Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, owner of HSF and the Galleria Motel, filed suit against the City and its police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment. The officers entered the public areas of the Galleria Motel and issued citations based on code violations they observed in plain view. The court concluded that the areas of the Galleria Motel open to the public are not within the enumerated items in the Fourth Amendment; therefore, no search occurs when police officers enter those areas. In this case, the complaint alleged only that police officers entered the public areas of the Galleria Motel. Therefore, plaintiff failed to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy pursuant to Katz v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Patel v. City of Montclair" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Los Angeles County public defender, filed suit against the County and a deputy sheriff, alleging that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the deputy briefly arrested her pursuant to a judicial command that she appear in court. The district court concluded that the arrest violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, but that the deputy was protected by qualified immunity. The court concluded that the deputy could not reasonably have believed that he had one of the usual Fourth Amendment justifications for the arrest where he had no warrant; plaintiff was not suspected of a crime; he was not in hot pursuit or performing a community care-taking function, etc. The referee's order, by its clear terms, did not authorize the deputy to seize plaintiff; no reasonable officer could have understood the referee as ordering that plaintiff be forcibly brought into court; and an unreasonable mistake of fact does not provide the basis for qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Demuth v. Cnty. of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

CTTA filed suit challenging Articles 30 and 30.1 of the San Francisco Police Code (the “Permit Scheme”), which comprehensively regulate the towing industry within the city and provide a number of conditions and requirements concerning the towing permits. CTTA claimed that the Permit Scheme was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 14501. On remand, the district court upheld nearly all of the Permit Scheme. The court concluded that the FAAAA’s safety exception does not, as CTTA contends, limit the set of valid safety rationales in this context to those concerned only with the safe physical operation of the tow trucks themselves; the permit requirements of sections 3000 and 3050 are “genuinely responsive” to the set of real safety concerns that underlay enactment of the Permit Scheme, fall within the Act’s safety exception, and are exempted from preemption; the application requirements, including the criminal history disclosure requirements, fall within the scope of section 14501(c)(2)(A), and are therefore not preempted; the fee and penalty provisions fall under the safety exception and are not preempted; the possession and display requirements are not preempted; the business plan requirement is preempted by the FAAAA, but the requirement is severable from the valid complaint requirement contained in section 3052(4), and from the Permit Scheme more generally; and the recordkeeping and brochure requirements fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception, and are therefore saved from preemption. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "CTTA v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

In 2013, Metro rejected an advertisement submitted by AFDI, a nonprofit entity, because Metro concluded that the ad failed to meet the guidelines specified in Metro's transit advertising policy. Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that Metro's rejection violated the First Amendment and seeking a preliminary injunction. The district court denied relief and AFDI filed this interlocutory appeal. The court applied Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King County and concluded that plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to Metro's other reasons for rejecting the ad. Because it has created a nonpublic forum only, Metro’s rejection of plaintiffs’ advertisement must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. In this case, Metro’s rejection of the ad on the ground of falsity likely was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The court further concluded that, even if plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success, they nevertheless would not be entitled to a preliminary injunction because they have not shown that “extreme or very serious damage will result” from the denial of a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying AFDI's motion for a preliminary injunction. View "AFDI v. King County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Montana state prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims based on the violation of his rights under the federal and state constitutions as a result of searches of his home, storage shed, and workplace in 2008, that were made in connection with his criminal prosecution. The court concluded that the district court properly considered plaintiff's complaint and summarily determined that he could not state a cause of action. The material submitted by petition in support of his complaint shows that he knew of the searches in August 2008; his claims concerning the searches accrued at that time under federal law; and plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his claim should be equitably tolled where defendants did not conceal the existence of his claim or prevented him from filing a timely lawsuit. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his action. The court also affirmed the district court's decision to count the dismissal as a strike against plaintiff for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The court concluded that applying a strike to a paid case is consistent with the plain language of the statute, furthers the purposes behind the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and accords with the rulings of its sister circuits. View "Belanus v. Clark" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a border patrol agent, filed suit against DHS, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), because the agency did not promote him based on his age. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DHS. The court adopted the Seventh Circuit's rebuttable presumption approach and held that an average age difference of ten years or more between the plaintiff and the replacements will be presumptively substantial, whereas an age difference of less than ten years will be presumptively insubstantial. The court concluded that, in this case, the average age difference between plaintiff and the selected Assistant Chief Patrol Agent is eight years, which is presumptively insubstantial. However, the court concluded that, although less than ten years older than his replacements, plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that the agency considered age in general to be significant in making its promotion decisions, and that the Tucson Chief Patrol Agent considered plaintiff’s age specifically to be pertinent in considering plaintiff’s promotion. The court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting plaintiff where plaintiff did not meet the leadership and judgment required for the GS-15 positions. The court concluded, however, that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Chief influenced or was involved in the hiring decisions of the GS-15 positions, despite that he was not the final decisionmaker. Further, the district court erred in concluding that the Chief had a limited role in the hiring decision and did not consider the Chief's repeated retirement discussions with plaintiff in assessing whether the Chief's articulated nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment and the court reversed and remanded. View "France v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Foundation, the sole beneficiary of Ray Charles' estate, filed suit to challenge his heirs' purported termination of copyright grants that Charles conferred while he was alive. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the suit meets the threshold requirements of constitutional standing and ripeness, the argument that the Foundation may be a beneficial owner lends no support to its claim to standing; the Foundation is a real party in interest and has third-party standing; under the zone-of-interests test, the Foundation properly asserts its own claims where termination, if effective, would directly extinguish the Foundation’s right to receive prospective royalties from the current grant; and the Foundation is indeed a party whose injuries may have been proximately caused by violations of the statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "The Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the school district had violated T.B.’s civil rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' allegations that the school district violated the ADA and Section 504 by failing to offer and implement a gastronomy tube (g-tube) feeding regime that would enable T.B. to attend school safely; California law establishes federally enforceable rights governing g-tube feeding in schools; the court held that where the State has defined an accommodation by law, that accommodation is enforceable in court; but, plaintiffs failed to prove that the district court was deliberately indifferent to the need to meet state standards for feeding T.B. at school. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the claim regarding the 2007-2008 Individualized Education Plan (IEP), because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the district violated T.B.’s civil rights by failing to accommodate his need for g-tube feedings. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court that a reasonable jury would not be able to find that the district retaliated against plaintiffs. The court vacated the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs and remanded. View "T.B. V. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PCC, his former employer, on his claim of discrimination in violation of Oregon disability law. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that an employee whose stress leads to violent threats is not a “qualified individual” under the Oregon statute. In this case, plaintiff had threatened to kill co-workers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California's Shark Fin Law, Cal. Fish & Game Code 2021(b), which makes it unlawful to possess, sell, offer for sale, trade, or distribute a shark fin in the state. Plaintiffs alleged that the law violates the Supremacy Clause by interfering with the national government’s authority to manage fishing in the ocean off the California coast, and the dormant Commerce Clause by interfering with interstate commerce in shark fins. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' amended complaint with prejudice. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the law is preempted by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), 16 U.S.C. 1801-1884, where plaintiffs failed to identify any actual conflict between the MSA or the California law. The court also concluded that the district court did not fail to grant leave sua sponte and did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. In this instance, leave to amend would be futile. Further, the court rejected plaintiffs' Commerce Clause argument, concluding that nothing about the extraterritorial reach of the Shark Fin Law renders it per se invalid; the law does not fix prices in other states, require those states to adopt California standards, or attempt to regulate transactions conducted wholly out of state, and the price control cases are therefore inapposite; and the Shark Fin Law does not interfere with activity that is inherently national or that requires a uniform system of regulation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chinatown Neighborhood Ass'n v. Harris" on Justia Law