Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The school board of Tucson developed the Mexican American Studies (MAS) program in Tucson public schools to provide a culturally relevant curriculum for students by incorporating historical and contemporary Mexican American contributions into coursework and classroom studies. Arizona state superintendents of education successfully sponsored and implemented legislation that did away with the program (A.R.S. 15-111 and 15-112). The statute prohibits a school district or charter school from including in its program of instruction any courses or classes that: (1) “Promote the overthrow of the United States government,” (2) “Promote resentment toward a race or class of people,” (3) “Are designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group,” or (4) “Advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals.” Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the statutes. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings that A.R.S 15-112(A)(3) is unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment but severable from the rest of the statute; that A.R.S. 15-112(A)(2) and (A)(4) are not overbroad in violation of the First Amendment; and that A.R.S. 15-112(A)(2) and (A)(4) are not vague in violation of the Due Process Clause. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs’ equal protection claim where there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether the enactment and/or enforcement of A.R.S. 15-112 was motivated at least in part by a discriminatory intent. The court remanded that claim for trial. Finally, the court remanded plaintiffs’ First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claim to the district court for further proceedings. View "Arce v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by use of excessive force by prison guards. At issue was a claim that a threat of retaliatory action by a prison guard had the effect of rendering the prison grievance system unavailable so as to excuse the prisoner’s failure to meet the time limitation for filing a grievance. As a preliminary matter, the court held that exhaustion issues must instead generally be decided on a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. The court joined other circuits in holding that fear of retaliation may be sufficient to render the inmate grievance procedure unavailable, and the court approved the test applied in the Eleventh Circuit that requires both a subjective and objective basis for the fear. In this case, the court held that plaintiff failed to show an objective basis for his belief that prison officials would retaliate against him for filing a grievance. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "McBride v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, applying advantage gambling techniques, won a significant amount of money on video blackjack machines at a casino owned and operated by the Tonto Apache Tribe on tribal land. Plaintiffs filed suit against the tribal defendants, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and under state tort law for battery, false imprisonment, conversion, defamation, trespass to chattels, and negligence. The district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. At issue was whether tribal officers may assert tribal sovereign immunity when sued in their individual capacities for an assertedly unconstitutional detention and seizure of property. The court concluded that sovereign immunity is a quasi-jurisdictional issue that, if invoked at the Rule 12(b)(1) stage, must be addressed and decided; the district court erred in concluding that it could deny the tribal defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion even if they were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity; the tribal defendants are not entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, however, because they are being sued in their individual capacities, rather than in their official capacities, for actions taken in the course of their official duties; and whether the tribal defendants were acting under state or tribal law does not matter for purposes of this analysis, although it will matter for purposes of deciding whether plaintiffs can succeed in their section 1983 claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Pistor v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The United States filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district judge’s policy restricting the pro hac vice admission of government attorneys. After the petition was filed, the district judge reversed his previous order denying an attorney in this case pro hac vice admission. The court concluded that the case was not moot and that the controversy remains live where it was reasonably likely that the judge will again deny the pro hac vice applications of attorneys for the United States; while the reversal of the challenged order did not render this controversy moot, it rendered a formal writ of mandamus a superfluous or ineffective remedy here; in this case, the judge acted outside his discretion by failing to provide a valid reason to deny the attorney's application for pro hac vice admission; the judge committed clear error; the first and second Bauman v. U.S. District Court factors weighed in favor of issuing mandamus when the petition was filed, and weigh in favor of offering guidance to the district court; the fact that the judge's order in this case was not an isolated occurrence weighed in favor of granting mandamus relief when the petition was filed; the district court's order raises important problems or issues of first impression and weighed in favor of mandamus relief when the petition was filed and weighs in favor of offering guidance to the district court even though a formal writ is no longer necessary; and issuing a formal writ would have been an appropriate remedy but for the judge’s voluntary cessation. Accordingly, the court denied the petition without prejudice. View "USA V. USDC-NVR" on Justia Law

