Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Jacob Newmaker was fatally shot by Officer Maxwell Soeth, Newmaker's parents filed suit against the City of Fortuna, Officer Soeth, and Fortuna Police Sergeant Ellebrecht. Plaintiffs alleged that Soeth used unconstitutionally excessive force by striking Newmaker multiple times with his police baton and then fatally shooting him. The district court granted summary judgment to Officer Soeth based on qualified immunity. The court held that the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to Officer Soeth. The court explained that summary judgment is not appropriate in 42 U.S.C. 1983 deadly force cases that turn on the officer’s credibility that is genuinely in doubt. In this case, a reasonable jury could conclude that Soeth and Ellebrecht were wrong when they claimed that Newmaker grabbed the baton. In the alternative, a reasonable jury could conclude, given the trajectory of the bullets through Newmaker’s body, that even if Newmaker had grabbed the baton Officer Soeth could not have fired his first shot while Newmaker was standing up and swinging the baton. Because this case requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, the court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Newmaker v. City of Fortuna" on Justia Law

In November 2014, the Voters of Maui County passed a ballot initiative banning the cultivation and testing of genetically engineered (GE) plants. The district court granted the GE Parties’ motion for summary judgment filed in the Robert Ito Farm action and granted the County’s motion to dismiss filed in the Atay action. The district court found the Ordinance unenforceable because it was expressly and impliedly preempted by federal law, impliedly preempted by state law, and in excess of the County’s authority under the Maui County Charter. SHAKA appealed the district court’s judgment in both cases. The court concluded that SHAKA and other appellants have Article III standing based on the allegations of five individual appellants who allege that GE farming operations on Maui threaten economic harm to their organic, non-GE farms. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in denying SHAKA’s motion to remand to state court, and in denying SHAKA’s request for Rule 56(d) discovery. The court held that the Ordinance is expressly preempted by the Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 7756(b), to the extent that it bans GE plants that the U.S. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) regulates as plant pests. The court held that the ban is not impliedly preempted by the Plant Protection Act in its application to GE crops that APHIS has deregulated, but is impliedly preempted in this application by Hawaii’s comprehensive state statutory scheme for the regulation of potentially harmful plants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and its dismissal in two related actions related to the ordinance. View "Atay v. County of Maui" on Justia Law

After Kauai County passed Ordinance 960 to regulate pesticides and genetically engineered (GE) plants, plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Ordinance. Plaintiffs are companies that supply seed for GE plants. The Ordinance requires commercial farmers to maintain “buffer zones” between crops to which pesticides are applied and certain surrounding properties, provide notifications before and after applying pesticides, and file annual reports disclosing the cultivation of GE crops. The Hawaii Pesticides Law, HRS Ch. 149A, and its implementing rules also regulate pesticides, including by imposing notification requirements and conditions of use, such as locations of permissible use. The district court held that the Ordinance's pesticide provisions are preempted by Hawaii state law. The court concluded that the Hawaii Pesticides Law preempts Ordinance 960's pesticide provisions because both address the same subject matter, the State's scheme for the regulation of pesticides is comprehensive; and the legislature clearly intended for the State’s regulation of pesticides to be uniform and exclusive. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motion to certify the preemption issues to the Hawaii Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Hawaii Pesticides Law impliedly preempts Ordinance 960’s pesticide provisions; affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Hawaii law impliedly preempts Ordinance 960’s GE crop reporting provision in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition; and affirmed the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to certify. View "Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. County of Kauai" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of a child with a disability, sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction requiring the Seattle School District (the district) to place their child in a general education class pending the outcome of the due process challenge. In May 2015, the Bellevue School District produced an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for the child that encompassed two stages: The first stage would begin immediately and the second would begin at the start of the 2015–16 school year. Plaintiffs allowed the child to finish the school year in accordance with the first stage of the IEP but did not agree to the second stage. Over the summer, the family moved to Seattle. Just before the start of the 2015–16 school year, the district proposed a class setting for the child that was similar to the second stage of the May 2015 IEP. Plaintiffs objected and sought a “stay-put” placement. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion on the ground that they had not established a likelihood of success on the merits. The court agreed with the district that a partially implemented, multi-stage IEP, as a whole, is a student’s then-current educational placement. In this case, stage two of the May 2015 IEP was the child's stay-put placement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "N. E. v. Seattle School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, six states, filed suit seeking to block enforcement of California's laws and regulations prescribing standards for the conditions under which chickens must be kept in order for their eggs to be sold in the state. Plaintiffs seek to block enforcement before the laws and regulations take effect. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this case as parens patriae where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties because plaintiffs' alleged harm to the egg farmers in plaintiffs' states is insufficient to satisfy the first prong of parens patriae; plaintiffs' allegations regarding the potential economic effects of the laws, after implementation, were necessarily speculative; and plaintiffs’ reliance on cases granting parens patriae standing to challenge discrimination against a state’s citizens is misplaced where the laws do not distinguish among eggs based on their state of origin. The court also concluded that plaintiffs would be unable to assert parens patriae standing in an amended complaint. Because plaintiffs could allege post-effective-date facts that might support standing, the complaint should have been dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the action without prejudice. View "State of Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, UPS, alleging a state law gender-based hostile work environment claim. A jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on that claim, but the district court granted UPS's motion for a new trial on the ground that the claim was preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185(a). The jury in the second trial found for UPS. The court concluded that the district court erred in holding plaintiff's claim preempted. The court fashioned a two-part test to determine whether a state law claim is preempted under section 301. At the first step, the court asks “whether a particular right inheres in state law or, instead, is grounded in a CBA.” Only if the claim is “founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements” is preemption warranted at this step. At step two, “to determine whether a state law right is ‘substantially dependent’ on the terms of a CBA,” the court asks “whether the claim can be resolved by ‘look[ing] to’ versus interpreting the CBA.” In this case, the jury did not have to decide what any provision of the CBA requires. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's conclusion that plaintiff's claims were preempted to the extent they relied on her allegations regarding UPS’s extra work assignments, and reinstated the jury verdict from the first trial. The court also reversed the district court’s conclusion that the jury’s damages award was “grossly excessive” and remanded for reconsideration. View "Matson v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State Defendants, alleging state and federal claims arising out his discharge from the Hospital and subsequent transportation to Sacramento. The district court dismissed the federal statutory claims with prejudice as a sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), and the supplemental state law claims without prejudice. The court held that plaintiff waived the argument that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his federal claims under Rule 41(b). The court explained that, in the absence of a showing that the district court abused its discretion, because the prior interlocutory order of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is not reviewable, there would be no basis to appeal. Therefore, the court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to make in his opening brief the abuse of discretion argument as to Rule 41(b), he has waived it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Brown v. Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three former baristas, filed a class action against Starbucks, challenging the legality of Starbucks’ practice of withholding state and federal taxes from baristas’ paychecks based on the cash tips they receive. As a general practice, the baristas do not report to Starbucks how much they receive in tips. Instead, for tax withholding purposes, the company simply imputes 50 cents per hour in estimated tip income to each barista and withholds state and federal taxes from the baristas’ paychecks based on that amount. The district court granted Starbucks' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that, under the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341, and the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court also concluded that the federal-state comity doctrine bars the district court from awarding statutory damages on the state-tax component of plaintiffs’ claims, from which the federal-tax component cannot be severed. Because all of the claims are jurisdictionally barred or foreclosed by the comity doctrine, the court concluded that the entire action must be remanded to state court. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Fredrickson v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

