Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

MEIC filed suit against the Director of the Montana Department of Environmental Quality, claiming that the Director will violate duties imposed by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. 1201-1328. The district court granted the Director's motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and Intervenors' motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). MEIC alleged a pattern or practice of the Director granting mining permit applications without doing proper cumulative hydrologic impact assessments (chias). The court concluded that, assuming arguendo, those allegations established that the Director will not do a proper CHIA for the application at issue, MEIC did not establish a substantial risk that the Director will grant the application at all. Even if the court assumed that MEIC could bring suit on behalf of its members, the members do not have standing because they did not suffer an actual or imminent injury in fact. Under a constitutional ripeness standard, MEIC also failed to allege a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality because MEIC failed to demonstrate a substantial risk that the Director will grant the application. In regards to MEIC's argument under the firm prediction rule, the court concluded that the rule's standards were not met where the court could not make a firm prediction about whether or not the Director will grant the application. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "MEIC v. Stone-Manning" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellants, commercial fishers, were stopped by officers from the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) while driving on a public highway. The officers pulled Appellants’ vehicle over to check for compliance with fish and game laws. The inspection failed to reveal any fish and game violations. Appellants filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the WDFW officers violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by stopping and searching their automobile and harassing them over the years. The district court dismissed the case, concluding (1) qualified immunity precluded Appellants’ Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim because the law regarding warrantless stops by WDFW officers was not clearly established at the time of the stop; and (2) the relevant statute of limitations barred Appellants’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the stop violated Appellants’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights, and therefore, the WDFW officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on Appellants’ Fourth Amendment claim; and (2) the district court correctly dismissed Appellants’ substantive due process claim. Remanded.View "Tarabochia v. Adkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a teacher in the United States Forest Service’s Job Corps Program, filed a Freedom of Information Act request to obtain records pertaining to an investigation into misconduct allegations. The Forest Service located responsive pages but withheld almost half of them under the personal privacy exemption. An administrative appeal resulted in the disclosure of 188 pages of heavily-redacted documents. Plaintiff filed suit, challenging the redactions. The district court ordered the Forest Service to create a Vaughn index describing each document and explaining why each document was exempt from disclosure. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and remanded with instructions to order the government to produce a more detailed Vaughn index with regard to two categories of documents, and if that was not sufficient, to conduct an in camera review. The Court held that the remaining redactions were proper.View "Kowack v. United States Forest Serv." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in California state court of murder and related offenses. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his Batson motion because the prosecution engaged in purposeful discrimination when it exercised four peremptory strikes against Hispanic venirepersons. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions. Thereafter, Petitioner applied for habeas relief. The district court denied the application, determining that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges did not violate Petitioner’s federal constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the application, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, the prosecutor’s factually-erroneous reason for striking Venireperson 4968 was pretextual; and (2) the state court’s finding to the contrary amounted to an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.”View "Castellanos v. Small" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair, filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA), Cal. Civ. Code 54 et seq., against the City because none of the City's public on-street parking is accessible to people with disabilities. The district court denied the City's motion to dismiss, concluding that the broad language of the ADA requires public entities to ensure that all services, including on-street parking, are reasonably accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. The district court then granted the City's motion to certify the order for interlocutory appeal and the City petitioned for leave to appeal. The text of the ADA, the relevant implementing regulations, and the DOJ's interpretation of its own regulations all lead the court to conclude that public entities must ensure that all normal governmental functions are reasonably accessible to disabled persons, irrespective of whether the DOJ has adopted technical specifications for the particular types of facilities involved. Therefore, the court held that plaintiff has stated a claim under the ADA and the CDPA based on the City's alleged failure to provide accessible on-street diagonal stall parking. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Fortyune v. City of Lomita" on Justia Law

El Dorado, a mobile home park owner located in the City of Fillmore alleged that the City interfered with an application for a subdivision of its seniors-only mobile home park by causing unreasonable delays and imposing extralegal conditions because of a fear that subdivisions would lead to El Dorado opening the Park to families. El Dorado's complaint was dismissed for lack of standing. The court concluded, however, that El Dorado had Article III standing where El Dorado suffered a concrete and particularized, actual, injury, in the form of added expenses caused by the City's interference of the application. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "El Dorado Estates v. City of Fillmore" on Justia Law

