Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Sears, alleging three disability discrimination claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code 12940(a). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sears. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Sears terminated plaintiff because of his disability; that Sears declined to accommodate his disability; and that Sears did not engage in an interactive process to determine possible accommodation for his disability. In this case, plaintiff presented several state law claims that deserved trial and it should not take a whole lot of evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact in a disability discrimination case, at least where the fact issue on discrimination is genuine and the disability would not preclude gainful employment of a person working with accommodation. Moreover, it is entirely besides the point that some of plaintiff's evidence was self-serving, as it will often be the case in a discrimination case that an employee has something to say about what company representatives said to him or her. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck and Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair to move in public, filed suit against BB&B under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 2000a(b), for purported architectural barriers that plaintiff claimed impeded his ability to fully use the store. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to BB&B. The court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that the ADA does not require wall space within the maneuvering clearance next to the frame of a restroom door that must be pulled open. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in ruling that, because the door lacked a "latch" within the meaning of standards governing ADA compliance, no maneuvering space was required next to the frame of a restroom door that must be pushed open. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kohler v. Bed Bath & Beyond" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a 55-year-old-man with disabilities that require him to use a wheelchair and two canes, filed suit against defendants, alleging that his new parole terms, including a housing restriction imposed under the California Sexual Predator and Control Act that required plaintiff to move from his residence, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff claimed that defendants' decision to require him to live in motels that did not have accommodations for his disabilities caused him pain and stress, exacerbated his medical conditions, and deprived him of access to important medical treatments. The district court concluded that plaintiff's claims were time-barred under California's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. The court held, however, that the district court did not apply the correct statute of limitations standards with respect to the Title II and ADA claims; the district court must borrow the three-year limitations period applicable to claims under California Government Code 11135; under the three-year limitations period, plaintiff's ADA claim is not time-barred; and, although plaintiff does not contest the applicable limitations periods as to his other claims, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice without allowing plaintiff leave to amend. Accordingly, reversed and remanded. View "Sharkey v. O'Neal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of her son, Philip Cortez, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against a corrections officer and the State of Arizona after Cortez was attacked by two other inmates and sustained severe, permanent mental impairment. The court concluded that there are triable issues of material fact related to the officer's awareness of an objectively substantial risk of serious harm where the officer escorted Cortez and the other two inmates by himself through an isolated prison passage. All three inmates were mutually hostile, half-restrained, and high-security inmates. Further, there is sufficient evidence that the officer was subjectively aware of the risk involved in the escort and acted with deliberate indifference to Cortez's safety. The court also concluded that there are triable issues of material fact in regards to the gross negligence claim against the State where the State's gross negligence standard is lower than the federal deliberate indifference standard. Accordingly, the court remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cortez v. Skol" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against I-Flow, manufacturer of the PainBuster continuous infusion pump, alleging state common law claims for negligence and strict products liability. Plaintiff alleged that I-Flow negligently failed to warn that its pain pump should not be used in intra-articular spaces such as the glenohumeral joint; and that I-Flow was strictly liable for selling a product that was unreasonably dangerous due to the lack of adequate warnings. The PainBuster is regulated under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) to the Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 360c(a)(1)(A)(i), (B), (C)(i). Concluding that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal where judgment was entered as to all defendants, the court concluded that the requested jury instructions regarding negligence and federal standards were not preempted by the MDA. Therefore, the court remanded and declined to reach the evidentiary issues. The court dismissed I-Flow's cross appeal as moot. View "McClellan v. I-Flow Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, while incarcerated, received a $107,416.48 settlement from a medical liability claim against a drug manufacturer whose products caused him to develop diabetes. Counsel in the product liability suit deposited the settlement proceeds into plaintiff's inmate trust account. After the ODOC issued an order requiring plaintiff to pay $65,353.94 for the estimated cost of his incarceration and then subsequently froze and withdrew the funds at issue, plaintiff filed suit alleging various constitutional violations. The court concluded that plaintiff received insufficient due process as the result of Oregon's actions considering plaintiff's substantial interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the ability to provide a hearing without compromising a significant government interest. Nor should providing a pre-deprivation hearing be administratively burdensome. However, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants considering no precedent established a state's obligation to provide a pre-deprivation hearing in these circumstances and thus, was not clearly established at the time of the conduct. Further, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim where the withdrawal was a reimbursement rather than a punishment. View "Shinault v. Hawks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pro se California prisoner, filed suit against defendants alleging violations of her constitutional rights to due process of law and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff alleged that prison officials started rumors that she was a convicted sex offender and changed her prison records. As a result, gang members threatened plaintiff and, when plaintiff reported the problem, prison officials refused to file her grievance and rejected her appeal. The court concluded that, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), a court of appeals may require a three strike prisoner seeking in forma pauperis status to show an imminent danger at the time the notice of appeal is filed; the Andrews v. Cervantes standard is the appropriate one to be applied in determining whether a prisoner has shown an imminent danger on appeal, and that applying that standard to plaintiff’s case, she may proceed in forma pauperis on appeal; and the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on the issue of exhaustion because defendants have not met their burden of establishing that defendant did not exhaust available administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiff's right to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The court vacated the order of the district court and remanded for further proceedings on the issue of exhaustion. View "Williams v. Paramo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against EA, alleging that Madden NFL, a series of video games, includes accurate likenesses of plaintiffs without authorization, as well as roughly 6,000 other former NFL players who appear on more than 100 historic teams in various editions of Madden NFL. EA moved to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion where EA has not shown a probability of prevailing on its incidental use defense and its other defenses are effectively precluded by the court's decision in Keller v. Elec. Arts. In this case, EA has not shown that the transformative use defense applies to plaintiffs' claims; EA has not established a probability of prevailing on either the common law public interest defense or the "public affairs" exemption of California Civil Code 3344(d); the Rogers v. Grimaldi test does not apply to plaintiffs' right-of-publicity claims; and EA has not established a probability of prevailing on its incidental use defense. View "Davis v. Electronic Arts" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit against Old Republic, a company that sells home warranty plans, alleging that Old Republic arbitrarily denied claims made by him and a putative class of similarly situated policyholders of Old Republic plans, or otherwise cheated him and this class out of benefits owed under their policies. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's orders denying his motion for class certification, denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint, and granting Old Republic's motion for partial summary judgment. The court did not reach the merits of the district court's order because the appeal is moot. The parties settled all of plaintiff's claims and plaintiff expressly released all of his claims against Old Republic. Applying Narouz v. Charter Commc'sn, the court concluded that the appeal is moot because plaintiff has no financial interest or other personal interest whatsoever in class certification. View "Campion v. Old Republic Protection Co." on Justia Law

The City of Spokane filed suit against Fannie, Freddie, and FHFA, arguing that Fannie and Freddie are not statutorily exempt from paying real property transfer taxes. The court concluded that it is clear that the statutory carve-outs allowing for the taxation of real property as "other real property is taxed" encompass only property taxes, not excise taxes. Therefore, Fannie and Freddie are statutorily exempt from paying the transfer taxes in Washington. The court held that the entities' exemption statutes do not exceed Congress's constitutional authority. Because Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the secondary mortgage market, it has power under the Necessary and Proper Clause not only to create Fannie and Freddie but also to ensure their preservation by exempting them from state and local taxes. Finally, the exemptions neither commandeer state and local officials nor transgress general principles of federalism. Therefore, the court rejected Spokane's Tenth Amendment arguments. Accordingly, the court held that Congress exempted Fannie and Freddie from state and local taxation of real property transfers and that it had constitutional authority to do so. The court affirmed the judgment. View "City of Spokane v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law