Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and his children against police officers, four DHS officials and the City, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that DHS and the officers took custody of his children without reasonable cause. The court concluded that the factual issues do not preclude the court from hearing the officers' appeal and rejected plaintiff's claim under Johnson v. Jones. In this case, the undisputed facts provide a sufficient basis to determine whether the officers’ reliance on DHS’s determination violated any clearly established right of plaintiffs. The court also concluded that the officers were not incompetent in believing that they were legally authorized to act in reliance on DHS’s determination. And even if the officers were mistaken in their belief that they could remove the children at the direction of DHS without court authorization, their actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court's order denying qualified immunity to the officers and remanded. View "Sjurset v. Button" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class of representatives of a group of tenants who receive rent subsidies through the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, filed suit asserting that defendants reduced the amount of Section 8 beneficiaries' subsidies without providing adequate notice, in violation of federal and state law. The court concluded that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the Housing Authority; there is no genuine dispute of fact as to whether the Housing Authority failed to provide meaningful information to Section 8 beneficiaries about the change to the payment standard and the effect of that change upon the beneficiaries and their property interests; that failure violated both the requirements of the Voucher Program regulations and the requirements of procedural due process; and that failure also resulted in a violation of two state statutes which require public entities to take reasonable efforts to comply with the mandatory duties established by federal regulations. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nozzi v. HACLA" on Justia Law

California Education Code 56346(f) requires school districts to initiate a due process hearing if the school district determines that a portion of an Individualized Education Program (IEP) to which a parent does not consent is necessary to provide a child with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1450. The ALJ concluded that the district offered an appropriate placement but Mother's refusal to consent prevented the district from implementing and providing a FAPE. I.R. appealed, but the district court affirmed. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that the district could not initiate a due process hearing to address Mother's refusal to the IEP's recommended placement. In this case, the district waited a year and a half before initiating a hearing, which the court determined was too long a period of time. Therefore, to the extent that I.R. lost an educational opportunity and was deprived of educational benefits for an unreasonably prolonged period, the district can be held responsible for denying her a FAPE for that unreasonably prolonged period. The court reversed and remanded. View "I.R. v. L.A. U.S.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five Tucson voters and a non-profit corporation called PIA, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Tucson’s hybrid system for electing members of its city council. The Supreme Court has held that the primary and general elections are a “single instrumentality for choice of officers.” Because the primary and general elections are two parts of a “unitary” process, a citizen’s right to vote in the general election may be meaningless unless he is also permitted to vote in the primary. Because the constituency of the representative to be elected remains static throughout the election process, the geographical unit must also remain static throughout that process. In this case, such mismatches between voters at different stages of a single election cycle are not constitutionally permissible. The court concluded that the practical effect of the Tucson system is to give some of a representative’s constituents - those in his home ward - a vote of disproportionate weight. The court held that every otherwise eligible voter who will be a constituent of the winner of the general election must have an equal opportunity to participate in each election cycle through which that candidate is selected. Because all Tucsonans have an equal interest in determining who the nominees will be, the city may not exclude out-of-ward voters from the primaries. Thus, the court rejected the city's final argument that the hybrid system is a reasonable “residency restriction” on the right to vote. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the city. View "Public Integrity Alliance v. City of Tucson" on Justia Law

The Nation filed suit against defendants challenging the constitutionality of H.B. 2534, a law passed by the Arizona legislature that allows a city or town within populous counties to annex certain surrounding, unincorporated lands. The Nation alleges that H.B. 2534 was enacted to block the federal government from taking the 135 acres it purchased into trust on behalf of the Nation. The Nation planned to build a casino on Parcel 2 of the land. This process would render the land part of the Nation’s reservation pursuant to the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-503, 100 Stat. 1798. The court concluded that H.B. 2534 stands as a clear and manifest obstacle to the purpose of the Act because it was enacted after the Nation’s trust application was filed, and it uses that application itself to thwart the taking of purchased land into trust. Accordingly, the court held that H.B. 2534 is preempted by the Act. The legality of the Secretary’s taking of Parcel 2 into trust pursuant to the Act is affirmed, and the Nation is free to petition the Secretary to have the remainder of the land taken into trust, pursuant to the Act. View "Tohono O'odham Nation v. Arizona" on Justia Law

