Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The prison guards' union filed suit challenging Washington state's designation of female-only correctional positions as discrimination based on sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The court concluded that the state's individualized, well-researched decision to designate discrete sex-based correctional officer categories was justified because sex is a bona-fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) for those positions. The court found that the state was well-justified in concluding that rampant abuse should not be an accepted part of prison life and taking steps to protect the welfare of inmates under its care. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the state. View "Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. WA Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City retaliated against him for engaging in protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiff alleged that the statements he made to his supervisors regarding the alleged unlawful hiring and use of temporary exempt employees, such as himself, in contravention of the San Francisco Charter were related to a matter of public concern and protected under the First Amendment. The district court concluded that defendant failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint, while potentially significant in their implications, arose primarily out of concerns for his own professional advancement and his dissatisfaction with his status as a temporary employee; the form and context of plaintiff's speech weighs strongly against finding that First Amendment protection is warranted; and, in this case, plaintiff voiced his grievances internally - at union meetings, to his supervisor, and to Human Resources - and they were specifically related to the conditions of his employment. Because plaintiff did not engage in protected speech, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his complaint. View "Turner v. City & Cty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Department appealed the district court’s order expanding a preliminary injunction forbidding the Department from decreasing the individual budgets of a class of participants in and applicants to Idaho’s Developmental Disabilities Waiver program (DD Waiver program) without adequate notice. The court rejected the Department's ripeness argument and concluded that the dispute is ripe for adjudication where plaintiffs alleged that they have already felt the effects of the Department's actions in a concrete way; the district court reasonably found that participants’ services are capped by their individual budgets under Idaho law; the district court also did not abuse its discretion in holding that plaintiffs were likely to show that the 2011 Budget Notices did not comply with the notice requirements of the Medicaid regulations; the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that they were denied adequate notice under the Due Process Clause; the Department waived its argument that plaintiffs failed to show that the proposed class was likely to suffer irreparable harm; the court joined a number of its sister circuits in rejecting Eleventh Amendment challenges directed at orders reinstating social assistance benefits prospectively; and the court declined to exercise jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying the motion to approve the 2013 Proposed Notice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "K.W. v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of a disabled student, filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., seeking reimbursement by the DOE for the costs of attending a private program. The hearing officer denied the request for reimbursement, concluding that it was untimely under Haw. Rev. Stat. 302A-443(a). The district court held, however, that the student's placement by the parents was “bilateral,” not “unilateral,” so that the parents’ request was not untimely, and concluded that the parents were entitled to reimbursement. The court agreed and concluded that the student's family is entitled to reimbursement for the 2010–11 school year because the DOE tacitly consented to his enrollment at the private school program by failing to provide an alternative. The court also affirmed the district court's fee award. View "Sam K. v. Hawaii Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint charging Apple Nevada with sexual harassment and discrimination, as well as an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court dismissed the complaint based on untimeliness. The court held that the filing date of a complaint is the date it is delivered to the clerk, whether it is submitted with or without an IFP application; if an IFP application is submitted with the complaint in lieu of the filing fee, and the application is thereafter denied, the district court will be free to dismiss the complaint if the fee is not paid within a reasonable time following the denial; and the filing date will be the date on which the complaint was originally delivered to the clerk’s office along with the IFP application. The court also held that it is an abuse of discretion to deny an IFP application based upon a spouse’s financial resources, unless there is a reasonable inquiry into (a) whether the spouse’s resources are actually available to the would-be plaintiff and (b) whether the spouse in fact has sufficient funds, given his or her own expenses, to assist in paying the fee. In this case, plaintiff's complaint was filed for purposes of the statute of limitations when she delivered it to the clerk's office along with her IFP application. The complaint was filed on time and the denial of the IFP application lacked adequate foundation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Escobedo v. Apple American Grp." on Justia Law

Jennie McCormack filed suit alleging that Idaho Code Title 18, Chapters 5—the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act (“PUCPA”)—and 6, which regulate the performance of abortions, violate various provisions of the United States Constitution. Dr.Richard Hearn, McCormack's attorney and third-party intervenor, who is also an Idaho licensed physician who intends to provide his patients with pre-viability medical abortions, challenged the constitutionality of §§ 18-505 and 18-608, which fall within Chapters 5 and 6 of Idaho Code Title 18. The court concluded that McCormack’s challenge to § 18-606 is not moot; McCormack has standing based on a lingering risk of prosecution under § 18-606; Dr. Hearn has standing to challenge §§ 18-505 and 18-608; section 18-505 is facially unconstitutional because it categorically bans some abortions before viability; section 18-608(2) is facially unconstitutional because it places an undue burden on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion by requiring hospitalizations for all second-trimester abortions; and section 18-608(1) in conjunction with § 18-605 is unconstitutionally vague. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McCormack v. Herzog" on Justia Law

