Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

CNS filed suit against defendant, the Executive Officer/Clerk of the Ventura County Superior Court, alleging that the Ventura County Superior Court's failure to provide same-day access to newly filed unlimited civil complaints violated its right of access to public judicial proceedings under the First Amendment. On appeal, CNS challenged the district court's order dismissing his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted defendant's motion to abstain from hearing the case under Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., and O'Shea v. Littleton, which permitted the federal district courts to decline to decide matters over which they have jurisdiction but which implicated sensitive state interests. The court concluded that CNS's First Amendment right of access claim fell within the general rule against abstaining under Pullman in First Amendment cases. Though the government may sometimes withhold information without violating the expressive rights protected by the First Amendment, the First Amendment right of access to public proceedings was inextricably intertwined with the First Amendment right of free speech. It was well-established that the right of access to public records and proceedings was necessary to the enjoyment of the right to free speech. CNS's right of access claim implicated the same fundamental First Amendment interests as a free expression claim, and it equally commanded the respect and attention of the federal courts. Under either de novo review or the de novo component of the modified abuse of discretion standard applicable in most abstention cases, the court concluded that O'Shea abstention was also improper. An injunction requiring the Ventura County Superior Court to provide same-day access to filed unlimited civil complaints posed little risk of an ongoing federal audit or a major continuing intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts into the daily conduct of state proceedings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Courthouse News Service v. Planet" on Justia Law

In enacting comprehensive welfare reform in 1996, Congress rendered various groups of aliens ineligible for federal benefits and also restricted states' ability to use their own funds to provide benefits to certain aliens. As a condition of receiving federal funds, Congress required states to limit eligibility for federal benefits, such as Medicaid, to citizens and certain aliens. Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that Basic Health Hawai'i violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it provided less health coverage to nonimmigrant aliens residing in Hawai'i (COFA Residents) than the health coverage that Hawai'i provided to citizens and qualified aliens who are eligible for federal reimbursements through Medicaid. The court concluded that Congress has plenary power to regulate immigration and the conditions on which aliens remain in the United States, and Congress has authorized states to do exactly what Hawai'i had done here - determine the eligibility for, and terms of, state benefits for aliens in a narrow third category, with regard to whom Congress expressly gave states limited discretion. Hawai'i has no constitutional obligation to fill the gap left by Congress's withdrawal of federal funding for COFA Residents. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction preventing Hawai'i from reducing state-paid health benefits for COFA Residents because Hawai'i is not obligated to backfill the loss of federal funds with state funds and its decision not to do so was subject to rational-basis review. View "Korab v. Fink" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and California law after police officers shot and killed Kamal Lal. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Lal lead police on a high speed chase for 45 minutes before the officers were able to disable his vehicle. In the four minutes that elapsed after Lal exited the truck, he first tried to seriously injure himself, tried to provoke the officers into shooting him, threw rocks at the officers, and then, ignoring instructions to stop, advanced upon the officers threatening them with a football-sized rock he held over his head. Under the totality of the circumstances, the district court's determinations that the officers objectively feared immediate serious physical harm and that a reasonable officer could have believed that Lal threatened him with immediate serious danger were sound. That Lal may have been intent on committing "suicide by cop" did not negate the fact that he threatened the officers with such immediate serious harm that shooting him was a reasonable response. According, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lal v. California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against JAL, alleging that JAL retaliated against him for reporting safety concerns and constructively terminated him for reasons related to his medical and mental fitness. At issue on appeal was whether the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA), 49 U.S.C. 40103 et seq., preempted plaintiff's state law claims. The court concluded that the FAA and accompanying regulations preempted plaintiff's retaliation and constructive termination claims. The court held that federal law preempted state law claims that encroached upon, supplemented, or altered the federally occupied field of aviation safety and presented an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's legislative goal to create a single, uniform, system of regulating that field. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration where he conceded that the conduct giving rise to his claims occurred in U.S. airspace. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of JAL. View "Ventress v. Japan Airlines" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order denying her motion for preliminary injunction of San Francisco Police Code sections 4512 and 613.10(g) on the ground that both infringed upon her Second Amendment rights. The court concluded that section 4512, which requires handguns to be stored in a locked container when not carried on the person, burdens the rights protected by the Second Amendment because storage regulations such as section 4512 are not part of a long historical "tradition of proscription;" section 4512 is not a substantial burden on the Second Amendment; and, applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that section 4512 is substantially related to the important government interest of reducing firearm-related deaths and injuries. The court also concluded that section 613.10(g), which prohibits the sale of hollow-point ammunition within San Francisco, regulates conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment because restrictions on ammunition may burden the core Second Amendment right to self-defense and the record contained no persuasive historical evidence suggesting otherwise. Determining that plaintiff had standing to challenge section 613.10(g), the court concluded that section 613.10(g) is a reasonable fit to achieve its goal of reducing the legality of ammunition, and section 613.10(g) thus satisfies intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff would not succeed on the merits of her claims and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. View "Jackson v. City & Ctny. