Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), 42 U.S.C. 1996, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, plaintiffs sought to prevent the government from prosecuting them under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., for possessing cannabis for religious or therapeutic use, obtaining cannabis, and cultivating or distributing cannabis consistent with state law. At issue in this appeal is the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government on the RFRA claim. The court concluded that, even assuming such use constitutes an “exercise of religion,” no rational trier of fact could conclude on this record that a prohibition of cannabis use imposes a “substantial burden.” Nothing in the record demonstrates that a prohibition on cannabis forces plaintiffs to choose between obedience to their religion and criminal sanction, such that they are being "coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs." The court failed to see how prohibiting a substance that plaintiffs freely admit is a substitute for peyote would force them to act at odds with their religious beliefs. In light of Holt v. Hobbs, plaintiffs in this case have produced no evidence establishing that denying them cannabis forces them to choose between religious obedience and government sanction. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims under the AIRFA because the Act does not create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Oklevueha Native Am. Church v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Palomar College Police Officer Christopher Dillard under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims of unlawful seizure and excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Dillard qualified immunity on summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff on the issue of liability. At issue was whether a law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk, searching a suspect for weapons, based solely on the perceived domestic violence nature of the investigation. The court held that, although the domestic violence nature of a police investigation is a relevant consideration in assessing whether there is reason to believe a suspect is armed and dangerous, it is not alone sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. In this case, the court held that Dillard violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure by detaining him for the purpose of performing a Terry frisk. However, the court held that Dillard is entitled to qualified immunity, because it was not clearly established at the time that the perceived domestic violence nature of an investigation was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. The court further held that Dillard used excessive force when he tased plaintiff in order to force him to submit to the Terry frisk against his consent. Nonetheless, given the unsettled state of the law regarding the use of Tasers at the time, Dillard is entitled to qualified immunity. It was not clearly established at the time of Dillard’s actions that an officer who mistakenly but reasonably believed he had the right to conduct a Terry frisk could not deploy a Taser in dart mode to overcome a suspect’s resistance to the frisk. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Thomas v. Dillard" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five individual recipients of deferred action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, and the ADAC, seek permanently to enjoin defendants from categorically denying drivers' licenses to DACA recipients. Defendants had instituted a policy that rejected the Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) issued to DACA recipients under the DACA program as proof of authorized presence for the purpose of obtaining a driver’s license. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction. The court agreed with the district court that DACA recipients are similarly situated to other groups of noncitizens Arizona deems eligible for drivers’ licenses. Consequently, Arizona’s disparate treatment of DACA recipients may well violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the court's previous opinion in Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer indicated is likely the case. Applying the principle of constitutional avoidance, however, the court need not and should not come to rest on the Equal Protection issue, even if it “is a plausible, and quite possibly meritorious” claim for plaintiffs, so long as there is a viable alternate, nonconstitutional ground to reach the same result. In this case, the court concluded that Arizona’s policy classifies noncitizens based on Arizona’s independent definition of “authorized presence,” classification authority denied the states under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.1101, et seq. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order that Arizona’s policy is preempted by the exclusive authority of the federal government to classify noncitizens. View "Arizona Dream Coalition v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a lawyer in California, filed suit challenging California’s procedures for attorney discipline. Plaintiff alleged that California violated her constitutional rights by not providing her meaningful judicial review in a fee dispute between herself and a client, and that the rules governing the California State Bar’s disciplinary procedures are facially unconstitutional. The court agreed with the State Bar that plaintiff's as-applied challenges are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. However, the court concluded that the State Bar misreads this Court’s statute-of-limitations decision in Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, which only applies to facial challenges involving property rights. In this case, plaintiff's facial claims are not time-barred because she filed her claim well within the two-year statute of limitations. On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiff's facial claims based on California’s state constitution fail because they have already been rejected by the Supreme Court of California. The court concluded that, contrary to plaintiff's contentions, People v. Kelly did not overrule In re Rose, which stated that it is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by the federal courts in interpreting their state constitutions. Plaintiff's First Amendment claims are unsupported because the court was aware of no case holding that the First Amendment provides a freestanding right for an individual to have a state court hear her dispute in the absence of some asserted state or federal cause of action, statutory or judge-made. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection claims also fail where California's change in its attorney discipline procedures are not so significant as to create a due process violation. While the regulation of lawyers in California is unlike California’s regulation of any other professionals, plaintiff has not demonstrated that this regulatory scheme violates Equal Protection. California’s decision to regulate lawyers principally via a judicially supervised administrative body attached to the State Bar of California, the organization of all state-licensed lawyers, is rational and so constitutional. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Scheer v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City's policy of training its police dogs to “bite and hold” individuals resulted in a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff accidentally triggered the burglar alarm when she stayed the night on her office couch. