Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case concerned Hawaii's "Act 163," Haw. Rev. Stat. 302A-1134(c), which barred students from attending public school after the last day of the school year in which they turned 20. At issue was whether state-funded high school diploma programs for adults who never graduated from high school were a form of "public education" under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(B)(I). The Community Schools for Adults offers "free public education" to students who did not require IDEA services. The Department offers, at taxpayer expense, the opportunity for nondisabled 20- and 21-year-olds to complete their secondary educations and earn high school diplomas. Providing IDEA services to disabled children of those ages would therefore be consistent with "State law or practice... respecting the provision of public education," so the state must do so. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment for the State on the IDEA claim, holding that Act 163 violated federal law. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "E.R.K. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

In two separate cases, the government charged defendant with being an alien in the United States after deportation, as well as misrepresenting his identity and citizenship to fraudulently obtain supplemental social security benefits, acquire food stamps, and make a claim of citizenship, and apply for a passport. Defendant was convicted of all charges and his primary defense to all the charges was that he was a citizen of the United States. The court concluded that the district court erred in invoking an inherent "gate-keeping" authority to exclude defendant's birth certificate pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) without relying on some substantive basis outside of Rule 104(a); the district court erred by concluding that no reasonable juror could determine that the birth certificate was "substantively genuine," and by excluding the birth certificate pursuant to Rule 403 without first assessing its probative value when taken as a true record of defendant's birth; and the district court's exclusion of the central piece of evidence for defendant's main defense to a critical element of all the charges in the two cases was violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment right to present a defense. Because the district court's error was not harmless, the court vacated all of the convictions and remanded for a retrial. View "United States v. Evans, Sr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an atheist, filed suit seeking damages and injunctive relief after he was forced as a condition of parole to participate in a residential drug treatment program that required him to acknowledge a higher power. The court held that the district judge erred in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial based on the jury's failure to award damages; in instructing the jury to determine whether liability should have been apportioned among the multiple defendants in this case; and in dismissing certain other of plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hazle, Jr. v. Crofoot, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Congress has no power to regulate the activities contemplated by the Montana Firearms Freedom Act, Mont. Code Ann. 30-20-104, and injunctive relief preventing the federal government from bringing civil or criminal actions under federal firearms law against Montana citizens acting in compliance with the Act. The court concluded that Plaintiff Gary Marbut alleged economic injury sufficient for standing. On the merits, Congress could have rationally concluded that the manufacture of unlicensed firearms, even if initially sold only within the State of Montana, would in the aggregate substantially affect the interstate market for firearms. Under Gonzales v. Raich and United States v. Stewart, that was enough to place the rifle Marbut wished to manufacture and sell within reach of the long arm of federal law. Because the Act purported to dictate to the contrary, it was necessarily preempted and invalid. Accordingly, the court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. View "Mont. Shooting Sports Ass'n v. Holder" on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood and others filed suit challenging Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-196.05(B) as a violation of the federal Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-196.05(B) barred patients eligible for the state's Medicaid program from obtaining covered family planning services through health care providers who performed abortions in cases other than medical necessity, rape, or incest. The court concluded that the district court's entry of final judgment and a permanent injunction mooted Arizona's appeal of the district court's preliminary injunction. Therefore, the court dismissed that appeal (Case No. 12-17558), and considered only Arizona's appeal of the summary judgment order and permanent injunction (Case No. 13-15506). The court held that the Medicaid Act's free-choice-of-provider requirement conferred a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court also held that the Arizona statute contravenes the Medicaid Act's requirement that states give Medicaid recipients a free choice of qualified provider. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment and permanent injunction. View "Planned Parenthood v. Betlach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the district alleging claims for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the district. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reconsidering its prior order denying summary judgment where the district court found that it had committed clear error by not considering whether plaintiff gave a sufficient explanation for the conflict between her ADA claim and her Nevada Public Employees' Retirement Systems (PERS) application under the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp. Under the standard set forth in Cleveland, the court concluded that plaintiff gave sufficient explanations for the inconsistencies between her ADA claim and her PERS and Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, applications to survive summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Smith v. Clark County School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a former Maricopa County Board of Supervisors member and his spouse, filed suit against defendants, former prosecutors and their spouses, alleging that defendants initiated a frivolous federal civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., suit against plaintiffs. The suit was part of an ongoing "political war" in Maricopa County. The prosecutors claimed that they were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from any claims arising out of their filing of the civil RICO action. The court held that, under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity because their actions were not sufficiently "analogous to those of a prosecutor." Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motions to dismiss based on these claims. View "Stapley v. Pestalozzi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the CDCR and others after she was terminated from her independent contractor position as a nurse and was unable to find other work within the CDCR. The court held that a state agency did not create constitutionally protected property interests for its independent contractors simply by instituting performance review procedures. Even assuming independent contractors could ever have constitutionally protected property interests in their positions, something more was required: either an affirmative grant of tenure or a guarantee from the government. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's federal deprivation of property claim where her orientation documents did not contain any such assurances. The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's federal deprivation of liberty claim where her liberty interest was in her profession as a nurse, not her placement with a particular employer. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Defendant Hill where plaintiff's allegations concerning him were conclusory and implausible on their face. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blantz v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a severely disabled student, filed suit arguing that he was entitled to remain at a private school he had been attending since the age of seven. The Department issued a formal notice that plaintiff's special education placement at the school would end when he turned 20 years old. Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to remain at the school until he was 22 years old. At issue on appeal was whether the "stay put" provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415j, applied to a student who has exceeded a state-imposed age limit on eligibility for public education. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the district court correctly granted plaintiff's motion for stay put. Plaintiff was entitled to remain at the school as his stay-put placement from the date he filed his administrative complaint and he was entitled to remain there until his case was finally resolved. View "A.D. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a representative Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Cal. Lab. Code 2699, action against defendants alleging that they illegally deprived him and other nonexempt employees of meal periods, overtime and vacation wages, and accurate itemized wage statements. At issue on appeal was whether the penalties recoverable on behalf of all aggrieved employees could be considered in their totality to clear the federal diversity jurisdiction amount in controversy requirement under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). The court concluded that the recoveries at issue could not be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy requirement. To the extent plaintiff could assert anything but his individual interest, the court was unpersuaded that such a suit, the primary benefit of which would inure to the state, satisfied the requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction. The state, as the real party in interest, was not a "citizen" for diversity purposes. Accordingly, the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this quintessential California dispute. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded, directing the district court to return the matter to state court for resolution. View " Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc." on Justia Law