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a prisoner suffering from schizoaffective disorder and who is proceeding pro se, sought damages from California prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of his request for a guardian ad litem because the Pro Bono Coordinator advised the court that no one was available to undertake the representation. In these consolidated appeals, at issue was whether the district court erred, under Rule 17(c)(2), by declining to appoint a guardian ad litem and instead staying plaintiff's cases indefinitely until he is found to be restored to competency. Determining that the court had jurisdiction over the appeal as a final decision under 28 U.S.C. 1291, or in the alternative, as a collateral order pursuant to Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by staying plaintiff's cases until he was found competent (if ever). Such a stay order failed to adequately protect plaintiff's interest and thus did not constitute "another appropriate order" under Rule 17(c). Instead, it amounted to a dismissal with prejudice. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded with instructions. View "Davis v. Walker" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an American citizen born in Iran, petitioned for review of a determination letter issued by DHS, seeking disclosure of his watchlist status, a meaningful opportunity to contest inclusion on any watchlist, and removal from all government watchlists. The watchlist at issue is the Consolidated Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). In Latif v. Holder, the court held that 49 U.S.C. 46110 did not grant circuit courts jurisdiction over broad constitutional claims - such as petitioner's - that seek removal from the TSDB. The court reaffirmed its holding in Latif and clarified that it is applicable even where a traveler's claims are brought as a challenge to a DHS Travel Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) determination letter. Accordingly, the court transferred to the district court where the jurisdictional defects that prevented the court from hearing petitioner's claims would not exist. View "Arjmand v. DHS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and others protested weekly outside the locked fence that surrounds the LA Campus of the VAGLA to draw public attention to the VA's failure to use the lawn for veterans. Plaintiff filed suit challenging the inconsistent enforcement of 38 C.F.R. 1.218, which prohibited the posting of materials on VA property except under certain circumstances. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiff with regard to declaratory relief, but denied any injunctive relief based on mootness. Plaintiff appealed. The district court concluded that a June 2010 e-mail instructing the VAGLA police to enforce section 1.218(a)(9) precisely and consistently mooted plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction by closing the LA Campus fence as a forum for all speech. The court agreed with the district court that the Government's voluntary cessation of its inconsistent enforcement of section 1.218(a)(9) mooted the request for injunctive relief. The court held that the VA satisfied its heavy burden of demonstrating mootness. The court presumed that the Government acted in good faith, and that presumption was especially strong here, where the Government was merely recommitting to consistent enforcement of one of its own longstanding regulations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Rosebrock v. Mathis, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Counties, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, violation of the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. 52.1; and common law false imprisonment. Plaintiff was erroneously arrested pursuant to a 1985 warrant, released, and then erroneously arrested again pursuant to a 1989 warrant and detained for a month. Plaintiff shared the same first and last name as the true subject of the warrant and police mistakenly believed that plaintiff was that person both times he was arrested. The district court granted the Counties' motions for summary judgment on all claims and denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The court concluded that the 1989 warrant satisfied the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment because it contained both the subject's name and a detailed physical description; that plaintiff was erroneously arrested based on the 1985 warrant simply did not affect whether the warrant itself satisfied the particularity requirement; and even if the Fourth Amendment did not require Los Angeles County to include more detailed information in the 1989 warrant in order to avoid the risk of repeated misidentification, defendant failed to show that the county had a policy or custom of failing to do so. The court also concluded that the officers' belief that plaintiff was the true subject of the warrant was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment; plaintiff's detention did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and, in regards to plaintiff's state law claims, because the employees relevant to this case would be able to invoke statutory immunities to avoid liability, the Counties could as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Rivera v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank appealed the dismissal of its claims against the FDIC. At issue was whether Deutsche Bank's claims were general unsecured claims under 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(11) and thereby prudentially moot because of the lack of sufficient funds in the estate to pay unsecured claims. The court concluded that, because Deutsche Bank was a quintessential creditor, its claims were third-tier general unsecured liabilities under section 1821(d)(11)(A)(iii), and the district court properly held that Deutsche Bank's claims were prudentially moot, as there were insufficient funds to satisfy general unsecured liabilities. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. FDIC" on Justia Law