Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a class of cardholders who paid credit card penalty fees, challenged those fees on constitutional grounds. Plaintiffs argued that the fees are analogous to punitive damages imposed in the tort context and are subject to substantive due process limits described in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. The court concluded that the due process analysis developed in the context of jury-awarded punitive damages was not applicable to contractual penalty clauses. Further, there was no derivative liability under the Unfair Competition Law. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint where constitutional due process jurisprudence did not prevent enforcement of excessive penalty clauses in private contracts and the fees were permissible under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 85-86, and the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), 12 U.S.C. 1831d(a). View "In re: Late Fee & Over-Limit Fee Litigation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that the continuous twenty-four-hour illumination of his cell violated the Eighth Amendment. The court reversed, concluding that there were material issues of fact remaining as to the brightness of the continuous lighting in plaintiff's cell, as to the effect on plaintiff of the continuous lighting, and as to whether the defendant officials were deliberately indifferent. Even if it were possible for a defendant to defeat an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim at summary judgment by showing a legitimate penological interest, defendants have failed to make such a showing in this case. Because the district court did not consider the question of qualified immunity, the court left the issue for the district court to determine in the first instance. The court also remanded for the district court to consider the issue of filing fee deductions. View "Grenning v. Miller-Stout, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former prison inmate, filed suit alleging deliberate indifference to his mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Count I), and violations of his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs and to have access to the courts, in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendments (Counts II and III). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count I, dismissal of Counts II and III, and denial of appointment of counsel and informa pauperis (IFP) status. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were mooted by his release from prison. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Count I where the record indicated that prison mental healthcare professionals were incredibly responsive to plaintiff's needs and no reasonable trier of fact could find that there was deliberate indifference to plaintiff's complaints; affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's request for counsel where plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits and he has been able to articulate his legal claims; vacated the dismissal of Counts II and III because it was based on the determination that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to the filing of his initial complaint, rather than his amended complaint; and remanded for the district court to consider plaintiff's attempts to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Cano v. Taylor" on Justia Law

This litigation arose from the City's recent efforts to complete its power system expansion plan first conceived in 1972 and re-affirmed in 2007. The City owns and operates Idaho Falls Power. Alliance sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the City lacked the power to condemn property outside its boundaries for the purpose of building electric transmission lines. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Alliance, finding that Idaho law did not grant the City (or, by extension, IFP) the power to condemn property outside its corporate limits for the purpose of constructing the transmission lines. Because the power to exercise eminent domain extraterritorially for the purpose of constructing electric transmission lines (1) has not been expressly granted to the City by the state, (2) cannot be fairly implied from the powers that the City has been given by the state, and (3) is not essential to accomplishing the City's objects and purposes, the City does not have that power. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Alliance v. City of Idaho Falls" on Justia Law

Bill Graham, a successful promoter of rock and roll concerts, died testate and his will created individual trusts for his sons, Alexander and David. Nicholas Clainos was the trustee of the trusts and the executor of the estate and Richard Greene, through his firm, provided Clainos legal counsel. On appeal, Alexander and David challenged the district court's disposition of a motion to dismiss, a special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Proc. Code 425.16(b)(1), and related attorney's fees awards. The court affirmed the disposition of the motion to strike in part and reversed in part. The court concluded that striking plaintiffs' conversion and unjust enrichment claims against Clainos was erroneous. The court also concluded that striking plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim against Clainos was erroneous. The court further concluded that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged claims for conversion, copyright infringement, and declaratory relief against the BGA Defendants and that dismissal of those claims was erroneous. In regards to attorney's fees, the court vacated the post-motion-to-strike fee award to Clainos, as well as the post-motion-to-dismiss fee award to the BGA Defendants. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Graham-Sult v. Clainos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California state prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff claimed that prison officials engaged in retaliatory conduct, of which the governmental actors were aware, because of plaintiff's mother's website, which exposed prison corruption and fought for inmates' rights. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant and plaintiff appealed. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff was disqualified from proceeding in forma pauperis. The court held that repeated and knowing violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)'s "short and plain statement" requirement are strikes as "failures to state a claim" when the opportunity to correct the pleadings has been afforded and there has been no modification within a reasonable time. Plaintiff accrued two strikes for Ninth Circuit dismissals, and three additional strikes for district court dismissals. Therefore, plaintiff has more than met the requirement for a revocation of in forma pauperis status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Knapp v. Hogan, et al." on Justia Law

The City appealed the district court's determination that the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, preempted its decision to require T-Mobile to obtain voter approval before constructing mobile telephone antennae on city-owned park property. T-Mobile cross-appealed the denial of permanent injunctive relief. The court concluded that section 332(c)(7)(A) of the Act has the following preemptive scope: (1) it preempts local land use authorities' regulations if they violate the requirements of section 332(c)(7)(B)(i) and (iv); and (2) it preempts local land use authorities' adjudicative decisions if the procedures for making such decisions do not meet the minimum requirements of section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (iii). In this case, the voter-approval requirement imposed by Measure C was outside the City's framework for land use decision making because it did not implicate the regulatory and administrative structure established by the City's general plans and zoning and subdivision code. Therefore, the court concluded that it was not preempted and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Omnipoint v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, the Secretary of the Army, alleging that certain adverse employment actions resulted from discrimination. Plaintiff had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection but failed to list the action as an asset on her bankruptcy schedule. The district court held that no evidence suggested that plaintiff's original omission had been inadvertent or mistaken and that, weighing factors set forth in New Hampshire v. Maine, judicial estoppel barred the action. Plaintiff appealed. The court affirmed, concluding that this case was distinguishable from the court's holding in Ah Quin v. County of Kauai Department of Transportation, where plaintiff here filed false bankruptcy schedules and did not amend those schedules until defendant filed a motion to dismiss, suggesting that her omission had not been inadvertent. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its analysis under the New Hampshire factors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dzakula v. McHugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation seeking to recover a masterpiece French impressionist painting by Camille Pissarro that was allegedly taken from their ancestors by the Nazi regime. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of the Foundation's motion to dismiss the complaint without leave to amend. Amended California Code of Civil Procedure 338(c)(3) provides for a six-year statute of limitations period for the recovery of fine art against a museum, gallery, auctioneer, or dealer. The court found that the district court erred in concluding that section 338 intruded on foreign affairs and concluded that the district court erred in striking section 338 down as unconstitutional on the basis of field preemption. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that the Foundation's due process challenge could not be resolved on the Foundation's motion to dismiss. The court further concluded that the Foundation failed to demonstrate that section 338(c)(3) burdened its rights to free speech and, therefore, section 338(c)(3) did not violate the Foundation's First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Eugene, the Police Department (EPD), and others, alleging that they violated his First Amendment rights when they removed him from his position on the EPD K-9 team in retaliation for repeatedly airing concerns about work-related safety issues to his supervisors. The court concluded that the evidence presented to the jury did not reasonably permit the conclusion that plaintiff established a retaliation claim where, as here, a public employee reports departmental-safety concerns to his or her supervisors pursuant to a duty to do so, that employee did not speak as a private citizen and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and held that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hagen v. City of Eugene, et al." on Justia Law