Arizona enacted a statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-122, 16-135, 16-584, in 1970, which required each voter who votes in person to cast his or her ballot at the precinct polling station at which the voter was registered to vote. Plaintiff and others challenge the precinct vote rule on the grounds that it violated the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301, and unjustifiably burdened their election rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. After the district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff filed an emergency appeal. The court found that the precinct vote rule, as administered by Arizona, probably does not impermissibly burden minority voters by giving them less opportunity than non-minorities to participate in the political process. But even assuming, without deciding, that it imposes a cognizable burden on minority voters, plaintiff has not shown that Arizona’s enactment of the precinct vote rule is linked to social and historical conditions that have or currently produce racial discrimination against minority voters. Therefore, the court found that the district court correctly denied relief for the claimed violation of the VRA. The court also affirmed the district court's finding that the constitutional violation claims failed because the precinct vote rule, when considered together with other options available to Arizona voters, imposes only a minimal burden upon minority and majority voters. The court explained that such a minimal burden is sufficiently justified by Arizona’s interests in effective administration of voting in the State. View "Feldman v. Arizona Secretary of State's Office" on Justia Law

Leslie Feldman and others filed suit challenging Arizona House Bill 2023 (H.B. 2023), which precludes individuals who do not fall into one of several exceptions (e.g., election officials, mail carriers, family members, household members, and specified caregivers) from collecting early ballots from another person. Plaintiff argues that this state statute violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. 10301, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the First Amendment because, among other things, it disproportionately and adversely impacts minorities, unjustifiably burdens the right to vote, and interferes with the freedom of association. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and plaintiff filed this emergency interlocutory appeal. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on her Voting Rights Act claim. In this case, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that plaintiff adduced no evidence showing that H.B. 2023 would have an impact on minorities different than the impact on non-minorities, let alone that the impact would result in less opportunity for minorities to participate in the political process as compared to non-minorities. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that H.B. 2023 imposed a minimal burden on voters’ Fourteenth Amendment right to vote, in finding that Arizona asserted sufficiently weighty interests justifying the limitation, and in ultimately concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that she was likely to succeed on the merits of her Fourteenth Amendment challenge. The court also concluded that ballot collection is not expressive conduct implicating the First Amendment, but even if it were, Arizona has an important regulatory interest justifying the minimal burden that H.B. 2023 imposes on freedom of association. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of her First Amendment claim. In this case, plaintiff is not only unlikely to prevail on the merits, but, as the district court concluded, her interest in avoiding possible irreparable harm does not outweigh Arizona’s and the public’s mutual interests in the enforcement of H.B. 2023 pending final resolution of this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. View "Feldman v. Arizona Secretary of State's Office" on Justia Law