Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner George Wharton appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief. Police officers arrested Petitioner after finding the body of his live-in girlfriend stuffed in a barrel in their kitchen. Petitioner admitted killing her but claimed at trial that he had been provoked into the killing and, therefore, was guilty only of second-degree murder. The jury disagreed and convicted him of first-degree murder. In this habeas proceeding, Petitioner argued that his due process rights were violated when jurors saw him shackled and that his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance. The Ninth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed: although some jurors occasionally saw Petitioner in shackles while being transported through the halls of the courthouse, those sporadic sightings outside the courtroom did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The district court also correctly held that Petitioner's trial lawyer chose a constitutionally permissible guilt-phase strategy of forgoing certain defenses for fear of opening the door to the jury's learning about Petitioner's significant criminal history, which included a prior murder and rape. View "Wharton v. Martel" on Justia Law

Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agents and Long Beach Police Department ("LBPD") officers obtained warrants for wiretaps on two phones in the Summer of 2006. Officers intercepted communications pursuant to the wiretap, which led them to conclude that defendant was arranging a drug deal. Based on information initially obtained through the wiretaps, LBPD officers placed defendant under surveillance and eventually arrested defendant for felony drug possession. At intake, the officers strip searched defendant in the jail's strip search room. Five officers observed the strip search. The officers instructed defendant to remove his clothing and face the far wall of the room as they watched him. Defendant was instructed to bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough, but according to one of the observers, defendant instead moved his hand toward his right buttock. Instructed to repeat the procedure, defendant made a quick movement to his buttocks area with his hand and appeared "to be forcing or forcibly pushing an item inward." Defendant appealed his conviction for drug distribution and possession with intent to distribute, raising a number of issues on appeal, but the Ninth Circuit found only one had merit: that the forcible removal of drugs from defendant's rectum by officers without medical training or a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court concluded that the evidence obtained "from this brutal and physically invasive search" should have been suppressed. Therefore, the Court vacated defendant's conviction in part, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "United States v. Fowlkes" on Justia Law

Yongguo Lai, a native and citizen of China, appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing Lai's appeal of an immigration judge's (IJ) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA relied on the IJ's finding that Lai's claim of persecution and torture on account of his Christian religion was not credible. The IJ based her ruling, in relevant part, on Lai's testimony during cross-examination that contained information the IJ found to be missing from and inconsistent with Lai's initial written application and direct testimony, and uncorroborated in one respect. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit concluded the BIA's adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Lai v. Holder" on Justia Law

ISKCON appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), manager Stephen Yee, and the LAX police chief, on ISKCON's claim that section 23.27(c) of the Los Angeles Administrative Code - which bans continuous or repetitive solicitation for the immediate receipt of funds at LAX, a nonpublic forum - violated the First Amendment. Major international airports have a legitimate interest in controlling pedestrian congestion and reducing the risk of fraud and duress attendant to repetitive, in-person solicitation for the immediate receipt of funds. The court held that the ordinance acts as a reasonable restriction on protected speech under the First Amendment because it was limited in nature and leaves open alternative channels for ISKCON to raise money. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.View "ISKCON v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs' First Amendment right to freedom of religion by forcing them to provide direct staff support to a developmentally disabled client who wished to attend Jehovah's Witness services. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint against Defendant Matsushita because plaintiffs failed to allege specific facts against Matsushita other than to identify her title; the district court's holding that defendants' interpretation of the Lanterman Act, Cal. Welf. & Ins. Code 4500-4906, and its regulations, did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and the district court's denial of leave to amend because of futility of amendment. The court adopted the district court's well-reasoned and comprehensive disposition.View "Williams v. State of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her union appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on their First Amendment retaliation claims. Defendants cross-appealed a later order denying them attorneys' fees. The court remanded so that the district court could evaluate on a more detailed basis the incidents that it dismissed collectively as "petty workplace gripes" where there was evidence suggesting that some of these actions were taken as part of a more general campaign and hence might in context have greater materiality than when viewed in isolation. The court concluded that plaintiffs carried their burden of production sufficient to survive summary judgment as to the three involuntary transfers at issue. Plaintiffs presented a genuine factual dispute as to whether an internal investigation was retaliatory. Further, the district court erred in determining that defendant County was not subject to Monell liability. Defendants' cross-appeal is moot. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.View "Thomas v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer, filed suit after he was terminated following severe interpersonal problems between him and other police officers. Plaintiff contended that these interpersonal problems resulted from his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and that the police department discharged him based on his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The jury returned a general verdict for plaintiff, finding that he was disabled and that the City had discharged him because of his disability. The court reversed, holding that, based on the evidence presented, the jury could not have found plaintiff disabled under the ADA. Plaintiff's ADHD did not substantially limit plaintiff's ability to work or to interact with others. Therefore, the district court erred in denying the City's motion for judgment as a matter of law.View "Weaving v. City of Hillsboro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights when prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in refusing him cataract surgery to restore his vision. The court held that blindness in one eye caused by a cataract is a serious condition. The court also held that the blanket, categorical denial of medically indicated surgery solely on the basis of an administrative policy that "one eye is good enough for prison inmates" is the paradigm of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials and remanded for trial.View "Colwell v. Bannister, et al." on Justia Law

ATC filed suit challenging the City's denial of its Conditional Use Permit (CUP) applications for three of its San Diego telecommunications facilities. ATC raised claims under, among other provisions, the California Permit Streamlining Act (PSA), Cal. Gov't Code 65956(b); the Federal Telecommunications Act (TCA), 47 U.S.C. 332; California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5; and the Equal Protection Clause. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of ATC on the PSA claim because the court concluded that the CUP applications were not deemed approved before the City denied them. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the TCA claim where the City evaluated the CUP applications under the proper provision of the Land Development Code and supported its decision to deny them with substantial evidence; the City did not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services because ATC and the City are not "similarly situated" providers; and ATC has failed to show effective prohibition because it has not demonstrated that its proposals were the least intrusive means of filling a significant gap in coverage. ATC could not prevail on California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5 because it does not have a fundamental vested right to the continued use of the Verus, Border, and Mission Valley Facilities. There was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the City's decision to deny the CUP applications was rationally related to the City's legitimate interest in minimizing the aesthetic impact of wireless facilities and in providing public communications services. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.View "American Tower Corp. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a death row prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Department of Corrections officials and a prison guard, alleging that the prison guard read a confidential letter he sent to his attorney, rather than merely scanning it to inspect the letter for contraband. The court concluded that plaintiff stated a Sixth Amendment claim when he alleged that prison officials read his legal mail, that they claim entitlement to do so, and that his right to private consultation with counsel has been chilled; plaintiff's allegations also support a claim for injunctive relief; and, therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nordstrom v. Ryan" on Justia Law