Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are individual physicians based in Arizona, joined by several Arizona medical and advocacy groups. The named Defendants are Arizona Attorney General Kristin Mayes, all Arizona County Attorneys, and various state enforcement agencies. The Attorney General declined to defend this lawsuit, and the district court allowed Warren Petersen, President of the Arizona Senate, and Ben Toma, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives, to intervene. This suit by Arizona physicians, medical associations, and advocacy groups claims that an Arizona law criminalizing the performance of certain abortions is unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. The panel held that the physician plaintiffs had demonstrated both actual and imminent injuries sufficient for standing. Plaintiffs suffered an actual injury—economic losses— because they lost money by complying with the laws, which forbade them from providing medical services they would otherwise provide, and these economic losses were fairly traceable to the statute. A favorable decision would relieve plaintiffs of compliance with the laws and restore the revenue generated by the prohibited procedures. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged two imminent future injuries that affected interests protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: (1) a liberty interest that was imperiled because violating the statute could result in imprisonment; and (2) a property interest that was threatened because a statutory violation could result in revocation of plaintiffs’ licenses, loss of revenue, and monetary damages. Finally, plaintiffs satisfied the causation and redressability requirements with respect to their imminent future injury. View "PAUL ISAACSON, ET AL V. KRISTIN MAYES, ET AL" on Justia Law

Under California law, certain political advertisements run by a committee must name the committee’s top financial contributors. The City and County of San Francisco added a secondary-contributor disclaimer requirement that compels certain committees, in their political advertisements, to list the major donors to those top contributors. Plaintiffs, who supported the passage of a ballot measure in the June 7, 2022, election, alleged that the secondary-contributor disclaimer requirement violates the First Amendment, both on its face and as applied against Plaintiffs. The district court held that Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits and denied Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.   The Ninth Circuit issued (1) an order amending its opinion filed on March 8, 2023, denying a petition for rehearing en banc, and ordering that no future petitions will be entertained; and (2) an amended opinion affirming the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin enforcement of a San Francisco ordinance that imposes a secondary-contributor disclaimer requirement on certain political advertisements, in addition to California’s top contributor disclaimer requirement. The panel first determined that even though the June 2022 election had occurred, this appeal was not moot because the controversy was capable of repetition yet evading review. The panel held that Plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claim. Addressing the remaining preliminary injunction factors, the panel concluded that the public interest and the balance of hardships weighed in favor of Defendants. View "NO ON E, SAN FRANCISCANS OPPOSING THE AFFORDABLE, ET AL V. DAVID CHIU, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death after a California jury found her guilty of attempted murder and first-degree murder, finding true the special circumstances of lying in wait and murder for financial gain. Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of her 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d) habeas petition. In the petition, Petitioner argued that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during penalty-phase closing arguments by referencing Biblical verses to persuade the jury to impose a death sentence. Applying the extremely deferential standard required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial. The panel granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) as to Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor improperly used peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After conducting a comparative juror analysis, the panel concluded that, under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, the California Supreme Court’s finding that the trial court did not err in determining there was no purposeful discrimination was an objectively reasonable determination of the facts. View "MAUREEN MCDERMOTT V. DEBORAH JOHNSON" on Justia Law

Three private contractors providing war-zone security services to the Department of Defense (DOD) appealed a district court order remanding to Nevada state court this suit brought by a group of their employees who guarded DOD bases, equipment, and personnel in Iraq. The guards alleged that their working conditions violated the contractors’ recruiting representations, their employment contracts, and the Theater Wide Internal Security Services II (TWISS II) contract between the contractors and the Department of Defense.The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that the contractors met the limited burden imposed by the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1442(a)(1), which permits removal of a civil action against “any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof . . . for or relating to any act under color of such office.” To satisfy this requirement, a removing private entity must show that (a) it is a “person” within the meaning of the statute; (b) there is a causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to a federal officer’s directions, and the plaintiff’s claims; and (c) it can assert a colorable federal defense. There was no dispute that the contractors, as corporations, were “persons” for purposes of Section 1442(a)(1). The panel held that the contractors sufficiently pleaded that there was a causal nexus between their actions and the guards’ claims. View "NICHOLAS DEFIORE, ET AL V. SOC LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