A-1 filed suit challenging the constitutionality of four provisions of Hawaii's campaign finance laws under Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. On appeal, A-1 challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commission. The court concluded that Hawaii’s expenditure and noncandidate committee definitions in HRS 11-302 are not vague given the Commission’s narrowing construction; Hawaii's advertising definition in HRS 11-302 is not unconstitutionally vague; the noncandidate committee reporting and disclosure requirements survive exacting scrutiny as applied to A-1 where they were substantially related to Hawaii's important interest in informing the electorate, preventing corruption or its appearance, and avoiding the circumvention of valid campaign finance laws; the disclaimer requirement for advertisements is constitutional under Citizens United; A-1 lacks standing to challenge the electioneering communications reporting requirements; the contractor contribution ban is constitutional even as applied to contributions to legislators who neither award nor oversee contracts; and individual Plaintiffs Yamada and Stewart are entitled to attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits, but vacated the fee award, referring the matter to the Appellate Commissioner with instructions. View "A-1 A-Lectrician v. Snipes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Guam resident who is not eligible to register to vote because he is not a Native Inhabitant, filed suit alleging that Guam's Native Inhabitant classification is an unlawful proxy for race. At issue was whether plaintiff had standing to challenge the classification and whether his claims are ripe. The court concluded that plaintiff has Article III standing where his challenge to Guam's registration restriction asserts a judicially cognizable injury that would be prevented or redressed if the district court were to grant his requested relief; the claim is ripe because plaintiff alleges he is currently subject to unlawful unequal treatment in the ongoing registration process; and, therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Davis v. Guam" on Justia Law

Defendant filed suit against the County, the Sheriff's Department, and individual defendants after he was savagely attacked by an intoxicated arrestee who had been placed in a "sobering cell" with plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff against both the individual and entity defendants for past and future damages. On appeal, defendants challenged the denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court concluded that neither the individual defendants, plaintiff's jailers, is entitled to qualified immunity where the duty to protect plaintiff from violence was clearly established at the time of the incident; the jury could have found that Defendant Solomon was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to plaintiff because he disregarded plaintiff's pounding on the cell door; and the jury could have found that Defendant Valentine was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to plaintiff when he placed the attacker in plaintiff's cell. In regards to punitive damages, no additional evidence is required to make a finding of "reckless disregard" when a finding of "deliberate indifference" has been made. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment against the individual defendants. However, the court reversed the judgment against the County where plaintiff's claims under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. was legally viable but there was no evidence that the County had actual knowledge of the risk of plaintiff's safety. Further, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence regarding the amount of past damages. View "Castro v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The IRS requires non-profit educational and charitable organizations registered under 24 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) to disclose the names and contributions of their "significant donors" on Form 990 Schedule B. CCP filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking to enjoin the Attorney General from requiring it to file an unredacted Form 990 Schedule B. The court affirmed the district court's denial of CCP's motion for a preliminary injunction because CCP failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court concluded that CCP's First Amendment facial challenge to the Attorney General's disclosure requirement fails exacting scrutiny where CCP has not shown any "actual burden" on its, or its supporters', freedom of association. In this case, CCP did not claim and produced no evidence to suggest that their significant donors would experience threats, harassment, or other potential chilling conduct as a result of the Attorney General's disclosure requirement. The regulation has a "plainly legitimate sweep" where CCP concedes that the Attorney General has a compelling interest in enforcing the laws of California and CCP does not contest the Attorney General's power to require disclosure of significant donor information as a part of her general subpoena power. Further, the disclosure requirement bears a substantial relation to a sufficiently important government interest. Therefore, CCP's First Amendment facial challenge to the disclosure requirement fails exacting scrutiny. Finally, the court concluded that federal tax law, 26 U.S.C. 6104, does not preempt the requirement. View "Ctr. for Competitive Politics v. Harris" on Justia Law