Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Retired Hall of Fame football player, James "Jim" Brown, filed suit against EA, alleging that EA violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), through the use of Brown's likeness in EA's "Madden NFL" series of football video games. The court rejected the "likelihood of confusion" test and the "alternative means" test, concluding that the only relevant legal framework for balancing the public's right to be free from consumer confusion about Brown's affiliation with "Madden NFL" and EA's First Amendment rights in the context of Brown's section 43(a) claim was the Rogers v. Grimaldi test. Applying the Rogers test, the court concluded that the use of Brown's likeness was artistically relevant to the "Madden NFL" games and that there were no alleged facts to support the claim that EA explicitly mislead consumers as to Brown's involvement with the games. In this case, the public interest in free expression outweighed the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of EA's motion to dismiss. View "Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc." on Justia Law

These interlocutory appeals stemmed from an encounter between a group of young men and several BART officers that ended with the shooting and death of one of the men. The court concluded that Defendant Mehserle was not entitled to immunity from Oscar Grant, Jr.'s Fourteenth Amendment claim where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mehserle's action's were required by a legitimate law enforcement purpose; the court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal asserting a right to federal law qualified immunity from a California state law (Civil Code 52.1) violation; Mehserle was entitled to qualified immunity from a claim that he unlawfully arrested Plaintiff Anicete; the district court failed to consider whether there was any evidence that Mehserle participated in the extended detentions of Plaintiffs Anicete, Reyes, or Nigel Bryson; the district court properly denied Mehserle qualified immunity from Plaintiff Jack Bryson's unlawful arrest claim; Defendant Pirone was properly denied qualified immunity for his initial detention of Reyes, the Brysons, and Greer; Pirone was not entitled to qualified immunity for conducting a de facto arrest of Reyes and the Brysons; Pirone was not entitled to qualified immunity from Greer's unlawful arrest claim; and to the extent the district court relied on Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco to deny Defendant Domenici immunity, its judgment was vacated. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, dismissed in part, and remanded. View "Johnson v. BART" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that deputies used excessive force against her late husband and that a deputy unreasonably seized her when he kept her from the crime scene. At issue was whether a reasonable jury could determine that the deputies violated the Constitution when they fatally shot the husband - an armed homeowner on his patio. In this instance, the court concluded that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the deputies' use of excessive force was constitutionally excessive where, among other things, the husband was not in the vicinity when the deputies arrived and plaintiff appeared unscathed and not in jeopardy. Accordingly, the court concluded that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court dismissed plaintiff's cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "George v. Morris, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that police officers used excessive force which resulted in her son's death. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The court held that the district court did not correctly conclude as a matter of law that the pre- and post-handcuffing conduct of defendants did not violate the son's constitutional rights and that no negligence occurred. The standard used by the district court was not correct where the district court judge's analysis was infected by impermissible credibility assessments. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The court declined to reassign the case where, despite the district court judge's error of law, the court had no reason to believe that the judge would be unable fairly and correctly to apply the Rule 50(a) standard on remand. View "Krechman v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her employer discriminated against her based upon her sex. While pursuing the discrimination action, plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, failing to list the bankruptcy action in her bankruptcy schedules. The employer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in the discrimination action on the ground that judicial estoppel prohibited plaintiff from proceeding. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. However, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether plaintiff's bankruptcy omission was "mistaken" or "inadvertent." View "Quin v. County of Kauai Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a C-5 quadriplegic, filed suit alleging unlawful discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and related California disability laws, claiming that Peter Piper Pizza prevented him from moving around the restaurant. At issue was whether any barriers interfered with plaintiff's ability "to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations" of the restaurant. Plaintiff missed the period for disclosing his expert and, instead, incorporated the expert's pronouncements into his own presentation, putting forth the expert as a rebuttal expert. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that plaintiff lacked personal knowledge of the barriers he encountered and that his declaration was insufficient. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court abused its discretion in discounting defendant's evidence as lacking personal knowledge and constituted improper expert testimony. The district court also erred in requiring a showing that removal of any barriers was "readily achievable." View "Strong v. Valdez Fine Foods, et al." on Justia Law

The parties dispute whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(2), limited the amount that plaintiff, a prisoner who qualified as a prevailing party who would ordinarily be entitled to an award of attorney's fees, could recover from defendant for attorney's fees incurred in defending his judgment on appeal to 150 percent of the monetary relief awarded to him at trial. The court held that the fee cap in section (d)(2) did not apply to attorney's fees earned in conjunction with an appeal in which prison officials sought unsuccessfully to reverse a verdict obtained by the prisoner before the district court. The court granted plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees on appeal and referred the matter to the Appellate Commissioner to determine the amount of such fees, as well as the amount of reimbursable costs. View "Woods v. Carey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Bresnan alleging violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2520-21, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030, and Montana state law for invasion of privacy and trespass to chattels in connection with targeted advertising they received while using Bresnan's Internet service. The district court declined to enforce a choice-of-law clause in the service subscriber agreement, provided to all Bresnan customers, specifying that New York law should apply, and an arbitration clause. The court held that AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion further limited the savings clause in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-2 et seq., and therefore, the court held that the FAA preempted Montana's reasonable expectations/fundamental rights rule and that the district court erred in not applying New York law because a state's preempted public policy was an impermissible basis on which to reject the parties' choice-of-law selection. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of Bresnan's motion to compel arbitration and remanded to the district court with instructions to apply New York law to the arbitration agreement. View "Mortensen, et al. v. Bresnan Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the Department of Labor's new regulations providing that a labor certification expired after 180 days unless a visa application was filed or, in this case, 180 days after the regulation became final. Plaintiff alleged that enforcing the 180-day rule without providing actual notice constituted an impermissible retroactive rule. The court agreed with the district court that publication of the proposed and final rules in the Federal Register afforded adequate notice of the revision, and that the regulation was not impermissibly retroactive. Further, the text of the statute did not foreclose the establishment of an expiration date for labor certifications. Because the regulation did not have retroactive effect, plaintiff's labor certifications expired when it did not take timely action after the effective date of the new regulation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government. View "Elim Church of God v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Postal Service for breach of prior settlement agreements, as well as various other claims related to her employment at the Postal Service. The district court dismissed plaintiff's breach of contract claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1), granted the Court of Federal Claims exclusive jurisdiction to hear breach of contract claims against the Postal Service that put more than $10,000 in controversy. The district court also dismissed seven of plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff had not complied with the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2675(a), and held that plaintiff's three remaining claims were barred by res judicata. The court concluded that, even assuming that the Tucker Act conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims to hear claims against the Postal Service, the Postal Reorganization Act (PRA), 39 U.S.C. 401 and 409, also vested the district court with independent jurisdiction over such claims. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Although the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's breach of contract claim, it did not err in dismissing it because she failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. None of her remaining claims were viable and, therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of her complaint. View "Tritz v. U.S. Postal Service" on Justia Law