Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the City's enactment of an ordinance which had the practical effect of prohibiting new group homes - i.e., homes in which recovering alcoholics and drug users live communally and mutually support each other's recovery - from opening in most residential zones. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims; plaintiffs have created a triable fact that the ordinance was enacted in order to discriminate against them on the basis of disability, and that its enactment and enforcement harmed them; and the court reversed the district court's dismissal of all of plaintiffs' damages claims, except for its dismissal of Terri Bridgeman's claim for emotional distress. View "Pac. Shores Properties v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law

Rocky Mountain and American Fuels filed two separate actions against CARB, contending that the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, 95480-90, violated the dormant Commerce Clause and was preempted by Section 211(o) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o), known as the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). The court held that the Fuel Standard's regulation of ethanol did not facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce, and its initial crude-oil provisions (2011 Provisions) did not discriminate against out-of-state crude oil in purpose or practical effect. The court also held that the Fuel Standard did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition on extraterritorial regulation. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court for further considerations under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. View "Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey" on Justia Law

NRIC challenged the Sixth Northwest Power Plan (the Plan) that the Council adopted in May 2010. NRIC argued that the Plan failed to give due consideration for protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife as the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (the Power Act), 16 U.S.C. 839-839h, required. The court concluded that the NRIC had not pointed to any part of the Power Act that required the Council to reconsider fish and wildlife measures in light of its evaluation of the regional power system from the subsequent power-planning process. Absent such a showing, the court would not second-guess the due consideration that the Council gave to fish and wildlife interests in the adoption of the Plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Plan with respect to NRIC's due-consideration challenge. The court remanded, however, the Plan to the Council for the limited purposes of (1) allowing public notice and comment on the proposed methodology for determining quantifiable environmental costs and benefits, and (2) reconsidering the inclusion in the Plan of the BPA's estimate of the 2009 Program's costs to hydrosystem operations. View "NW Res. Inf. Ctr. v. NW Power & Conserv. Council" on Justia Law

I-TAP, an approved apprenticeship program for Federal purposes, but not recognized by California as a state-approved apprenticeship program, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the CDIR's actions were inconsistent with the National Apprenticeship Act of 1937 (Fitzgerald Act). The court concluded that federal subject-matter jurisdiction existed in this case; the court declined to afford controlling deference to the DOL's new interpretation of the meaning of "Federal purposes" under 29 C.F.R. 29.2 under Auer v. Robbins, but nevertheless adopted that interpretation as the most persuasive construction of the regulation at issue; the court adopted the DOL's new interpretation of Federal purposes, which required of agreements, contracts, etc., that conformity with federal apprenticeship standards be a condition for the federal assistance at issue; plaintiffs' preemption claim failed where the three projects at issue did not qualify as Federal purposes, and it was not impermissible for the CDIR to require the contractors on the projects to comply with California's apprenticeship standards; and plaintiffs' dormant Commerce Clause, equal protection, and substantive due process challenges failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Indep. Training v. Cal. Dep't Indus. Relations" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a former prison gang member and police informant. Defendants are producers of the documentary television series, "Gangland." Plaintiff filed suit for various claims alleging that defendants' failure to conceal his identity in an episode of "Gangland" endangered his life and cost him his job as an informant. On interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion to strike the complaint under California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. The court concluded that defendants have met their initial burden under the anti-SLAPP statute where defendants' acts in furtherance of their right of free speech were in connection with issues of public interest. The court also concluded that, at this juncture, plaintiff's claims were not barred by the release he signed. It follows that plaintiff's statements were not barred by the parole evidence rule. The court further concluded that plaintiff met his burden of showing a probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) public disclosure of private fact; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) false promise; and (4) declaratory relief. Plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) appropriation of likeness and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Doe v. Gangland Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

The Warden appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In this instance, petitioner filed his federal petition well over one year after his conviction became final. However, the Supreme Court has long recognized, under Schlup v. Delo, that in a "narrow class of cases... implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice," federal courts could hear the merits of a habeas petition despite an otherwise applicable procedural bar. Petitioner contended, and the district court concluded, that his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should be considered on the merits despite its untimeliness because he is innocent. The court concluded that it was simply implausible that McQuiggin v. Perkins would alter the district court's conclusions about the credibility of petitioner's evidence, because the district court already undertook the precise analysis that Perkins prescribes. Because the court concluded that petitioner met the demanding Schlup standard, the court must exercise the "equitable discretion" of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors did not result in the incarceration of innocent persons. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that petitioner had made the requisite showing that he is actually innocent. View "Larsen v. Soto" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the handcuffing and removal from school of then eleven-year-old C.B. by Sonora Police officers. The district court rendered a verdict ostensibly in favor of defendants, but the district court concluded that the verdict was incomplete and inconsistent and directed them to re-deliberate. On appeal, the court concluded that the unscripted supplemental jury instructions, together with the problematic verdict form, gave the jury the misimpression that its initial answers to Questions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were internally inconsistent and needed to be revised. The court also concluded that Officers McIntosh and Prock were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because the law was, and still is, not "clearly established" that handcuffing and driving a juvenile from school to a relative's place of business implicated Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court vacated the verdict and judgments, remanding for further proceedings. The district court was instructed to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of individual defendants McIntosh and Prock as to the 1983 claims. The court did not address whether defendants were entitled to an offset of the amount paid in settlement by the school district and one of the school's teachers. View "C. B. v. City of Sonora, et al." on Justia Law

The Conservancy alleged that the United States was improperly diverting water from Icicle Creek, a tributary of the Wenatchee River, to the Leavenworth National Fish Hatchery and otherwise violating Washington state law. The court dismissed the action, concluding that the Conservancy lacked prudential standing to bring its claim that the Hatchery operation violated the Washington water code, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Conservancy's other claims because they either did not challenge final agency action or rested on provisions of Washington law that were not incorporated into federal reclamation law. View "Wild Fish Conservancy v. Jewell" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was disciplined for serving process on defendant, a prison official, plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging unconstitutional retaliation. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant. The court concluded that plaintiff's acknowledgment that the disciplinary report was not issued because of his other litigation activities compelled the conclusion that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation claim to the extent it was based on prior lawsuits. The court also concluded that plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct when he served process on another inmate's behalf; the court rejected defendant's access-to-courts arguments; and concluded that the First Amendment did not protect plaintiff's attempted service of process on defendant because of the general incompatibility between prison and free association and because there was no evidence of expressive association. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Blaisdell v. Frappiea" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four landlords, challenged the constitutionality of the City's Rent Escrow Account Program (REAP). The Housing Department places property into REAP when a landlord fails to repair habitability violations and tenants pay a reduced rent. The court concluded that placing plaintiffs' property into REAP did not violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights where REAP served legitimate governmental goals and was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose; plaintiffs' procedural challenge could not support an as-applied substantive due process claim; and denial of leave to amend the complaint was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law