Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former inmate at the Penitentiary, as well as a Muslim and a member of the Nation of Islam, appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of fifteen employees of the Department on several civil rights claims filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-2000cc-5. The court concluded that plaintiff's RLUIPA claims for monetary relief are foreclosed by Sossamon v. Texas and Wood v. Yordy and plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief are moot because he has been released from custody; plaintiff's section 1983 free exercise claims, all stemming from his religious beliefs against consuming and handling pork, are affirmed except that the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for plaintiff's claim that he was required to cook pork as part of his job duties; and, in regards to the First Amendment retaliation claim, the court concluded that there were genuine issues as to whether a food services manager retaliated against plaintiff for his complaints of discrimination and his threat to sue. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's equal protection claim based on allegations of racial discrimination in the disciplinary proceedings following an altercation. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "Jones v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against eight prison medical staff, alleging that they denied him constitutionally adequate medical care while he was incarcerated in the prison. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the magistrate judge erred in giving a jury instruction. The court held that when a pro se civil litigant, such as plaintiff, fails to object to a jury instruction, the court will review the instruction under the ordinary standard of review, rather than for plain error, if the district court and opposing party were fully aware of the potential problem with, and would-be objection to, the instruction. Further, the court held that the deference instruction should not ordinarily be given in Eighth Amendment medical care cases brought by prisoners. Rather, the instruction may be given only when there is evidence that the treatment to which the plaintiff objects was provided pursuant to a security-based policy. In this case, the instruction was error where neither party drew such a connection. Because the error was harmless, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Chess v. Dovey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a devout racist and an Aryan Christian Odinist, challenged the State's classification of him as eligible to occupy a prison cell with an individual of a different race, alleging that such a placement would interfere with his religious practice. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's ruling that the State's refusal to exempt him from its Integrated Housing Policy did not violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. a2000cc et seq., or the First Amendment. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that plaintiff's challenge was not moot even though he had transferred prisons because he remains in State custody, and that he was not barred from arguing on appeal that the State improperly burdened his ability to perform the Odinist warding ritual. On the merits, the court concluded that the State has a compelling interest in avoiding invidious racial discrimination and potential liability under the Equal Protection Clause, and the only way for the State to satisfy this interest was to reject plaintiff’s request for an exemption from the Housing Policy. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Walker v. Beard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a conservative political activist, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and related state law causes of action, alleging that defendant, a L.A. County Deputy District Attorney, acted under color of state law when he published derogatory statements about her on his personal blog and on Twitter. The court held that plaintiff has not supported adequately her claim that defendant acted under color of state law for the purposes of section 1983. In this case, the factual allegations compel the conclusion that defendant did not act under color of state law when he blogged and Tweeted about plaintiff because he did so for purely personal reasons, and the communications were unrelated to his work as a county prosecutor. The court concluded that the district court applied an incorrect standard to evaluate the amount in controversy and, as a result, improperly dismissed plaintiff's state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Naffe v. Frey" on Justia Law

The prison guards' union filed suit challenging Washington state's designation of female-only correctional positions as discrimination based on sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The court concluded that the state's individualized, well-researched decision to designate discrete sex-based correctional officer categories was justified because sex is a bona-fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) for those positions. The court found that the state was well-justified in concluding that rampant abuse should not be an accepted part of prison life and taking steps to protect the welfare of inmates under its care. