Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

United is the claims administrator for Plans named as defendants in this suit and all of the Plans are governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Spinedex, as assignee and would-be assignee of Plan beneficiaries, filed suit against United and the Plans seeking payment of denied benefit claims. ACS, as well as individual Plan beneficiaries, Jack Adams and Claude Aragon, joined the suit as plaintiffs. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court reversed, concluding that Spinedex had Article III standing; Spinedex was not assigned the right to bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty; ACS does not have associational standing to bring suit against United; Adams' claim for breach of fiduciary duty is time-barred; Spindex's claims as assignee of beneficiaries under the Martz Agency Plan and the Acoustic Technologies Plan are not time-barred; and the anti-assignment provision of the Discount Tire Plan precluded assignment by Plan beneficiaries to Spinedex. The court vacated or reversed, and remanded for further proceedings, the district court's holdings that Aragon's claim for breach of fiduciary duty was not exhausted, that United is not a proper defendant for benefit claims under the American Express Plan, and that some of the claims assigned to Spinedex were not administratively exhausted. View "Spinedex Physical Therapy v. United Healthcare" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was adjudicated a sexually violent predator under California Welfare and Institutions Code 6600(a)(1) and has been reporting to his local police station every 90 days to fill out a registration form pursuant to the requirements of California Penal Code 290.012(b). At issue on appeal is the constitutionality of section 290.012(b). The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim that the registration requirement violates the fundamental right to be free from physical restraint by requiring sexually violent predators to appear in person every 90 days to register. Applying rational basis review, the court concluded that the registration requirement is rationally related to California's interest in deterring recidivism and promoting public safety. The district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim that the registration requirement violates the Ex Post Facto Clause; plaintiff's equal protection challenge failed because neither mentally disordered offenders nor mentally disordered sex offenders are similarly situated to sexually violent predators; plaintiff waived his claim that section 290.012(b) is unconstitutionally vague; and plaintiff failed to state a claim under California's Administrative Procedure Act, Cal. Gov't Code 11340 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Litmon v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging Idaho and Nevada statutes and enacted amendments preventing same-sex couples from marrying and refusing to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed elsewhere. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that, in Sevcik v. Sandoval, a live case and controversy still exists even though Nevada's officials have ceased to defend their laws constitutionality where the Governor and Clerk-Recorder remain parties and continue to enforce the laws at issue. Further, the Supreme Court's summary dismissal in Baker v. Nelson is not controlling precedent that precludes the court from considering plaintiffs' claims. On the merits, the court held that the Idaho and Nevada laws violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they deny lesbian and gays who wish to marry persons of the same sex a right they afford to individuals who wish to marry persons of the opposite sex. The laws do not satisfy the heightened scrutiny standard the court adopted in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs. The court rejected defendants' essential contention that bans on same-sex marriage promote the welfare of children by encouraging good parenting in stable opposite-sex families. Defendants' other contentions are without merit. Because defendants failed to demonstrate that these laws further any legitimate purpose, they unjustifiably discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in Latta v. Otter. The court reversed and remanded the judgment in Sevcik.View "Latta v. Otter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the NPS's enforcement of a regulation banning the operation of hovercrafts on the Nation River. Alaska intervened, challenging the NPS's authority to require its researchers to obtain a permit before engaging in studies on the Alagnak River. Plaintiff and Alaska argued that section 103(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act precludes NPS from regulating activities on state-owned lands and navigable waters that fall within the boundaries of National Park System units in Alaska. The district court granted summary judgment to appellees. The court concluded that plaintiff had Article III standing, but that his interpretation of section 103(c) is foreclosed by the plain text of the statute. NPS's hovercraft ban applies to federally owned lands and waters administered by NPS nationwide, as well as navigable waters within national parks. The court rejected plaintiff's two additional arguments, that the Secretary exceeded her statutory authority in promulgating the regulation at issue and that her action raises serious constitutional concerns. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff. The court held that Alaska lacked standing to bring its challenge and vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss.View "Sturgeon v. Masica" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, non-profit organizations representing the manufacturers and distributors of pharmaceutical products, filed suit challenging the Alameda County Safe Drug Disposal Ordinance, which requires that prescription drug manufacturers, who either sell, offer for sale, or distribute "Covered Drugs" in Alameda, operate and finance a "Product Stewardship Program." The court concluded that the Ordinance, both on its face and in effect, does not discriminate because it applies to all manufacturers that make their drugs available in Alameda County - without respect to the geographic location of the manufacturer; the Ordinance does not directly regulate interstate commerce where it does not control conduct beyond the boundaries of the county; under the balancing test in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the court concluded that, without any evidence that the Ordinance will affect the interstate flow of goods, the Ordinance does not substantially burden interstate commerce; and therefore, the Ordinance does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.View "PRMA v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against two ICE agents, seeking damages for the time he spent in pre-trial detention on state criminal charges allegedly as a result of the agents' wrongful acts. