Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a Montana state prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims based on the violation of his rights under the federal and state constitutions as a result of searches of his home, storage shed, and workplace in 2008, that were made in connection with his criminal prosecution. The court concluded that the district court properly considered plaintiff's complaint and summarily determined that he could not state a cause of action. The material submitted by petition in support of his complaint shows that he knew of the searches in August 2008; his claims concerning the searches accrued at that time under federal law; and plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his claim should be equitably tolled where defendants did not conceal the existence of his claim or prevented him from filing a timely lawsuit. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his action. The court also affirmed the district court's decision to count the dismissal as a strike against plaintiff for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The court concluded that applying a strike to a paid case is consistent with the plain language of the statute, furthers the purposes behind the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and accords with the rulings of its sister circuits. View "Belanus v. Clark" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a border patrol agent, filed suit against DHS, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), because the agency did not promote him based on his age. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DHS. The court adopted the Seventh Circuit's rebuttable presumption approach and held that an average age difference of ten years or more between the plaintiff and the replacements will be presumptively substantial, whereas an age difference of less than ten years will be presumptively insubstantial. The court concluded that, in this case, the average age difference between plaintiff and the selected Assistant Chief Patrol Agent is eight years, which is presumptively insubstantial. However, the court concluded that, although less than ten years older than his replacements, plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that the agency considered age in general to be significant in making its promotion decisions, and that the Tucson Chief Patrol Agent considered plaintiff’s age specifically to be pertinent in considering plaintiff’s promotion. The court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting plaintiff where plaintiff did not meet the leadership and judgment required for the GS-15 positions. The court concluded, however, that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Chief influenced or was involved in the hiring decisions of the GS-15 positions, despite that he was not the final decisionmaker. Further, the district court erred in concluding that the Chief had a limited role in the hiring decision and did not consider the Chief's repeated retirement discussions with plaintiff in assessing whether the Chief's articulated nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment and the court reversed and remanded. View "France v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Foundation, the sole beneficiary of Ray Charles' estate, filed suit to challenge his heirs' purported termination of copyright grants that Charles conferred while he was alive. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the suit meets the threshold requirements of constitutional standing and ripeness, the argument that the Foundation may be a beneficial owner lends no support to its claim to standing; the Foundation is a real party in interest and has third-party standing; under the zone-of-interests test, the Foundation properly asserts its own claims where termination, if effective, would directly extinguish the Foundation’s right to receive prospective royalties from the current grant; and the Foundation is indeed a party whose injuries may have been proximately caused by violations of the statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "The Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the school district had violated T.B.’s civil rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' allegations that the school district violated the ADA and Section 504 by failing to offer and implement a gastronomy tube (g-tube) feeding regime that would enable T.B. to attend school safely; California law establishes federally enforceable rights governing g-tube feeding in schools; the court held that where the State has defined an accommodation by law, that accommodation is enforceable in court; but, plaintiffs failed to prove that the district court was deliberately indifferent to the need to meet state standards for feeding T.B. at school. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the claim regarding the 2007-2008 Individualized Education Plan (IEP), because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the district violated T.B.’s civil rights by failing to accommodate his need for g-tube feedings. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court that a reasonable jury would not be able to find that the district retaliated against plaintiffs. The court vacated the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs and remanded. View "T.B. V. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PCC, his former employer, on his claim of discrimination in violation of Oregon disability law. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that an employee whose stress leads to violent threats is not a “qualified individual” under the Oregon statute. In this case, plaintiff had threatened to kill co-workers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California's Shark Fin Law, Cal. Fish & Game Code 2021(b), which makes it unlawful to possess, sell, offer for sale, trade, or distribute a shark fin in the state. Plaintiffs alleged that the law violates the Supremacy Clause by interfering with the national government’s authority to manage fishing in the ocean off the California coast, and the dormant Commerce Clause by interfering with interstate commerce in shark fins. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' amended complaint with prejudice. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the law is preempted by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), 16 U.S.C. 1801-1884, where plaintiffs failed to identify any actual conflict between the MSA or the California law. The court also concluded that the district court did not fail to grant leave sua sponte and did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. In this instance, leave to amend would be futile. Further, the court rejected plaintiffs' Commerce Clause argument, concluding that nothing about the extraterritorial reach of the Shark Fin Law renders it per se invalid; the law does not fix prices in other states, require those states to adopt California standards, or attempt to regulate transactions conducted wholly out of state, and the price control cases are therefore inapposite; and the Shark Fin Law does not interfere with activity that is inherently national or that requires a uniform system of regulation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chinatown Neighborhood Ass'n v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California's Shark Fin Law, Cal. Fish & Game Code 2021(b), which makes it unlawful to possess, sell, offer for sale, trade, or distribute a shark fin in the state. Plaintiffs alleged that the law violates the Supremacy Clause by interfering with the national government’s authority to manage fishing in the ocean off the California coast, and the dormant Commerce Clause by interfering with interstate commerce in shark fins. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' amended complaint with prejudice. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the law is preempted by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), 16 U.S.C. 1801-1884, where plaintiffs failed to identify any actual conflict between the MSA or the California law. The court also concluded that the district court did not fail to grant leave sua sponte and did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. In this instance, leave to amend would be futile. Further, the court rejected plaintiffs' Commerce Clause argument, concluding that nothing about the extraterritorial reach of the Shark Fin Law renders it per se invalid; the law does not fix prices in other states, require those states to adopt California standards, or attempt to regulate transactions conducted wholly out of state, and the price control cases are therefore inapposite; and the Shark Fin Law does not interfere with activity that is inherently national or that requires a uniform system of regulation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chinatown Neighborhood Ass'n v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the owner of a pharmacy and two individual pharmacists who have religious objections to delivering emergency contraceptives, challenged the Commission's rules requiring the timely delivery of all prescription medications by licensed pharmacies. The rules permit pharmacies to deny delivery for certain business reasons, such as fraudulent prescriptions or a customer’s inability to pay; permit a religiously objecting individual pharmacist to deny delivery, so long as another pharmacist working for the pharmacy provides timely delivery; but, unless an enumerated exemption applies, the rules require a pharmacy to deliver all prescription medications, even if the owner of the pharmacy has a religious objection. The district court held that the rules violate the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses, and the court permanently enjoined enforcement of the rules. The court reversed, concluding that the rules are neutral and generally applicable and that the rules rationally further the State’s interest in patient safety. Further concluding that the rules do not infringe on a fundamental right, the court reversed the judgment. View "Stormans, Inc. v.Wiesman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City and several police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and California law, alleging unlawful arrest and excessive force claims. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could have concluded that no probable cause existed, based both on evidence that plaintiff did not in fact resist Officer Abuhadwan and evidence that plaintiff did not impede Abuhadwan in the exercise of his lawful duties. Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment as a matter of law on the unlawful arrest claim. The court also concluded that the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim so substantially prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the excessive force claim as to warrant reversal of the verdict. The court held that the district court's incorrect evidentiary ruling, categorically excluding evidence to establish plaintiff's theory on municipal liability, resulted in the judge erroneously entering judgment as a mater of law for defendants. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on the Monell claims. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion in blanketly refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and so reversed its dismissal of plaintiff’s state law claims. View "Velazquez v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

WCDSS took B.W. into protective custody when she was two-days old and placed her with a foster parent without obtaining prior judicial authorization. Plaintiff, B.W.'s biological father, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the County and three social workers, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff lacked a cognizable liberty interest in his relationship with B.W. and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants because he could not prove a violation of his constitutional rights. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in deciding that the complaint did not provide adequate notice that B.W. asserted a Fourth Amendment claim on her own behalf and, therefore, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this basis. The court further concluded that Defendants Wilcox and Kennedy are not entitled to qualified immunity on B.W.'s Fourth Amendment claim where a reasonable juror might find that a reasonable social worker could not have determined that B.W. would be in imminent danger of serious bodily injury in the time that it would have taken to obtain a warrant. Thus, the court reversed and remanded on this issue. Because the evidence presented here creates at least an inference of an unconstitutional, unofficial custom in Washoe County, the County is not entitled to summary judgment. The court reversed and remanded as to this issue. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant Reynolds because plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that she was involved with the decision to take custody of B.W. View "Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe" on Justia Law