Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City's policy of training its police dogs to “bite and hold” individuals resulted in a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff accidentally triggered the burglar alarm when she stayed the night on her office couch. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded, however, that a reasonable jury could find that the police officers responding to the alarm used excessive force when they deliberately unleashed a police dog that they knew might well “rip[] [the] face off” any individual who might be present in the office. Because a reasonable jury could find that the force used was excessive, and the City concedes that the use of the force involved was in conformance with its policy, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lowry v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Daniel Chavez served a prison sentence for attempted sexual abuse and then entered probation. Chavez was ordered to enroll in a sex offender treatment program as a condition of his probation. The program required him to admit his guilt before treatment began and while his appeal was pending. Chavez maintained his innocence and invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Chavez was rejected from the treatment program and his probation officer sent him back to prison for violating the terms of probation. The Oregon Attorney General conceded error and the Oregon Court of Appeals remanded his case for retrial. Meanwhile, Chavez filed a pro se in forma pauperis (IFP) civil rights complaint in federal district court against his probation officer and therapist. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. At issue was whether a district court can sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint on the basis of qualified immunity under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), which requires dismissal if the action “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” The court held that the term “immune” as used in the statute includes both absolute and qualified immunity. In this case, because Chavez’s complaint did not clearly foreclose the possibility of qualified immunity, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chavez v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Developers filed suit against the City, contending that the City’s refusal to rezone land to permit higher-density development violated, among other things, the Equal Protection Clause and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Developers maintain that the City’s refusal stemmed from intentional discrimination against Hispanics and created a disparate impact. The court held that Developers presented plausible claims for relief for disparate treatment under the FHA and under the Equal Protection Clause where the City Council denied Developers’ request for rezoning despite the advice of its own experts to the contrary and in the context of what a reasonable jury could interpret as racially charged opposition by Yuma residents. Further, this was the only request for rezoning that the City had denied in the last three years. Because the complaint passes the plausibility bar given these circumstances, the court reversed and remanded. The court also reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact claim, rejecting the district court’s view that other similarly-priced and similarly modeled housing available elsewhere necessarily precluded a finding that there was a disparate impact. The court vacated the denial of the second summary judgment as moot and remanded for the district court to address the motion in the first instance. View "Avenue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two governmental organizations that provide legal representation to capital defendants and prisoners, filed suit raising numerous challenges to the Attorney General's regulations implementing the certification procedure for fast-tracking federal habeas cases for capital prisoners. On summary judgment, the district court sustained most of plaintiffs’ challenges, found the regulations arbitrary or capricious in several respects, and enjoined the regulations from going into effect. The court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss because plaintiffs did not have standing to bring this action. The court declined plaintiffs’ request for a limited remand to allow their clients an opportunity to intervene. The court stated that the Attorney General has not yet made any certification decisions, and, thus, challenges to the procedures and criteria set forth in the regulations are not yet ripe for review. View "Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. USDOJ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the District and two of its administrators, alleging that she had been wrongfully discharged under Washington law, that her First Amendment rights were infringed, that she was retaliated against for exercising such rights, and that she was entitled to recovery under a variety of other state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, her speech to the school and District administrators is made up of the complaints or concerns raised up the chain of command at plaintiff's workplace about her job that are generally not protected. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the scope of her duties, and the evidence indicates that her communication with District staff fell within her job duties. Further, plaintiff's speech to parents was within the scope of her duties and is not protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, plaintiff failed to meet her burden to show that the relevant speech was made in her capacity as a private citizen, and that the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was proper. The court must vacate the district court’s judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge under Washington law because an intervening authority has overruled the Washington state decision upon which the district court’s analysis was based. