Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs challenged Washington statutes that require a certificate of "public convenience and necessity" (PCN) in order to operate a ferry on Lake Chelan in central Washington sate. The court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not encompass a right to operate a public ferry on intrastate navigable waterways and affirmed the district court's dismissal of this claim. The court also held that the district court properly abstained from deciding on plaintiffs' challenges to the PCN requirement as applied to the provision of boat transportation services on the lake. The district court properly abstained under the Pullman doctrine, but the district court should have retained jurisdiction instead of dismissing the claim. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded this claim with instructions to the district court to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional challenge. View "Courtney, et al. v. Goltz, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss an indictment against him for violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), which prohibits persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from possessing firearms for life. Applying United States v. Brailey, the court concluded that defendant's domestic violence conviction did not divest him of "core" civil rights and he could not qualify for the civil rights restored exception to section 922(g)(9). The court rejected defendant's argument that the civil rights restored exception violated the Equal Protection Clause for the same reasons the court articulated in United States v. Hancock. Like the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, the court applied intermediate scrutiny to section 922(g)(9) and held that it was constitutional on its face and as applied to defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Chovan" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from an action to abate gang activity under California's general public nuisance statutes. The Orange County District Attorney's Office (OCDA), on behalf of the state, filed a public nuisance action against the Orange Varrio Cypress Criminal Street Gang (OVC). OCDA subsequently obtained a default judgment, including a permanent injunction (the Order) against OVC and others. Plaintiffs, individuals of whom OCDA and the Orange Police Department (OPD) served the Order and Notice, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that OCDA and OPD's "dismiss-and-serve strategy" violated the procedural due process clauses of the U.S. and California constitutions. The court concluded that the district court properly declined to abstain under Younger v. Harris; plaintiffs' suit was not a forbidden de facto appeal barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to abstain from granting relief under general principles of comity and federalism; and the court evaluated the district court's discretionary decision to grant relief under the Colorado River doctrine rather than under Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am. The court reversed the district court's judgment against Rackauckas on plaintiffs' second claim for relief in light of Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Alderman. Further, the court concluded, inter alia, that the Order profoundly implicated liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause; the district court correctly determined that the Mathews v. Eldridge factors "weigh clearly in favor" of the conclusion that defendants violated plaintiffs' procedural due process rights by failing to provide any form of hearing before subjecting them to the Order; and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's issuance of declaratory and injunctive relief in plaintiffs' favor. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Vasquez v. Rackauckas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate who has a history of bipolar disorder, delusions, Parkinson's disease, and hypertension, filed suit pro se against defendants, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court dismissed his claim and plaintiff, represented by counsel, appealed. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Dr. Bannister because plaintiff failed to submit evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Dr. Bannister was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Warden Neven and nurses Grisham, Diliddo, and Balao-Cledera because plaintiff expressly waived his appeal against them in his reply brief; vacated the clerk's entry of judgment in favor of Defendant Dr. Sussman because the district court abused its discretion in failing to comply with Rule 4(m); vacated the district court's decision denying plaintiff's request for leave to amend his second amended complaint to name additional defendants; and remanded with instructions to comply with Rule 4(m) with respect to Dr. Sussman and to allow plaintiff leave to amend his second amended complaint. View "Crowley v. Bannister" on Justia Law

Arizona filed suit against ASARCO on behalf of Angela Aguilar and the state. Aguilar later filed her own suit, alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. These proceedings were consolidated and removed to federal court. The jury found ASARCO liable on the sexual harassment claims only and the jury did not find any compensatory damages for Aguilar, instead awarding her one dollar in nominal damages for the sexual harassment claim. The jury also awarded Aguilar $868,750 in punitive damages. The district court subsequently ordered that the punitive damages be reduced to $300,000, which was the statutory maximum under Title VII for an employer of ASARCO's size. The court concluded that the punitive damages award was outside of constitutional limits and must be vacated. The court concluded that the requirement of a reasonable relationship between compensatory and punitive damages suggested that these damages should be reduced. However, given ASARCO's highly reprehensible conduct and the presence of a comparable civil penalty in the form of the Title VII damages cap, the court concluded that the Constitution did not bar the imposition of a substantial punitive award. Therefore, on remand, the district court could reorder a new trial unless plaintiff accepted a remittitur of $125,000. View "State of Arizona v. ASARCO" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q, seeking to compel the Agencies to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from the state's five oil refineries under the CAA. On appeal, Intervenor WSPA argued that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the parties' dispositive motions on the merits because plaintiffs have not met their burden in satisfying the "irreducible constitutional minimum" requirements for Article III standing under either the causality or redressability prong discussed in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order on the parties' dispositive motions and remanded with instructions that the action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon" on Justia Law

Arizona’s 2010 Senate Bill 1070 includes various immigration-related provisions, passed in response to the growing presence of unauthorized aliens in Arizona. The stated purpose of S.B. 1070 is “to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and government agencies in Arizona” by creating “a variety of immigration-related state offenses and defin[ing] the immigration-enforcement authority of Arizona’s state and local law enforcement officers.” Section 13-2929 of the Bill attempts to criminalize transporting, concealing, harboring, or attempting to transport, conceal, or harbor an unauthorized alien under certain circumstances and to criminalize inducing or encouraging an unauthorized alien to come to or reside in Arizona. The district court entered a preliminary injunction with respect to 13-2929 on the basis that it is preempted by federal law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute, as written, is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause because one of its key elements—being “in violation of a criminal offense”—is unintelligible. The provision is also preempted by federal law and invalid under the Supremacy Clause. View "Valle del Sol, Inc. v. State of Arizona" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, disabled state prisoners and parolees, filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., seeking disability accommodations. In these consolidated appeals, defendant challenged the scope of the district court's injunction in light of the amendments to California Penal Code 3056. The court concluded that the August 28 orders, which required California state officials to disseminate and implement a previously negotiated County Jail Plan for disabled persons and parolees, neither conflicted with section 3056 nor required more of defendants than was appropriate to assist in remedying the ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations for which they bear responsibility. Therefore, the court affirmed the remedial August 28 orders issued by the district court. Case No. 12-6018 was dismissed as moot and the court affirmed the district court's order in Case No. 12-17198. View "Armstrong v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants seeking damages for his detention and treatment at Guantanamo Bay. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, given the jurisdiction-stripping provisions in 28 U.S.C. 2241(e). Looking to the plain language of section 2241(e)(2), it was clear that this provision applied to plaintiff's claims, and that, as a result, no court, justice, or judge had authority to hear his action. The court concluded that Boumediene v. Bush did not address section 2241(e)(2), let alone strike it down; because section 2241(e)(2) was capable of functioning independently, and was consistent with Congress's basic objectives in enacting the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, the court concluded that it was severable from section 2241(e)(1), and remained in effect, provided that it was constitutional; and section 2241(e)(2) was not unconstitutional as applied to him. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims and remanded. View "Hamad v. Gates, et al." on Justia Law

Loops, designer of a flexible toothbrush made for safe use in prisons, bid on a contract with the NYC-DOC. Amercare ultimately won the contract using a similar toothbrush. Amercare filed a defamation suit against Loops after Loops alleged that Amercare had engaged in procurement fraud. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by entertaining Washington's anti-SLAPP motion, Wash. Rev. Code 4.25.510; under section 4.25.510, Loops was immune for all statements made to government agencies; the statute of limitations barred claims regarding the product alteration and counterfeiting accusations; and Americare did not show a likelihood of satisfying the elements of defamation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Phoenix Trading, Inc. v. Loops LLC" on Justia Law