Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff first applied for social security disability insurance (SSI) benefits ten years ago. When the benefits were denied, plaintiff requested a hearing but the SSA ruled that her request was untimely and denied a subsequent application on the ground of res judicata. The SSA never explained why it rejected plaintiff's facially valid excuse for the delay in her hearing request. The district court then dismissed her action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the ALJ failed to consider whether plaintiff's facially valid reasons constituted good cause excusing the delay, and deprived plaintiff of her due process right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to seek reconsideration of an adverse benefits determination. View "Dexter v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the crew of an Ecuadorian fishing boat, filed suit against the United States, alleging that the United States harmed plaintiffs and their property when the Coast Guard boarded the boat in search of drugs. The court held that, on the evidence submitted by the parties, reciprocity with Ecuador existed; the discretionary function exception applied generally to plaintiffs' claims because most of the actions by the Coast Guard were discretionary; the government could have violated its non-discretionary policy of paying damages to the owner of the boat; and to the extent that plaintiffs could establish that the United States violated that mandatory obligation, sovereign immunity did not bar this action. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tobar v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Arizona state prisoner, filed suit against defendants, alleging that they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131-12134, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794, by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. Plaintiff picked tomatoes for Eurofresh as a part of a convict labor force. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims against Eurofresh were properly dismissed because plaintiff and Eurofresh were not in an employment relationship, and Eurofresh did not receive federal financial assistance. The court concluded, however, that judgment was improperly granted to the State Defendants where they were liable for disability discrimination committed by a contractor. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court to determine in the first instance whether such discrimination occurred. View "Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc." on Justia Law

After the Department denied Memorial's application for a Certificate of Need to perform elective percutaneous coronary interventions (PCIs), Memorial filed suit alleging that the PCI regulations were an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and unreasonably discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that the requirements did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause where the minimum procedure requirement did not burden interstate commerce and the minimum procedure requirement protected public safety. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all of Memorial's remaining claims. View "Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the City's enactment of an ordinance which had the practical effect of prohibiting new group homes - i.e., homes in which recovering alcoholics and drug users live communally and mutually support each other's recovery - from opening in most residential zones. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims; plaintiffs have created a triable fact that the ordinance was enacted in order to discriminate against them on the basis of disability, and that its enactment and enforcement harmed them; and the court reversed the district court's dismissal of all of plaintiffs' damages claims, except for its dismissal of Terri Bridgeman's claim for emotional distress. View "Pac. Shores Properties v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law

Rocky Mountain and American Fuels filed two separate actions against CARB, contending that the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, 95480-90, violated the dormant Commerce Clause and was preempted by Section 211(o) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o), known as the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). The court held that the Fuel Standard's regulation of ethanol did not facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce, and its initial crude-oil provisions (2011 Provisions) did not discriminate against out-of-state crude oil in purpose or practical effect. The court also held that the Fuel Standard did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition on extraterritorial regulation. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court for further considerations under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. View "Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey" on Justia Law

NRIC challenged the Sixth Northwest Power Plan (the Plan) that the Council adopted in May 2010. NRIC argued that the Plan failed to give due consideration for protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife as the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (the Power Act), 16 U.S.C. 839-839h, required. The court concluded that the NRIC had not pointed to any part of the Power Act that required the Council to reconsider fish and wildlife measures in light of its evaluation of the regional power system from the subsequent power-planning process. Absent such a showing, the court would not second-guess the due consideration that the Council gave to fish and wildlife interests in the adoption of the Plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Plan with respect to NRIC's due-consideration challenge. The court remanded, however, the Plan to the Council for the limited purposes of (1) allowing public notice and comment on the proposed methodology for determining quantifiable environmental costs and benefits, and (2) reconsidering the inclusion in the Plan of the BPA's estimate of the 2009 Program's costs to hydrosystem operations. View "NW Res. Inf. Ctr. v. NW Power & Conserv. Council" on Justia Law

I-TAP, an approved apprenticeship program for Federal purposes, but not recognized by California as a state-approved apprenticeship program, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the CDIR's actions were inconsistent with the National Apprenticeship Act of 1937 (Fitzgerald Act). The court concluded that federal subject-matter jurisdiction existed in this case; the court declined to afford controlling deference to the DOL's new interpretation of the meaning of "Federal purposes" under 29 C.F.R. 29.2 under Auer v. Robbins, but nevertheless adopted that interpretation as the most persuasive construction of the regulation at issue; the court adopted the DOL's new interpretation of Federal purposes, which required of agreements, contracts, etc., that conformity with federal apprenticeship standards be a condition for the federal assistance at issue; plaintiffs' preemption claim failed where the three projects at issue did not qualify as Federal purposes, and it was not impermissible for the CDIR to require the contractors on the projects to comply with California's apprenticeship standards; and plaintiffs' dormant Commerce Clause, equal protection, and substantive due process challenges failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Indep. Training v. Cal. Dep't Indus. Relations" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a former prison gang member and police informant. Defendants are producers of the documentary television series, "Gangland." Plaintiff filed suit for various claims alleging that defendants' failure to conceal his identity in an episode of "Gangland" endangered his life and cost him his job as an informant. On interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion to strike the complaint under California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. The court concluded that defendants have met their initial burden under the anti-SLAPP statute where defendants' acts in furtherance of their right of free speech were in connection with issues of public interest. The court also concluded that, at this juncture, plaintiff's claims were not barred by the release he signed. It follows that plaintiff's statements were not barred by the parole evidence rule. The court further concluded that plaintiff met his burden of showing a probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) public disclosure of private fact; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) false promise; and (4) declaratory relief. Plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) appropriation of likeness and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Doe v. Gangland Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

The Warden appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In this instance, petitioner filed his federal petition well over one year after his conviction became final. However, the Supreme Court has long recognized, under Schlup v. Delo, that in a "narrow class of cases... implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice," federal courts could hear the merits of a habeas petition despite an otherwise applicable procedural bar. Petitioner contended, and the district court concluded, that his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should be considered on the merits despite its untimeliness because he is innocent. The court concluded that it was simply implausible that McQuiggin v. Perkins would alter the district court's conclusions about the credibility of petitioner's evidence, because the district court already undertook the precise analysis that Perkins prescribes. Because the court concluded that petitioner met the demanding Schlup standard, the court must exercise the "equitable discretion" of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors did not result in the incarceration of innocent persons. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that petitioner had made the requisite showing that he is actually innocent. View "Larsen v. Soto" on Justia Law