ASSE, a third-party Exchange Visitor Program (EVP) sponsor, challenged the Department's sanctions decision. The district court dismissed the suit as unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), because the administration of the EVP is "committed to agency discretion by law." The district court also dismissed ASSE's constitutional claims based on the grounds that the process was fundamentally fair. The court concluded that the Department failed to rebut the strong presumption of judicial reviewability because its regulations provide a “meaningful standard” by which the court can review its exercise of discretion in sanctioning ASSE. Therefore, the court may review the State Department’s final agency action under the standards prescribed by 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). To the extent the petition challenges the agency’s factfinding, the court may review the State Department’s determinations for substantial evidence. Because ASSE did not have a meaningful opportunity to rebut significant portions of the evidence that the Department used against it, the Department did not afford it adequate procedural protections. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding that ASSE failed to state a claim because the process afforded was fundamentally fair. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "ASSE Int'l, Inc. v. Kerry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a transgendered woman, petitioned the CDCR for sex reassignment surgery when she was incarcerated in the California prison system. After the petition was denied, plaintiff filed suit alleging that the denial amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The district court issued a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to provide plaintiff with sex reassignment surgery and CDCR appealed under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). This court stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal. While this appeal was pending, plaintiff was released on parole. Pursuant to Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Teamsters, the court concluded that, where “the facts surrounding” a prisoner’s release “are not sufficiently developed in the record . . . to determine” whether the release occurred through happenstance or the defendants’ actions, the appropriate course is to remand to the district court to determine whether to vacate its order. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court so that it can determine whether this appeal became moot through happenstance or defendants’ own actions. If the latter is the case, the court concluded that the district court should consider the factors under Ringsby to determine whether to vacate its preliminary injunction order. View "Norsworthy v. Beard" on Justia Law

IFA appealed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction which IFA sought in order to prevent the City from enforcing a provision in its recently enacted minimum wage ordinance. The court rejected IFA's constitutional challenges under the Dormant Commerce Clause, concluding that the district court did not apply an improper legal standard or clearly err in determining that the ordinance does not facially discriminate against out-of-state entities or interstate commerce. The court also concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding a legitimate purpose in the classification and a rational relationship between franchisees and their classification as large employers; the district court did not err in finding IFA did not show a likelihood of success on its First Amendment claim; the district court correctly ruled that IFA did not show a likelihood of succeeding on its Lanham Act claim because the ordinance does not conflict with the purposes of the Act; and the ordinance does not violate the state constitution where IFA failed to show that the classification derogated a fundamental right of citizens and where the classification rests on “‘real and substantial differences bearing a natural, reasonable, and just relation to the subject matter of the act.’” Finally, the court concluded that the remaining preliminary injunction factors favor the district court's denial of the injunction. Although the district court failed to include all Winter factors, it ultimately reached the proper conclusion because IFA did not raise serious questions going to the merits on any of its claims, nor did it show that an injunction is in the public interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Int'l Franchise Ass'n v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

After plaintiff served his full ten-year sentence, the State of Washington vacated his residential burglary and rape conviction based largely on newly-available DNA testing. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, a police detective, alleging the deliberate fabrication of evidence. The district court found that plaintiff's claim was time-barred and granted summary judgment for defendant. The court held that plaintiff’s claim did not accrue until he was acquitted of all charges on February 10, 2010. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff filed the underlying action within the three-year statute of limitations period, and it was error to dismiss his deliberate fabrication of evidence claim as time-barred. The court declined to address defendant’s qualified immunity defense, and remanded for the district court to consider it in the first instance. View "Bradford v. Scherschligt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that defendant violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and committed various torts during her investigation into whether G.J. had been abused. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of her motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court concluded that plaintiffs' account of the evidence supports a claim that defendant seized G.J., and did so despite the absence of exigent circumstances; case law provided fair warning to defendant that detaining G.J. would violate the Constitution; and therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to attempt to prove their version of the facts to a jury and summary judgment was not appropriate. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that defendant is not entitled as a matter of law to the reporter's privilege under section 11172(a) of the California Penal Code or discretionary immunity under section 820.2 of the California Government Code. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jones v. Wang" on Justia Law