A California court sentenced appellant Plaintiff to death. That same year, the California legislature codified a longstanding judicial rule guaranteeing the appointment of postconviction relief counsel to indigent prisoners who had been convicted and sentenced to death. Plaintiff requested the appointment of postconviction habeas counsel 26 years ago. Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming that by failing to appoint counsel as promised and so preventing him from developing and prosecuting his state habeas corpus petition for over two decades, state officials are violating his procedural due process rights. He sought a declaration that state officials’ “failure to timely appoint counsel is in violation” of his due process rights. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that Plaintiff has standing because he has adequately shown that the declaratory relief he seeks would redress his injuries. The panel agreed with the district court that abstention under O’Shea v. Littleton, as to Plaintiff’s individual request for declaratory relief, was not appropriate. The panel held that California is under no federal constitutional obligation to appoint postconviction counsel for all indigent capital prisoners. But Plaintiff stated a viable due process claim by alleging that he has been deprived of a valuable property interest for over a quarter century. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. However, the panel held that Plaintiff’s complaint, as presently drafted, did not plausibly allege that the state has failed to adequately protect his liberty interest in petitioning for habeas corpus. View "STEPHEN REDD V. PATRICIA GUERRERO, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendants responded to calls from the decedent’s neighbor that he was driving a pickup truck erratically on a rural field on his own property, that he was drunk and belligerent and may have fired a gun. An hour after thirty officers arrived at the property in marked police cars with their overhead lights on, Defendants used an unmarked armored vehicle to twice execute a pursuit intervention technique (“PIT”) maneuver by intentionally colliding with decedent’s truck in the field. Officers reportedly shot decedent after they thought they heard a gunshot and saw a rifle pointed at them. Decedent’s widow brought this civil suit seeking damages from the officers and the County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and state law. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The panel first rejected Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants violated decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights by entering the property without a warrant. The officers’ decision not to obtain a warrant before entering the property was not the proximate cause of decedent’s death. The panel next held that a jury could find that Defendants’ second PIT maneuver constituted deadly and excessive force because (1) it created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, (2) decedent did not pose an imminent threat to the officers or others at that point, and (3) less intrusive alternatives were available. Nevertheless, no clearly established law would have provided adequate notice to reasonable officers that their use of the armored vehicle to execute a low-speed PIT maneuver under these circumstances was unconstitutional. View "APRIL SABBE V. WASHINGTON CNTY BD OF COMM'RS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He argued that his Section 924(c) conviction and its mandatory 15-year consecutive sentence should be vacated because his predicate crime, voluntary manslaughter, does not qualify as a crime of violence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion. The panel wrote that for purposes of Section 924(c), voluntary manslaughter has the same mental state as murder—intent to commit a violent act against another or recklessness with extreme indifference to human life. Like murder, voluntary manslaughter requires at least an “extreme and necessarily oppositional” state of mind. The panel held that the district court therefore properly denied Defendant’s Section 2255 motion. View "USA V. DANIEL DRAPER" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an Idaho prisoner facing execution by lethal injection. He challenged Idaho’s execution practices. He alleged that these practices: 1) interfere with his ability to challenge the State’s method of execution as cruel and unusual punishment; 2) inhibit his ability to seek clemency; 3) inflict mental anguish; 4) increase the risk of an unconstitutionally painful execution; 5) treat similarly situated prisoners unequally; 6) violate the separation of powers under the Idaho Constitution; and 7) contravene Idaho Code Section 19-2716’s requirement that the director of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) establish procedures governing executions. On remand, and in light of then-co-plaintiff’s scheduled execution, the district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the district court violated the rule of mandate by denying leave to amend in connection with the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the complaint. The court explained that although its decision in Pizzuto I noted parenthetically that Plaintiff should be permitted to amend the complaint, the court did not foreclose the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint or address whether, in connection with such a dismissal, further amendment would be futile. The court agreed with the district court that amendment of several of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the First Amendment claims based on access to execution-related information. View "THOMAS CREECH, ET AL V. JOSH TEWALT, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing, and denied a petition for rehearing en banc, in a case in which the panel: (1) reversed a judgment of the district court granting Petitioner's habeas petition challenging his continued immigration detention after an initial bond hearing; and (2) held that due process does not require a second bond hearing.Judge Paez issued a statement regarding the court's denial. Judge Paez joined by Judges Murguia, Wardlaw, Gould, Berzon, Koh, Sung, Sanchez, H.A. Thomas, Mendoza, and Desai, wrote that the panel opinion conflicts with Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). View "AROLDO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California state prisoner, moved to recall the mandate and reinstate his 2017 appeal of the dismissal of his civil rights action against state agencies and Salinas Valley Prison medical staff and officials.   The Ninth Circuit denied the motion to reinstate the appeal but directed that his filing fees be refunded. The panel first determined that Plaintiff’s motion to recall the mandate, filed 661 days after the mandate became effective, was untimely. The panel next held that the extraordinary remedy of recalling the mandate and ordering reinstatement to prevent injustice or address exceptional circumstances was not necessary given that Plaintiff did not dispute that he had three strikes, was ineligible to proceed IFP under Section 1915(b)’s payment plan, and had not timely paid the filing fee. The appeal therefore was properly dismissed. The panel held that Section 1915 neither permits nor requires the collection of fees from a prisoner who is ineligible for IFP status because he has struck out under Section 1915(g). Plaintiff purported IFP appeal therefore was barred by 1915(g), and the district court was without authority to collect the filing fees from Plaintiff’s prison account. View "LEON MEYERS V. EDWARD BIRDSONG, ET AL" on Justia Law