Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

California prisons have been operating under a receivership since 2006 to comply with consent decrees. This appeal involved provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626, relating to the termination of such decrees. After the Supreme Court affirmed the three-judge court decision concerning the release orders in this case, the three-judge court in early 2013 asked the State when it intended to file a motion to terminate. The State responded that it hoped to be able to file within a few months. Plaintiffs indicated their need to file an informed response to such motion and the district court ordered the State to disclose its expert witnesses and their reports at least 120 days before it filed a motion to terminate. The court concluded that the district court's order was a sensible scheduling order designed to provide the court and plaintiffs with adequate notice of the evidence the State intended to rely upon in a motion to terminate; the order established a schedule for expert disclosures that was consistent with the State's own time line, and did not affect the operation of the automatic stay; and there was no clear error in the district court's issuance of the order. The court need not reach plaintiffs' claim that without the notice provisions of the order, the automatic stay provision violates due process. Accordingly, the court denied what the court construed as the State's Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. View "Plata v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against two officers, a medical doctor, and nurse alleging that they violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when the doctor, forcibly and without consent, removed a plastic baggie containing cocaine base from plaintiff's rectum. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to the officers. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim, holding that the doctor's actions could be attributed to the state, based on the court's holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers provided false information, encouragement, and active physical assistance to the doctor; therefore, the officers could be held responsible for the procedures performed by the doctor; based on the Winston v. Lee factors, a jury could conclude that the procedures performed by the doctor violated the Eighth Amendment; and the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court affirmed summary judgment as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim where plaintiff has not identified a single case finding a Fourteenth Amendment violation under circumstances like those here. The court declined to address issues related to the doctor. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "George v. Edholm, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California's Political Reform Act of 1974, Cal. Gov. Code 81000-91014 (PRA), which requires political committees to report certain information about their contributors to the State. Plaintiffs are political committees that supported the November 2008 passage of Proposition 8 and argued that their donors have been harassed as a result of the PRA disclosures. Plaintiffs sought an injunction exempting them from the PRA's future reporting deadlines and declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the State to purge all records of their past PRA disclosures. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State on all counts. The court held that Family PAC v. McKenna directly precluded plaintiffs' challenge to the $100 contribution threshold and the government's interest in disclosing contributions to ballot initiative committees is not merely a pre-election interest. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment with regard to plaintiffs' facial challenges to the post-election reporting requirements. In regard to plaintiffs' as-applied challenges, the court concluded that plaintiffs' request for an injunction does not present a live controversy where the information that plaintiffs seek to keep private has been publicly available on the Internet and in hard copy for nearly five years; plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief did not fall within the mootness exception for cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review; and plaintiffs' claim for forward-looking relief is not ripe for judicial review. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded with instructions. View "ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Mohammad Usman Chaudhry's family and three organizational plaintiffs filed suit after Usman was shot and killed by an LAPD officer. The Coroner took custody of his body but did not notify his family until twenty-one days later and the delay prevented Usman's family from burying him in accordance with the religions customs of Islam. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged most of the district court's orders granting defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The City and the officer cross-appealed. The court concluded that plaintiffs waived claims against some defendants by not addressing them in their opening brief. The court held that California's prohibition against pre-death pain and suffering damages limits recovery too severely to be consistent with 42 U.S.C. 1983's deterrence policy; thus, California's survival statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 377.34 does not apply to section 1983 claims where the decedent's death was caused by the violation of federal law; and therefore, the court reversed the district court's finding that section 377.34 is not inconsistent with section 1983 and the district court's striking of the jury's $1,000,000 verdict in favor of the Estate. The court remanded to the district court to consider in the first instance a motion for remittitur. The district court erred in dismissing the Estate's Cal. Civ. Code 52.1 claim and in denying its post-trial motion to amend the judgment where the City conceded that a successful claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment provides the basis for a successful claim under section 52.1. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to amend the judgment to reflect the Estate's success on that claim. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of Usman's parent's section 1983 claim against the officer for violating their Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. The court concluded that the court's decision recognizes that parents have a liberty interest in the companionship of their adult children and have a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment when the police kill an adult child without legal justification. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County defendants on the negligence claim under California law; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Usman's siblings' intentional infliction of emotional distress and section 1983 substantive due process claims; reversed as to their negligence claim against the County; and vacated the district court's attorneys' fees award. View "Chaudhry, et al v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law for wrongful detention, false arrest, and excessive force. An SFPD officer, Sergeant Kim, made a "high-risk" stop of plaintiff's vehicle after mistakenly identifying the vehicle as stolen. Plaintiff was held at gunpoint, handcuffed, forced to her knees, and detained for up to twenty minutes. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on the grounds that plaintiff could not establish a Fourth Amendment constitutional violation as a matter of law on her wrongful seizure, false arrest, or excessive claims because a rational jury could find for plaintiff on all three claims. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit on the grounds that Sergeant Kim was protected by qualified immunity because the court could not make a determination as a matter of law that Sergeant Kim could have reasonably believed at the time that the force actually used was lawful under the circumstances; consequently, the court remanded plaintiff's claims against the City and the SFPD for further resolution; and the court reversed and remanded the state law claims. View "Green v. City & Ctny. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an unsuccessful candidate for judicial office in Mohave County, Arizona, filed suit challenging the facial and as-applied constitutionality of certain provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct. The court held that Rule 4.1(A)(6) (the solicitation clause) is unconstitutional as applied to non-judge judicial candidates because it restricts speech that presents little to no risk of corruption or bias towards future litigants and is not narrowly tailored to serve those state interests. The court held that Rules 4.1(A)(2)-(5) - prohibiting speechifying, endorsements, and fundraising - are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest in an impartial judiciary, and are therefore unconstitutional restrictions on political speech of non-judge candidates for judicial office. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Wolfson v. Concannon, et al." on Justia Law

After plaintiff, who was twenty-seven years old at the time, was excluded from the presidential primary ballot under California law, she filed suit under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Twentieth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The court concluded that the case was not moot because it was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The court concluded that age requirements, like residency requirements and term limits, are neutral candidacy qualifications which the State had the right to impose; any burden on plaintiff's speech and association rights were minimal; and the burden was justified by California's asserted interest in protecting the integrity of the election process and avoiding voter confusion. The court rejected plaintiff's Equal Protection claim; because including ineligible candidates on the ballot could easily cause voter confusion, treating ineligible candidates differently from eligible ones was rationally related to the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of the election process; and the Secretary did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by excluding from the ballot candidates who are indisputably ineligible to serve, while listing those with a colorable claim of eligibility. Even if the Twentieth Amendment gave rise to a private right of action, nothing in the Twentieth Amendment states or implies that Congress has the exclusive authority to exclude a candidate with a known ineligibility from the presidential ballot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lindsay v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at SRCI, filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials violated his due process rights by housing him in the Intensive Management Unit (IMU) for twenty-seven months without periodic, meaningful review of his status. The court concluded that plaintiff's conditions of confinement in the IMU implicated a protected liberty interest under any plausible baseline. Nonetheless, the court concluded that plaintiff's claims against the Oregon Department of Corrections and his damages claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff's remaining damages claims were barred by qualified immunity. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief because the record showed that plaintiff had been released from the IMU and there was no evidence that he was likely to again be subject to the challenged conditions. View "Brown v. Oregon Dept. of Corr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants in the Superior Court of Guam, asserting claims arising from alleged breach of fiduciary duty in the course of the parties' several business ventures. Defendants removed to the District Court of Guam based on diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff is an alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence, living in Guam. Defendant Lai, a British Overseas Citizen, and Defendant Sekiguchi, a Japanese citizen, both live in Japan. The district court granted summary judgment on the merits in favor of defendants and plaintiff appealed, contesting subject matter jurisdiction for the first time. Whether or not Congress intended to confer jurisdiction in cases like this one by supplying constitutionally required minimal diversity through deemed citizenship, the deeming clause purported to do so. The court concluded, however, that the Organic Act of Guam, 48 U.S.C. 1421-1421k-1, precluded it from deciding the merits of the dispute between aliens because it conferred diversity jurisdiction upon the District Court of Guam reaching only as far as the diversity jurisdiction afforded to Article III courts. Because the Constitution does not supply diversity jurisdiction to Article III courts in suits between aliens, the jurisdiction afforded the federal court in Guam must also be so limited. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded, concluding that both the court and the District Court of Guam lacked jurisdiction to decide this dispute exclusively between aliens. View "Yokeno v. Sekiguchi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted at his first trial of first degree murder in which the prosecutor relied on evidence obtained in violation of his Miranda rights, and after the conviction was reversed he was again convicted, this time without the use of the illegally obtained evidence. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for damages as result of his conviction for first degree murder in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The court held that plaintiff's section 1983 claim against Sheriff Barnes for the Fifth Amendment violation was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey. Under Heck and Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim was not time-barred, and plaintiff may be able to show that he is entitled to damages, especially nominal damages, for the Miranda violation. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of that claim. The court held that plaintiff properly pleaded a claim of Monell liability against the Sheriff's Department, and that the Sheriff's Department was subject to suit under section 1983 for its investigative activities. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of this claim. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim against the District Attorney's Office, but instructed it to grant plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to state a claim against District Attorney Murphy. View "Jackson v. Barnes, et al." on Justia Law