Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bill Graham, a successful promoter of rock and roll concerts, died testate and his will created individual trusts for his sons, Alexander and David. Nicholas Clainos was the trustee of the trusts and the executor of the estate and Richard Greene, through his firm, provided Clainos legal counsel. On appeal, Alexander and David challenged the district court's disposition of a motion to dismiss, a special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Proc. Code 425.16(b)(1), and related attorney's fees awards. The court affirmed the disposition of the motion to strike in part and reversed in part. The court concluded that striking plaintiffs' conversion and unjust enrichment claims against Clainos was erroneous. The court also concluded that striking plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim against Clainos was erroneous. The court further concluded that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged claims for conversion, copyright infringement, and declaratory relief against the BGA Defendants and that dismissal of those claims was erroneous. In regards to attorney's fees, the court vacated the post-motion-to-strike fee award to Clainos, as well as the post-motion-to-dismiss fee award to the BGA Defendants. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Graham-Sult v. Clainos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California state prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff claimed that prison officials engaged in retaliatory conduct, of which the governmental actors were aware, because of plaintiff's mother's website, which exposed prison corruption and fought for inmates' rights. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant and plaintiff appealed. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff was disqualified from proceeding in forma pauperis. The court held that repeated and knowing violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)'s "short and plain statement" requirement are strikes as "failures to state a claim" when the opportunity to correct the pleadings has been afforded and there has been no modification within a reasonable time. Plaintiff accrued two strikes for Ninth Circuit dismissals, and three additional strikes for district court dismissals. Therefore, plaintiff has more than met the requirement for a revocation of in forma pauperis status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Knapp v. Hogan, et al." on Justia Law

The City appealed the district court's determination that the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, preempted its decision to require T-Mobile to obtain voter approval before constructing mobile telephone antennae on city-owned park property. T-Mobile cross-appealed the denial of permanent injunctive relief. The court concluded that section 332(c)(7)(A) of the Act has the following preemptive scope: (1) it preempts local land use authorities' regulations if they violate the requirements of section 332(c)(7)(B)(i) and (iv); and (2) it preempts local land use authorities' adjudicative decisions if the procedures for making such decisions do not meet the minimum requirements of section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (iii). In this case, the voter-approval requirement imposed by Measure C was outside the City's framework for land use decision making because it did not implicate the regulatory and administrative structure established by the City's general plans and zoning and subdivision code. Therefore, the court concluded that it was not preempted and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Omnipoint v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, the Secretary of the Army, alleging that certain adverse employment actions resulted from discrimination. Plaintiff had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection but failed to list the action as an asset on her bankruptcy schedule. The district court held that no evidence suggested that plaintiff's original omission had been inadvertent or mistaken and that, weighing factors set forth in New Hampshire v. Maine, judicial estoppel barred the action. Plaintiff appealed. The court affirmed, concluding that this case was distinguishable from the court's holding in Ah Quin v. County of Kauai Department of Transportation, where plaintiff here filed false bankruptcy schedules and did not amend those schedules until defendant filed a motion to dismiss, suggesting that her omission had not been inadvertent. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its analysis under the New Hampshire factors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dzakula v. McHugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation seeking to recover a masterpiece French impressionist painting by Camille Pissarro that was allegedly taken from their ancestors by the Nazi regime. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of the Foundation's motion to dismiss the complaint without leave to amend. Amended California Code of Civil Procedure 338(c)(3) provides for a six-year statute of limitations period for the recovery of fine art against a museum, gallery, auctioneer, or dealer. The court found that the district court erred in concluding that section 338 intruded on foreign affairs and concluded that the district court erred in striking section 338 down as unconstitutional on the basis of field preemption. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that the Foundation's due process challenge could not be resolved on the Foundation's motion to dismiss. The court further concluded that the Foundation failed to demonstrate that section 338(c)(3) burdened its rights to free speech and, therefore, section 338(c)(3) did not violate the Foundation's First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Eugene, the Police Department (EPD), and others, alleging that they violated his First Amendment rights when they removed him from his position on the EPD K-9 team in retaliation for repeatedly airing concerns about work-related safety issues to his supervisors. The court concluded that the evidence presented to the jury did not reasonably permit the conclusion that plaintiff established a retaliation claim where, as here, a public employee reports departmental-safety concerns to his or her supervisors pursuant to a duty to do so, that employee did not speak as a private citizen and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and held that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hagen v. City of Eugene, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Washington statutes that require a certificate of "public convenience and necessity" (PCN) in order to operate a ferry on Lake Chelan in central Washington sate. The court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not encompass a right to operate a public ferry on intrastate navigable waterways and affirmed the district court's dismissal of this claim. The court also held that the district court properly abstained from deciding on plaintiffs' challenges to the PCN requirement as applied to the provision of boat transportation services on the lake. The district court properly abstained under the Pullman doctrine, but the district court should have retained jurisdiction instead of dismissing the claim. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded this claim with instructions to the district court to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional challenge. View "Courtney, et al. v. Goltz, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss an indictment against him for violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), which prohibits persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from possessing firearms for life. Applying United States v. Brailey, the court concluded that defendant's domestic violence conviction did not divest him of "core" civil rights and he could not qualify for the civil rights restored exception to section 922(g)(9). The court rejected defendant's argument that the civil rights restored exception violated the Equal Protection Clause for the same reasons the court articulated in United States v. Hancock. Like the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, the court applied intermediate scrutiny to section 922(g)(9) and held that it was constitutional on its face and as applied to defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Chovan" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from an action to abate gang activity under California's general public nuisance statutes. The Orange County District Attorney's Office (OCDA), on behalf of the state, filed a public nuisance action against the Orange Varrio Cypress Criminal Street Gang (OVC). OCDA subsequently obtained a default judgment, including a permanent injunction (the Order) against OVC and others. Plaintiffs, individuals of whom OCDA and the Orange Police Department (OPD) served the Order and Notice, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that OCDA and OPD's "dismiss-and-serve strategy" violated the procedural due process clauses of the U.S. and California constitutions. The court concluded that the district court properly declined to abstain under Younger v. Harris; plaintiffs' suit was not a forbidden de facto appeal barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to abstain from granting relief under general principles of comity and federalism; and the court evaluated the district court's discretionary decision to grant relief under the Colorado River doctrine rather than under Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am. The court reversed the district court's judgment against Rackauckas on plaintiffs' second claim for relief in light of Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Alderman. Further, the court concluded, inter alia, that the Order profoundly implicated liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause; the district court correctly determined that the Mathews v. Eldridge factors "weigh clearly in favor" of the conclusion that defendants violated plaintiffs' procedural due process rights by failing to provide any form of hearing before subjecting them to the Order; and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's issuance of declaratory and injunctive relief in plaintiffs' favor. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Vasquez v. Rackauckas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate who has a history of bipolar disorder, delusions, Parkinson's disease, and hypertension, filed suit pro se against defendants, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court dismissed his claim and plaintiff, represented by counsel, appealed. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Dr. Bannister because plaintiff failed to submit evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Dr. Bannister was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Warden Neven and nurses Grisham, Diliddo, and Balao-Cledera because plaintiff expressly waived his appeal against them in his reply brief; vacated the clerk's entry of judgment in favor of Defendant Dr. Sussman because the district court abused its discretion in failing to comply with Rule 4(m); vacated the district court's decision denying plaintiff's request for leave to amend his second amended complaint to name additional defendants; and remanded with instructions to comply with Rule 4(m) with respect to Dr. Sussman and to allow plaintiff leave to amend his second amended complaint. View "Crowley v. Bannister" on Justia Law