After law enforcement officers arrested Defendant they obtained a warrant to search his home. The search of Defendant’s home resulted in the seizure of illegal drugs and firearms. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. On appeal, Defendant argued that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him, and because the search warrant was based on information acquired as a result of his unlawful arrest, the warrant was invalid and the evidence discovered during the search must be suppressed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Defendant’s suppression motion, holding (1) although Defendant’s arrest was supported by probable cause, the manner in which the officers made the arrest violated Payton v. New York; (2) evidence obtained as a result of Defendant’s unlawful arrest must be suppressed, and the remaining untainted evidence did not provide probable cause to issue a warrant; and (3) consequently, the entire warrant was invalid, and all evidence seized pursuant to it must be suppressed.View "United States v. Nora" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs allege that they hold land patents, issued by the federal government before Alaska entered the Union, giving title to certain Alaska streambeds. In 2010- 2011, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources determined that the waterways above these streambeds were navigable in 1959, the year Alaska was admitted to the Union, and remain navigable. Under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, all land beneath such waterways belongs to the state, 43 U.S.C. 1311(a). Plaintiffs argue that Alaska’s determination that the waterways have been navigable since 1959 does not disturb the title to the land that was granted to them and that, under the Act, streambeds that had already been patented by the federal government were not granted to Alaska upon its statehood. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Alaska has a sufficient interest in the lands to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiffs’ action was “close to the functional equivalent” of a quiet title action; the lands at issue are submerged lands beneath navigable waters, which have a “unique status in the law” insofar as “[s]tate ownership of them has been considered an essential attribute of sovereignty.”View "Lacano Invs., LLC v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

In 2009, a confidential informant told Anaheim police officer Stauber that Cruz was a gang member who sold methamphetamine and carried a gun. Stauber determined that Cruz had prior convictions including a felony involving a firearm. Later, the informant told Stauber where Cruz was, what his vehicle looked like, that he was armed and carried in his waistband, and that he had stated that “he was not going back to prison.” Stauber notified other officers, who converged on Cruz’s location. Officers noticed that Cruz’s vehicle had a broken tail light, executed a traffic stop, and surrounded him in a parking lot. Cruz attempted to escape, backing his SUV into a patrol car, but eventually stopped. The officers emerged with weapons drawn and shouted for Cruz to get on the ground as he was emerging from the vehicle. According to four officers, he ignored their commands and reached for his waistband. Fearing that he was reaching for a gun, five officers fired 20 shots. A bystander witnessed most of the event from the other side of Cruz’s vehicle, but didn’t see whether Cruz reached for his waistband. After they ceased firing, the officers approached to find Cruz’s body tangled in and hanging from his seatbelt. Cutting the body loose, they found no weapon, but a loaded nine-millimeter was later recovered from the passenger seat. Cruz’s relatives sued. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs had not presented anything to contest the officers’ version of events. The Ninth Circuit reversed, except as to one officer, noting “curious and material factual discrepancies.”View "Cruz v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

In 1976, Gail Kennedy, a professor at the University of California-Los Angeles ("UCLA"), led an archaeological field excavation project on the property of the Chancellor's official residence at the University of California-San Diego. During the excavation, the archaeological team discovered a double burial site and uncovered two human skeletons (the "La Jolla remains"). Scientists estimated the remains were between 8977 to 9603 years old, making them among the earliest known human remains from North or South America. The property on which the La Jolla remains were discovered was aboriginally occupied by members of the Kumeyaay Nation. Since their discovery, the University has maintained custody of the La Jolla remains, but they have been stored at multiple locations, including UCLA, the San Diego Museum of Man, the National Museum of Natural History, and the Smithsonian Institution. Central to the heart of this case was custody of the La Jolla remains. The Tribes and their representatives claimed the right to compel repatriation of the La Jolla remains to one of the Kumeyaay Nation's member tribes. Plaintiffs Timothy White, Robert Bettinger, and Margaret Schoeninger ("the Scientists"), professors in the University of California system, opposed repatriation because they wished to continue to study the La Jolla remains. The issue this case presented to the Ninth Circuit was whether the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA") abrogated tribal sovereign immunity and, if not, whether the district court properly dismissed this declaratory judgment action because the tribes and their representatives were indispensable parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 and could not be joined in the action. The Court concluded that NAGPRA did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and that the affected tribes and their representatives were indispensable parties. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "White, et al v. University of California" on Justia Law