and 2518(8)(a) were acting in good faith within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 2520(d), and they were protected from a damage judgment. View "Villa v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

In this case, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its previous opinion, denied as moot a petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc; and filed a superseding opinion.Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of all but one of the claims raised in his petition for writ of habeas corpus and the state cross-appealed the district court's grant of relief on petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his capital murder trial. The panel dismissed as unripe the claim the district court certified for appeal, and denied petitioner's motion to expand the certificate of appealability to include uncertified claims. The panel reversed the district court's grant of relief on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim because, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), the California Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in concluding that petitioner was not prejudiced by any deficient performance by his counsel. View "Andrews v. Davis" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was raped by a co-worker at the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC), she filed suit against the IDOC and others. The Ninth Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's Title VII hostile work environment claim. The panel held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the IDOC's actions were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. The panel noted that if the jury finds that the IDOC supervisors created a hostile work environment, the IDOC would also be liable. View "Fuller v. Idaho Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Deputy Doug Lieurance's issuance of a misdemeanor citation to plaintiff for obstructing a buffalo herding operation violated plaintiff's constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit held that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the unlawful seizure claim because the panel could not conclude as a matter of law that a reasonably prudent officer in the deputy's situation would have had probable cause to believe plaintiff committed obstruction and the district court improperly weighed evidence favorable to plaintiff against other evidence presented, failing to draw all inferences in plaintiff's favor; the district court did not first provide plaintiff notice and an opportunity to respond before dismissing the failure-to-train claim for failure to satisfy Rule 12(b)(6); the district court abused its discretion by excluding the entirety of plaintiff's police practices expert's testimony; the district court committed reversible procedural error in granting judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's First Amendment and related state claims without first providing him notice of the grounds for the decision; the district court improperly resolved numerous factual disputes reserved for the jury; and the panel lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's denial without prejudice of defendants' attorney fees motion. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Reed v. Lieurance" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit seeking a declaration that it has the right to investigate violations of tribal, state, and federal law, detain, and transport or deliver a non-Indian violator encountered on the reservation to the proper authorities. The Ninth Circuit held that the first amended complaint raised a federal question that provided federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331; the Tribe has presented a prudentially ripe case or controversy and the case is constitutionally ripe as well; and the district court's conclusion that the Tribe's response letter mooted all controversies between the parties was erroneous. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Arizona state prisoner, filed suit pro se in state court that was subsequently removed by defendant to federal court. The district court dismissed the suit as frivolous and denied pending motions without separately considering plaintiff's motion seeking appointment of a representative or guardian ad litem (GAL) to protect his interests. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the suit was frivolous but ordered a limited remand to evaluate plaintiff's competence and to consider the appointment of a GAL. The panel agreed with the district court's conclusion on remand that it was not required to evaluate plaintiff's competence because he had no interest in this case that could have been protected by appointment of a GAL or issuance of another order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2). Because plaintiff had incurred at least three strikes from prior cases, he was already subject to the limitations imposed under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) and could not be adversely impacted by whatever happened in this case. View "Harris v. Mangum" on Justia Law

The nondisclosure requirement in 18 U.S.C. 2709 is a content-based restriction on speech that is subject to strict scrutiny, and the nondisclosure requirement withstands such scrutiny. In this case, petitioners challenged the law authorizing the FBI to prevent a recipient of a national security letter (NSL) from disclosing the fact that it has received such a request. Applying strict scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit held that national security is a compelling government interest and the nondisclosure requirement of section 2709(c) is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. Assuming the nondisclosure requirement is the type of prior restraint for which the Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), procedural safeguards are required, the NSL law provides those safeguards. Therefore, the nondisclosure requirement in the NSL law does not run afoul of the First Amendment. View "Under Seal v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief and held that petitioner's claim was barred by her failure to exhaust available state court remedies, and was untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). Even assuming that futility persists as a potential exception to AEDPA's exhaustion requirement, it did not excuse petitioner's failure to exhaust her state court remedies in this instance. Furthermore, the fact that petitioner's claim implicates delay in California's post-conviction process did not excuse her failure to exhaust her present claim. The panel held that neither relation back nor the emergence of new facts rendered petitioner's claim timely. View "Alfaro v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is paralyzed from the waist down, filed suit alleging that defendant's refusal to install temporary vehicle hand controls violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff has stated a claim under section 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) for failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures. However, plaintiff failed to make a claim that defendant did not remove architectural barriers in existing facilities, because section 2182(b)(2)(A)(iv) did not apply to the circumstances of this case. Finally, additional implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. 36.307(a) and 36.306, did not preclude plaintiff's statutory claim. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded. View "Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley LLC" on Justia Law