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the state. View "Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. WA Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City retaliated against him for engaging in protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiff alleged that the statements he made to his supervisors regarding the alleged unlawful hiring and use of temporary exempt employees, such as himself, in contravention of the San Francisco Charter were related to a matter of public concern and protected under the First Amendment. The district court concluded that defendant failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint, while potentially significant in their implications, arose primarily out of concerns for his own professional advancement and his dissatisfaction with his status as a temporary employee; the form and context of plaintiff's speech weighs strongly against finding that First Amendment protection is warranted; and, in this case, plaintiff voiced his grievances internally - at union meetings, to his supervisor, and to Human Resources - and they were specifically related to the conditions of his employment. Because plaintiff did not engage in protected speech, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his complaint. View "Turner v. City & Cty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Department appealed the district court’s order expanding a preliminary injunction forbidding the Department from decreasing the individual budgets of a class of participants in and applicants to Idaho’s Developmental Disabilities Waiver program (DD Waiver program) without adequate notice. The court rejected the Department's ripeness argument and concluded that the dispute is ripe for adjudication where plaintiffs alleged that they have already felt the effects of the Department's actions in a concrete way; the district court reasonably found that participants’ services are capped by their individual budgets under Idaho law; the district court also did not abuse its discretion in holding that plaintiffs were likely to show that the 2011 Budget Notices did not comply with the notice requirements of the Medicaid regulations; the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that they were denied adequate notice under the Due Process Clause; the Department waived its argument that plaintiffs failed to show that the proposed class was likely to suffer irreparable harm; the court joined a number of its sister circuits in rejecting Eleventh Amendment challenges directed at orders reinstating social assistance benefits prospectively; and the court declined to exercise jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying the motion to approve the 2013 Proposed Notice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "K.W. v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of a disabled student, filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., seeking reimbursement by the DOE for the costs of attending a private program. The hearing officer denied the request for reimbursement, concluding that it was untimely under Haw. Rev. Stat. 302A-443(a). The district court held, however, that the student's placement by the parents was “bilateral,” not “unilateral,” so that the parents’ request was not untimely, and concluded that the parents were entitled to reimbursement. The court agreed and concluded that the student's family is entitled to reimbursement for the 2010–11 school year because the DOE tacitly consented to his enrollment at the private school program by failing to provide an alternative. The court also affirmed the district court's fee award. View "Sam K. v. Hawaii Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint charging Apple Nevada with sexual harassment and discrimination, as well as an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court dismissed the complaint based on untimeliness. The court held that the filing date of a complaint is the date it is delivered to the clerk, whether it is submitted with or without an IFP application; if an IFP application is submitted with the complaint in lieu of the filing fee, and the application is thereafter denied, the district court will be free to dismiss the complaint if the fee is not paid within a reasonable time following the denial; and the filing date will be the date on which the complaint was originally delivered to the clerk’s office along with the IFP application. The court also held that it is an abuse of discretion to deny an IFP application based upon a spouse’s financial resources, unless there is a reasonable inquiry into (a) whether the spouse’s resources are actually available to the would-be plaintiff and (b) whether the spouse in fact has sufficient funds, given his or her own expenses, to assist in paying the fee. In this case, plaintiff's complaint was filed for purposes of the statute of limitations when she delivered it to the clerk's office along with her IFP application. The complaint was filed on time and the denial of the IFP application lacked adequate foundation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Escobedo v. Apple American Grp." on Justia Law

Jennie McCormack filed suit alleging that Idaho Code Title 18, Chapters 5—the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act (“PUCPA”)—and 6, which regulate the performance of abortions, violate various provisions of the United States Constitution. Dr.Richard Hearn, McCormack's attorney and third-party intervenor, who is also an Idaho licensed physician who intends to provide his patients with pre-viability medical abortions, challenged the constitutionality of §§ 18-505 and 18-608, which fall within Chapters 5 and 6 of Idaho Code Title 18. The court concluded that McCormack’s challenge to § 18-606 is not moot; McCormack has standing based on a lingering risk of prosecution under § 18-606; Dr. Hearn has standing to challenge §§ 18-505 and 18-608; section 18-505 is facially unconstitutional because it categorically bans some abortions before viability; section 18-608(2) is facially unconstitutional because it places an undue burden on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion by requiring hospitalizations for all second-trimester abortions; and section 18-608(1) in conjunction with § 18-605 is unconstitutionally vague. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McCormack v. Herzog" on Justia Law