Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Nation filed suit against defendants challenging the constitutionality of H.B. 2534, a law passed by the Arizona legislature that allows a city or town within populous counties to annex certain surrounding, unincorporated lands. The Nation alleges that H.B. 2534 was enacted to block the federal government from taking the 135 acres it purchased into trust on behalf of the Nation. The Nation planned to build a casino on Parcel 2 of the land. This process would render the land part of the Nation’s reservation pursuant to the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-503, 100 Stat. 1798. The court concluded that H.B. 2534 stands as a clear and manifest obstacle to the purpose of the Act because it was enacted after the Nation’s trust application was filed, and it uses that application itself to thwart the taking of purchased land into trust. Accordingly, the court held that H.B. 2534 is preempted by the Act. The legality of the Secretary’s taking of Parcel 2 into trust pursuant to the Act is affirmed, and the Nation is free to petition the Secretary to have the remainder of the land taken into trust, pursuant to the Act. View "Tohono O'odham Nation v. Arizona" on Justia Law

ASSE, a third-party Exchange Visitor Program (EVP) sponsor, challenged the Department's sanctions decision. The district court dismissed the suit as unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), because the administration of the EVP is "committed to agency discretion by law." The district court also dismissed ASSE's constitutional claims based on the grounds that the process was fundamentally fair. The court concluded that the Department failed to rebut the strong presumption of judicial reviewability because its regulations provide a “meaningful standard” by which the court can review its exercise of discretion in sanctioning ASSE. Therefore, the court may review the State Department’s final agency action under the standards prescribed by 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). To the extent the petition challenges the agency’s factfinding, the court may review the State Department’s determinations for substantial evidence. Because ASSE did not have a meaningful opportunity to rebut significant portions of the evidence that the Department used against it, the Department did not afford it adequate procedural protections. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding that ASSE failed to state a claim because the process afforded was fundamentally fair. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "ASSE Int'l, Inc. v. Kerry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a transgendered woman, petitioned the CDCR for sex reassignment surgery when she was incarcerated in the California prison system. After the petition was denied, plaintiff filed suit alleging that the denial amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The district court issued a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to provide plaintiff with sex reassignment surgery and CDCR appealed under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). This court stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal. While this appeal was pending, plaintiff was released on parole. Pursuant to Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Teamsters, the court concluded that, where “the facts surrounding” a prisoner’s release “are not sufficiently developed in the record . . . to determine” whether the release occurred through happenstance or the defendants’ actions, the appropriate course is to remand to the district court to determine whether to vacate its order. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court so that it can determine whether this appeal became moot through happenstance or defendants’ own actions. If the latter is the case, the court concluded that the district court should consider the factors under Ringsby to determine whether to vacate its preliminary injunction order. View "Norsworthy v. Beard" on Justia Law

IFA appealed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction which IFA sought in order to prevent the City from enforcing a provision in its recently enacted minimum wage ordinance. The court rejected IFA's constitutional challenges under the Dormant Commerce Clause, concluding that the district court did not apply an improper legal standard or clearly err in determining that the ordinance does not facially discriminate against out-of-state entities or interstate commerce. The court also concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding a legitimate purpose in the classification and a rational relationship between franchisees and their classification as large employers; the district court did not err in finding IFA did not show a likelihood of success on its First Amendment claim; the district court correctly ruled that IFA did not show a likelihood of succeeding on its Lanham Act claim because the ordinance does not conflict with the purposes of the Act; and the ordinance does not violate the state constitution where IFA failed to show that the classification derogated a fundamental right of citizens and where the classification rests on “‘real and substantial differences bearing a natural, reasonable, and just relation to the subject matter of the act.’” Finally, the court concluded that the remaining preliminary injunction factors favor the district court's denial of the injunction. Although the district court failed to include all Winter factors, it ultimately reached the proper conclusion because IFA did not raise serious questions going to the merits on any of its claims, nor did it show that an injunction is in the public interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Int'l Franchise Ass'n v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

After plaintiff served his full ten-year sentence, the State of Washington vacated his residential burglary and rape conviction based largely on newly-available DNA testing. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, a police detective, alleging the deliberate fabrication of evidence. The district court found that plaintiff's claim was time-barred and granted summary judgment for defendant. The court held that plaintiff’s claim did not accrue until he was acquitted of all charges on February 10, 2010. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff filed the underlying action within the three-year statute of limitations period, and it was error to dismiss his deliberate fabrication of evidence claim as time-barred. The court declined to address defendant’s qualified immunity defense, and remanded for the district court to consider it in the first instance. View "Bradford v. Scherschligt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that defendant violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and committed various torts during her investigation into whether G.J. had been abused. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of her motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court concluded that plaintiffs' account of the evidence supports a claim that defendant seized G.J., and did so despite the absence of exigent circumstances; case law provided fair warning to defendant that detaining G.J. would violate the Constitution; and therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to attempt to prove their version of the facts to a jury and summary judgment was not appropriate. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that defendant is not entitled as a matter of law to the reporter's privilege under section 11172(a) of the California Penal Code or discretionary immunity under section 820.2 of the California Government Code. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jones v. Wang" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representatives of a class of non-resident commercial fishers, filed suit contending that California’s discriminatory fees violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution. The court held that California's differential commercial fishing license fees, Cal. Fish & Game Code 7852, 7881, 8550.5, and 8280.6, violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because charging non-residents two to three times the amount charged to residents plainly burdens non-residents’ right to pursue a common calling, in this case commercial fishing. Although its stated objective, compensation for State expenditures for conservation or enforcement, is valid, California has failed to show that the differential fee charged to a non-resident is closely related to a resident’s share of the State’s expenditures. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs. View "Marilley v. Bonham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Lieutenant with the Corrections Department, filed suit alleging violations of both 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the California Whistleblower Protection Act, California Government Code 8547, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating the whistleblower retaliation issue because it had been litigated during the State Personnel Board proceedings. The court reversed because, pursuant to State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court, the State Personnel Board’s decision does not have preclusive effect under theories of res judicata and collateral estoppel and thus does not prevent plaintiff from litigating his whistleblower retaliation damages claim in the district court. View "Wabakken v. CA Dep't of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and numerous non-profit organizations filed a class-action suit challenging one aspect of the LASC's consolidation plan: the consolidation of unlawful detainer (tenant eviction) actions into hub courts. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit on federal abstention grounds under O'Shea v. Littleton. In this case, plaintiffs seek precisely the sort of “heavy federal interference in such sensitive state activities as administration of the judicial system” that Younger v. Harris and O’Shea sought to prevent. View "Miles v. Wesley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against San Jose police officers and others after the officers took the children into protective custody without a warrant or court order. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of a new trial on compensatory and punitive damages. The court concluded that the district court did not err by concluding that a new trial was warranted. The jury instructions in the first trial may have permitted the jury to improperly award damages for deprivations for which defendants were not responsible. The court also concluded that the district court permissibly concluded that the jury awarded compensatory damages for emotional distress from the separation that was not caused by the police officers; the district court could likewise infer that the jury improperly punished the officers for that same separation. Because one of the factors used to examine the excessiveness of a punitive damages award is the amount of compensatory damages awarded, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that a flawed compensatory damages award justified a retrial for punitive damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Watson v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law