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded, however, that a reasonable jury could find that the police officers responding to the alarm used excessive force when they deliberately unleashed a police dog that they knew might well “rip[] [the] face off” any individual who might be present in the office. Because a reasonable jury could find that the force used was excessive, and the City concedes that the use of the force involved was in conformance with its policy, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lowry v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Daniel Chavez served a prison sentence for attempted sexual abuse and then entered probation. Chavez was ordered to enroll in a sex offender treatment program as a condition of his probation. The program required him to admit his guilt before treatment began and while his appeal was pending. Chavez maintained his innocence and invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Chavez was rejected from the treatment program and his probation officer sent him back to prison for violating the terms of probation. The Oregon Attorney General conceded error and the Oregon Court of Appeals remanded his case for retrial. Meanwhile, Chavez filed a pro se in forma pauperis (IFP) civil rights complaint in federal district court against his probation officer and therapist. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. At issue was whether a district court can sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint on the basis of qualified immunity under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), which requires dismissal if the action “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” The court held that the term “immune” as used in the statute includes both absolute and qualified immunity. In this case, because Chavez’s complaint did not clearly foreclose the possibility of qualified immunity, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chavez v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Developers filed suit against the City, contending that the City’s refusal to rezone land to permit higher-density development violated, among other things, the Equal Protection Clause and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Developers maintain that the City’s refusal stemmed from intentional discrimination against Hispanics and created a disparate impact. The court held that Developers presented plausible claims for relief for disparate treatment under the FHA and under the Equal Protection Clause where the City Council denied Developers’ request for rezoning despite the advice of its own experts to the contrary and in the context of what a reasonable jury could interpret as racially charged opposition by Yuma residents. Further, this was the only request for rezoning that the City had denied in the last three years. Because the complaint passes the plausibility bar given these circumstances, the court reversed and remanded. The court also reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact claim, rejecting the district court’s view that other similarly-priced and similarly modeled housing available elsewhere necessarily precluded a finding that there was a disparate impact. The court vacated the denial of the second summary judgment as moot and remanded for the district court to address the motion in the first instance. View "Avenue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two governmental organizations that provide legal representation to capital defendants and prisoners, filed suit raising numerous challenges to the Attorney General's regulations implementing the certification procedure for fast-tracking federal habeas cases for capital prisoners. On summary judgment, the district court sustained most of plaintiffs’ challenges, found the regulations arbitrary or capricious in several respects, and enjoined the regulations from going into effect. The court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss because plaintiffs did not have standing to bring this action. The court declined plaintiffs’ request for a limited remand to allow their clients an opportunity to intervene. The court stated that the Attorney General has not yet made any certification decisions, and, thus, challenges to the procedures and criteria set forth in the regulations are not yet ripe for review. View "Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. USDOJ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the District and two of its administrators, alleging that she had been wrongfully discharged under Washington law, that her First Amendment rights were infringed, that she was retaliated against for exercising such rights, and that she was entitled to recovery under a variety of other state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, her speech to the school and District administrators is made up of the complaints or concerns raised up the chain of command at plaintiff's workplace about her job that are generally not protected. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the scope of her duties, and the evidence indicates that her communication with District staff fell within her job duties. Further, plaintiff's speech to parents was within the scope of her duties and is not protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, plaintiff failed to meet her burden to show that the relevant speech was made in her capacity as a private citizen, and that the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was proper. The court must vacate the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge under Washington law because an intervening authority has overruled the Washington state decision upon which the district court’s analysis was based. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for consideration of the wrongful discharge claim in light of Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co. However, because the court affirmed with respect to the federal claim, the district court should first consider whether to continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. View "Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, diagnosed with Hepatitis C, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for injunction relief and damages, alleging constitutionally inadequate medical care and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff is not bound by his deposition testimony and his damages claims against defendants in their individual capacities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment; given the failure of plaintiff's requested treatment for Hepatitis C and there is no reasonable expectation that plaintiff will request the same failed treatment again, plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot; plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut the Youngsberg v. Romeo professional judgment standard and thus the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's claim of inadequate medical care; plaintiff has set forth specific facts plausibly suggesting that Dr. Bell employed an explicit racial classification sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny; the district court erred in concluding that no constitutional violation occurred when Dr. Bell failed to offer any compelling justification for the racial classification, let alone a justification that was narrowly tailored; and, because it was not clearly established that a reasonable official would understand that the use of race-related success-of-treatment data as a factor in a medical treatment decision would be unconstitutional, Dr. Bell is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mitchell v. State of Washington" on Justia Law