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss based on lack of standing. Plaintiff appealed, alleging that he needed the assistance of a bail bondsman to post the required bail and that he unsuccessfully tried to secure such assistance. The court concluded that plaintiff has adequately alleged that his inability to utilize the services of a bail bondsman caused him to remain in pre-trial detention unnecessarily, at least during the period in which the bail condition remained in effect. Plaintiff's complaint expressly alleged that every bail bondsman he contacted told him why: "because of the immigration detainer." Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.View "Mendia v. Garcia, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Sweetwater, alleging unlawful sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that Sweetwater intentionally discriminated against female student athletes when they failed to provide equal treatment and benefits as compared to male athletes. On appeal, Sweetwater challenged the district court's grant of declaratory and injunctive relief to plaintiffs on their Title IX claims. The court concluded that Sweetwater has not fully and effectively accommodated the interests and abilities of its female athletes; the district court did not err in its award of summary judgment to plaintiffs on their Title IX unequal participation claim; and the court affirmed the grant of injunctive relief to plaintiffs on that issue. The court rejected Sweetwater's claims of evidentiary errors; the district court's ruling that plaintiffs have Article III standing and its decision to deny Sweetwater's motion to strike that claim were not error; plaintiffs stated a prima facie case of Title IX retaliation; the district court correctly could find that a coach was fired in retaliation for plaintiffs' Title IX complaints, not for any of the pretextual, non-retaliatory reasons that Sweetwater has offered; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting permanent injunctive relief to plaintiffs on their claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and rejected Sweetwater's attempt to relitigate the merits of its case.View "Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

This case arose from California's decision to extend its control to cleanup of radioactive pollutants (Senate Bill 990). Boeing filed suit challenging the validity of SB 990, which controlled cleanup of the Santa Susanna Laboratory grounds. The district court agreed with Boeing that the federal government had preempted the field of regulation of nuclear safety, and alternatively that clean up of radioactive materials at the Santa Susanna site is a federal activity. California appealed. The court concluded that Boeing had standing where it could clearly demonstrate an injury in fact; SB 990 violates intergovernmental immunity and is invalid under the Supremacy Clause because the activities of the federal government are free from regulation by any state and state laws are invalid if they regulate the United States directly or discriminate against the federal government or those with whom it deals; the court agreed with the district court that the terms of SB 990 are unseverable; and the court declined to construe SB 990 as limited to non-radioactive cleanup. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "The Boeing Co. v. Raphael" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, two groups challenged the BPA's decision to forgo refunds after the court invalidated three sets of contractual arrangements in which BPA agreed to subsidize certain longtime industrial customers rather than sell them power directly. The court held that these subsidy arrangements were unreasonable and were contrary to BPA's authority. The court remanded to BPA regarding whether it could or should seek refunds of the improper subsidies. BPA concluded that it was contractually barred from seeking refunds as to some of the invalidated contracts; it had no legal or equitable basis for seeking refunds as to the others; and if it did pursue recovery of the subsidies, it might become mired in counterproductive, protracted litigation. Petitioners' core argument is that their power costs have been impermissibly raised by BPA's decision because, if BPA did seek refunds of the subsidies, it could pass the recovered funds to its customers as lower rates. The court rejected petitioners' contention that BPA has a duty, under either the Constitution's Appropriations Clause or BPA's governing statutes, to seek all refunds to which it may be entitled. The court concluded that BPA's decisions in most respects sufficiently and reasonably balanced its competing obligations to merit the court's deference, except in one respect. The court denied the petition for review with regard to the decision not to seek refunds with respect to the 2007 Block Contracts and the Port Townsend Contract. The court granted the petition and remanded to BPA for further proceedings with regard to recovery of subsidies paid under the Alcoa Amendment.View "ICNU v. BPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Commonwealth after she was terminated from her position as Special Assistant to the Governor for Women's Affairs. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth on her retaliation, breach of contract, and estoppel claims. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim where she failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether she did not hold a policymaking or confidential position; properly granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim where it was undisputed that plaintiff held her position by virtue of appointment rather than by contract; and properly granted summary judgment on the estoppel claim where she failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether government officials engaged in any affirmative misconduct going beyond mere negligence as required for equitable estoppel, and where she failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the Commonwealth gained an advantage by asserting one position and then later sought an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position as required by judicial estoppel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court denied the Commonwealth's request for sanctions.View "Peter-Palican v. CNMI" on Justia Law