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for consideration of the wrongful discharge claim in light of Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co. However, because the court affirmed with respect to the federal claim, the district court should first consider whether to continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. View "Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, diagnosed with Hepatitis C, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for injunction relief and damages, alleging constitutionally inadequate medical care and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff is not bound by his deposition testimony and his damages claims against defendants in their individual capacities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment; given the failure of plaintiff's requested treatment for Hepatitis C and there is no reasonable expectation that plaintiff will request the same failed treatment again, plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot; plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut the Youngsberg v. Romeo professional judgment standard and thus the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's claim of inadequate medical care; plaintiff has set forth specific facts plausibly suggesting that Dr. Bell employed an explicit racial classification sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny; the district court erred in concluding that no constitutional violation occurred when Dr. Bell failed to offer any compelling justification for the racial classification, let alone a justification that was narrowly tailored; and, because it was not clearly established that a reasonable official would understand that the use of race-related success-of-treatment data as a factor in a medical treatment decision would be unconstitutional, Dr. Bell is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mitchell v. State of Washington" on Justia Law

This case arose when female corrections officer, Alice Hancock, filed a charge of discrimination with the Division against her employer, Geo, alleging that she had been subjected to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of state and federal employment laws. In this appeal, the Division and the EEOC challenged the district court's summary judgment rulings in favor of Geo. The court held that the EEOC and the Division sufficiently conciliated its class claims against Geo in this lawsuit in light of Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC; assuming that exhaustion requirements from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA), Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-1481(A), apply in this case, the court held that the EEOC and the Division may maintain their claims on behalf of aggrieved employees provided that the employee has alleged at least one act of misconduct that occurred within 300 days prior to the date the first aggrieved employee, Alice Hancock, filed her charge against Geo; in an EEOC class action an aggrieved employee is not required to file a new charge of discrimination with the EEOC if her claim is already encompassed within the Reasonable Cause Determination or if the claim is “like or reasonably related” to the initial charge; and that aggrieved employee Sofia Hines has presented material issues of fact as to her hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order. View "Arizona ex rel. Horne v. The Geo Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Sheriff Arpaio, Maricopa County, and the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO), alleging that defendants violated federal law by racially profiling Latino drivers and passengers and stopping them under the guise of enforcing federal and state immigration laws. The court issued an opinion mostly affirming the district court's decision to enter a permanent injunction enjoining Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO from conducting racially discriminatory traffic stops (Melendres II). The court also concluded that the MCSO had improperly been named as a party in the action and the court ordered that Maricopa County be substituted in place of MCSO. Maricopa County now appeals from four district court orders entered between December 2011 and April 2014, which are the same orders that Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO appealed from previously in Melendres II. The court concluded that the County failed to carry its burden of invoking the court's jurisdiction and the court dismissed the appeal because the County's notice of appeal was untimely filed under 28 U.S.C. 2107(a) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The court rejected the County's arguments to the contrary and dismissed the appeal. View "Melendres v. Maricopa Cnty." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the parties contest the proper interpretation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), 5 U.S.C. 3345 et seq., as it relates to the appointment of the former Acting General Counsel of the NLRB. KTSS challenges the authority of Lafe E. Solomon, the former Acting General Counsel of the NLRB, to authorize a petition for injunctive relief against KTSS after the President nominated him to the permanent position. As a preliminary matter, the court rejected KTSS’s argument that because Solomon’s appointment did not comply with section 3(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 153(d), the appointment was necessarily invalid. The court concluded that, to be valid, a petition under section 10(j) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 160(j), must be authorized by the Board through one of two avenues: the first is for a quorum of three Board members to directly authorize the specific 10(j) petition, and the second is for the General Counsel to authorize the petition pursuant to a previous delegation of the Board’s 10(j) authority to the General Counsel. The Board concedes that the first avenue was not satisfied in this case. The court held that the second avenue was not satisfied either because Solomon was not properly serving as Acting General Counsel under the FVRA at the time that the petition was filed. In light of this holding, the court need not reach KTSS’s alternative argument that the Board never validly delegated its 10(j) authority to Solomon. Finally, the Board explicitly waived any arguments based on the FVRA’s exemption clause and it does not otherwise contest the remedy sought by KTSS. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition. View "Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs." on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a dispute between Shell and Greenpeace over the search for oil in the Chukchi Sea. The parties now dispute the propriety of a preliminary injunction entered by the district court to protect Shell from certain more vigorous and more intrusive aspects of Greenpeace’s activism. The court did not reach any of Greenpeace's challenges to the injunction because the court concluded that the appeal is moot. Here, the preliminary injunction has expired and will not be renewed. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace" on Justia Law