California enacted Senate Bill 863 to combat an acute “lien crisis” in its workers’ compensation system. Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that SB 863 violates the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed the Takings claim because the economic impact of SB 863 and its interference with plaintiffs’ expectations is not sufficiently severe to constitute a taking; the lien activation fee does not burden any substantive due process right to court access; assuming, without deciding, that the lien activation fee is analogous to a tax, its retroactive effect does not violate due process because its retroactivity is justified by a rational legislative purpose; the district court abused its discretion in finding that a “serious question” exists as to the merits of plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim; in the absence of a “serious question” going to the merits of this claim, the preliminary injunction must be vacated; the exemption provision is rationally related to the purpose of clearing the lien backlog amounts to a determination that plaintiffs have no chance of success on the merits because, regardless of what facts plaintiffs might prove during the course of litigation, “a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data;" the presence in the Commission Report of evidence suggesting that non-exempt entities are the biggest contributors to the backlog is sufficient to eliminate any chance of plaintiffs succeeding on the merits; and the court exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and reversed. View "Angelotti Chiropractic v. Baker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a transgender inmate, filed a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs. Plaintiff alleged that she suffers from severe gender dysphoria for which sexual reassignment surgery (SRS) is the medically necessary treatment, but that prison officials refuse to provide the surgery. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the complaint stated an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief could be granted where plaintiff plausibly alleges that she has severe gender dysphoria, citing repeated episodes of attempted self-castration despite continued hormone treatment, the medically accepted treatment for her dysphoria is SRS, and prison officials were aware of her medical history and need for treatment, but denied the surgery because of a blanket policy against SRS. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Rosati v. Igbinoso" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former inmate at the Penitentiary, as well as a Muslim and a member of the Nation of Islam, appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of fifteen employees of the Department on several civil rights claims filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-2000cc-5. The court concluded that plaintiff's RLUIPA claims for monetary relief are foreclosed by Sossamon v. Texas and Wood v. Yordy and plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief are moot because he has been released from custody; plaintiff's section 1983 free exercise claims, all stemming from his religious beliefs against consuming and handling pork, are affirmed except that the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for plaintiff's claim that he was required to cook pork as part of his job duties; and, in regards to the First Amendment retaliation claim, the court concluded that there were genuine issues as to whether a food services manager retaliated against plaintiff for his complaints of discrimination and his threat to sue. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's equal protection claim based on allegations of racial discrimination in the disciplinary proceedings following an altercation. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "Jones v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against eight prison medical staff, alleging that they denied him constitutionally adequate medical care while he was incarcerated in the prison. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the magistrate judge erred in giving a jury instruction. The court held that when a pro se civil litigant, such as plaintiff, fails to object to a jury instruction, the court will review the instruction under the ordinary standard of review, rather than for plain error, if the district court and opposing party were fully aware of the potential problem with, and would-be objection to, the instruction. Further, the court held that the deference instruction should not ordinarily be given in Eighth Amendment medical care cases brought by prisoners. Rather, the instruction may be given only when there is evidence that the treatment to which the plaintiff objects was provided pursuant to a security-based policy. In this case, the instruction was error where neither party drew such a connection. Because the error was harmless, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Chess v. Dovey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a devout racist and an Aryan Christian Odinist, challenged the State's classification of him as eligible to occupy a prison cell with an individual of a different race, alleging that such a placement would interfere with his religious practice. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's ruling that the State's refusal to exempt him from its Integrated Housing Policy did not violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. a2000cc et seq., or the First Amendment. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that plaintiff's challenge was not moot even though he had transferred prisons because he remains in State custody, and that he was not barred from arguing on appeal that the State improperly burdened his ability to perform the Odinist warding ritual. On the merits, the court concluded that the State has a compelling interest in avoiding invidious racial discrimination and potential liability under the Equal Protection Clause, and the only way for the State to satisfy this interest was to reject plaintiff’s request for an exemption from the Housing Policy. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Walker v. Beard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a conservative political activist, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and related state law causes of action, alleging that defendant, a L.A. County Deputy District Attorney, acted under color of state law when he published derogatory statements about her on his personal blog and on Twitter. The court held that plaintiff has not supported adequately her claim that defendant acted under color of state law for the purposes of section 1983. In this case, the factual allegations compel the conclusion that defendant did not act under color of state law when he blogged and Tweeted about plaintiff because he did so for purely personal reasons, and the communications were unrelated to his work as a county prosecutor. The court concluded that the district court applied an incorrect standard to evaluate the amount in controversy and, as a result, improperly dismissed plaintiff's state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Naffe v. Frey" on Justia Law