Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of his son, filed suit against the Hawaii Department of Education, alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d). The district court found that the Department did not deny the son a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by holding an annual individualized education program (IEP) meeting without the participation of the parent. Plaintiff did not attend the meeting even though he actively sought to reschedule it in order to participate. The court concluded, however, that the Department denied the son a FAPE by denying plaintiff the opportunity to participate and plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement if he could establish that the private school placement was proper under the Act. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Doug C., et al. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging violations of his constitutional rights after prison officials discovered a letter plaintiff wrote to his fellow inmates calling on them to work together in support of his class action lawsuit against prison administrators. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's adverse partial summary judgment order on his First Amendment claims. Pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction, the parties agreed to withdraw all post-trial motions. Defendants also agreed to pay plaintiff punitive damages, plus costs and attorney's fees, and to expunge all records of the disciplinary charges. The Accord and Satisfaction encompassed the district court's prior summary judgment ruling on plaintiff's First Amendment claims. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff's appeal was rendered moot by the parties' settlement agreement and dismissed the appeal. View "Jones v. McDaniel, et al." on Justia Law

Higher Taste sued the Park district under 42 U.S.C. 1983, requesting a declaration that Resolution 40-05 violated its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction barring the resolution's enforcement. The district court granted Higher Taste's motion for a preliminary injunction, expressly ruling that Higher Taste had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The parties later executed a written settlement agreement. Higher Taste then moved for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b), which permitted an award to the "prevailing party" in certain civil rights actions, including those brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the motion. The court reversed and concluded that, because Higher Taste was a prevailing party within the meaning of section 1988, it should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. On remand, the district court should determine in the first instance whether such special circumstances exist. View "Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the Secretary's denial of their claims for Medicare coverage for dental services. Plaintiffs contended that this denial was premised on the Secretary's unreasonable interpretation of the Medicare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, which contravened the intent of Congress and violated plaintiffs' right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. The court concluded that, although the statutory provision for exclusion of dental services was ambiguous in the sense that plausible divergent constructions could be urged, the Secretary's interpretation of the statute was reasonable. The court also concluded that the Secretary's statutory interpretation warranted Chevron deference and the Secretary's statutory interpretation was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fournier v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, the warden of the prison where defendant had served his sentence and the director of the Montana Department of Corrections, seeking damages related to his sentence and probation. The court concluded that prison officials who simply enforced facially valid court orders were performing functions necessary to the judicial process. Accordingly, the court held that prison officials, like defendants in this case, who were charged with executing facially valid court orders enjoyed absolute immunity from section 1983 liability for conduct prescribed by those orders. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. View "Engebretson v. Mahoney" on Justia Law

After petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison with the possibility of parole, California amended its constitution to give the Governor authority to review parole-board decisions for prisoners convicted of murder. The parole board subsequently found petitioner suitable for parole but the then-Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, reversed the decision. Petitioner claimed that retroactive application of the interim change to the California Constitution violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Rosenkrantz was not an unreasonable application of clearly established law, and neither was the Superior Court's decision in petitioner's case that relied on it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Biggs v. Sec'y of Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

Arizona House Bill 2036 (H.B. 2036), enacted in April 2012, forbids, except in a medical emergency, abortion of a fetus determined to be of a gestational age of at least twenty weeks. Arizona law separately prohibited abortions after fetal viability unless necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life or health. The challenged provision at issue, Section 7 of H.B. 2036, extended the abortion ban earlier in pregnancy, to the period between twenty weeks gestation and fetal viability. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the court concluded that Arizona could not deprive a woman of the choice to terminate her pregnancy at any point prior to viability. Section 7 effects such a deprivation, by prohibiting abortion from twenty weeks gestational age through fetal viability. The twenty-week law was therefore unconstitutional under an unbroken stream of Supreme Court authority, beginning with Roe v. Wade and ending with Gonzales v. Carhart. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of declaratory and injunctive relief. View "Isaacson v. Horne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Kohl's Department Store claiming that he bought merchandise from Kohl's that he would not have purchased had he not been misled by advertisements stating that the merchandise was marked down from a fictitious "original" or "regular" price. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiff alleged that he "lost money or property" and, therefore, had statutory standing under California law to sue Kohl's to enforce California's prohibition on this deceptive marketing practice. In Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that all a consumer needed to allege to establish standing to bring an Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, et seq., or Fair Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500, et seq., claim was that (1) the defendant made a false representation about a product, (2) the consumer purchased the product in reliance on the misrepresentation, and (3) he would not have purchased the product otherwise. The court rejected defendant's argument that Kwikset was distinguishable because it involved a different type of unlawful misrepresentation than the one at issue here. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's UCL and FAL claims. For nearly identical reasons, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code 1750, et seq., claims. The court also denied defendant's motion to certify both on the merits and because of the circumstances attendant to its filing. View "Hinojos v. Kohl's Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, father of Adolf Anthony Sanchez Gonzalez, sued officers and the City of Anaheim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his Fourth Amendment right of familial association and Gonzalez's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable and excessive force. Gonzalez's daughter and successor-in-interest then brought a separate suit raising similar federal claims and various state law claims. The district court consolidated both actions and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that striking Gonzalez in the arm with a flashlight was not excessive force given his stubborn refusal to follow the officers' commands; because all three Graham v. Connor factors supported the officers, they were justified in applying significant force; because the officers' prior conduct never amounted to a constitutional violation, the shooting was not unreasonable as a result; and plaintiffs presented no evidence to suggest that the officers, at any point, had a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest or self-protection and, therefore, plaintiffs' claim that the officers' conduct violated their due process right to familial association failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent 24 years in prison after being convicted for murder based largely upon the perjured testimony of an unreliable jailhouse informant, Edward Fink. Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the District Attorney's Office failed to create any system for the Deputy District Attorneys handling criminal cases to access information pertaining to the benefits provided to jailhouse informants and other impeachment information, and failed to train Deputy District Attorneys to disseminate this information. At issue on appeal was whether a district attorney acted as a local or a state official when establishing policy and training related to the use of jailhouse informants. The court concluded that the policies challenged by plaintiff were distinct from the acts the district attorney undertook on behalf of the state. Even taking into account the control and supervisory powers of the Attorney General, the District Attorney represented the county when establishing policy and training related to the use of jailhouse informants. Therefore, a cause of action could lie against the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the pleadings. View "Goldstein v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law