Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against correctional officials at the Saguaro Correctional Center (SCC), asserting that the decision to house him in the same cell with a member of a rival gang after he had fought with another member of that same gang violated his Eight Amendment rights. The district court rejected defendant's claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk he faced from the cell assignment. The court concluded that, despite the late Rand v. Rowland notice, plaintiff did not suffer a deprivation of substantial rights when the district court decided the summary judgment motion on the merits. Plaintiff's response demonstrated that he understood the nature of summary judgment and complied with the requirements of Rule 56. Thus, reversal and remand of the district court was not required. Further, the undisputed evidence in the record showed that defendants were not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of an attack if the rival gang member and plaintiff were placed in a cell together. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Labatad v. CCA, et al" on Justia Law

This dispute involved a revenue-sharing agreement between GCSD and SNW to build the Skywalk over the Grand Canyon on remote tribal land. GCSD filed suit against SNW seeking declaratory judgment that the Hualapai Tribe lacked the authority to condemn its intangible property rights and injunctive relief. After multiple hearings, the district court denied GCSD's temporary restraining order to enjoin SNW based on the principles of comity and ordered GCSD to exhaust tribal court remedies prior to review in federal court. The court affirmed and held that where, as here, a tribal court has asserted jurisdiction and was entertaining a suit, the tribal court must have acted in bad faith for exhaustion to be excused. The facts of this case did not support a finding of bad faith on the part of the tribal court. The submitted evidence supported the district court's finding that the tribal court operated independently from the tribal council and the evidence presented did not meet the narrow futility exception. The tribal court did not plainly lack jurisdiction because Montana v. United States's main rule was unlikely to apply to the facts of this case. Furthermore, the district court correctly relied on Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area, Inc. v. LaRance, which provided for tribal jurisdiction without even reaching the application of Montana. Even if the tribal consensual relationship with SNW or the financial implications of the agreement likely placed it squarely within one of Montana's exceptions and allowed for tribal jurisdiction. View "Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. v. 'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against Boeing and BISS alleging breach of contract as well as several statutory and common law claims. At issue was the enforceability of a forum selection clause. The court held that the evidence submitted and the allegations made by plaintiff were more than sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the forum selection clause at issue here was enforceable under M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shores Co. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by granting BISS's motion to dismiss without convening an evidentiary hearing. The district court also abused its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. The court did, however, grant Boeing's and BISS's joint motion to strike the portions of plaintiff's reply brief that included new evidence or alleged new facts not in the record before the district court. View "Petersen v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the court considered whether San Rafael's mobilehome rent regulation violated the park owners' substantive due process rights, constituted a regulatory taking under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, or ran afoul of the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment under the standards articulated in Kelo v. City of New London. The court concluded that the district court properly rejected the City's arguments that MHC's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and precluded by res judicata, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing MHC to amend its complaint. The court also concluded that the regulation did not constitute either a Penn Central or a private taking. Because the court reached the merits of the takings issue, the court need not resolve the question of ripeness. The court further concluded that the district court did not err in granting judgment on MHC's substantive due process claims; the district court did not err in submitting the breach of settlement contract claims to the jury, denying the motion for a directed verdict on that question, denying the motion for a new trial, or awarding attorneys' fees; and in its original lawsuit, MHC waived its claim for damages in order to have a bench trial on the constitutional claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's holding as to the Penn Central and private takings, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "MHC Limited Financing v. City of San Rafael" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Trump University for, among other things, deceptive business practices. Trump University counterclaimed against plaintiff for defamation based on the statements in letters and Internet postings plaintiff had made. Plaintiff then moved under California's "anti-SLAPP" (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) law, California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, to strike the defamation claim. At issue on appeal was whether Trump University, a private, for-profit entity purporting to teach Trump's "insider success secrets," was itself a public or limited public figure so as to implicate the First Amendment. The court concluded that Trump University was a limited public figure for the limited purpose of the public controversy over the quality of the education it purported to provide, and to prevail here, must demonstrate that plaintiff acted with actual malice. Because the district court erred by failing to recognize Trump University's status as a limited public figure, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Makaeff, et al v. Trump University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the County Defendants. Plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the County Defendants conspired to violate, and did violate, her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they unlawfully searched her home pursuant to an invalid search warrant, used excessive force in the execution of that warrant, and arrested her without probable cause. Because there was probable cause to search plaintiff's residence and to arrest her, the court affirmed the district court's entry of judgment with respect to those claims. Because disputed issues of material fact remained regarding plaintiff's excessive force and conspiracy claims, however, the court reversed and remanded those claims to the district court for further proceedings. View "Cameron v. Craig" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued several police officers and their employer, the City of Los Angeles, for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff was charged with attempted murder and was eventually acquitted. At issue was whether plaintiff's action was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. The court concluded that plaintiff raised a genuine dispute as to whether an officer fabricated evidence at the preliminary hearing by falsely testifying that the victim had identified plaintiff as the shooter. That alleged fabrication plainly met the materiality threshold for defeating summary judgment on the merits. In this case, the state court never purported to find either that the officer's testimony was credible or that the victim's testimony was not. Accordingly, plaintiff was not barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion and, therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Wige v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

AGC sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Caltrans and its officers, on the grounds that Caltrans' 2009 Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program unconstitutionally provided race- and sex-based preferences to certain groups. On appeal, AGC challenged the district court's adverse summary judgment rulings. The district court held that Caltrans' substantial statistical and anecdotal evidence provided a strong basis in evidence of discrimination against the four named groups, and that the program was narrowly tailored to benefit only those groups. The court dismissed AGC's appeal because AGC did not identify any of its members who have suffered or will suffer harm as a result of Caltrans' program, and therefore AGC had not established that it had associational standing to bring suit. View "Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Cal. Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

Appellees are the named plaintiffs representing a certified class of non-citizens who challenged their prolonged detention, pursuant to certain federal immigration statutes, without individualized bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention. The district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the government to identify all class members detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) and 1225(b), and to provide each of them with a bond hearing before an IJ with power to grant their release. The government appealed. The court held that appellees were likely to succeed on the merits; appellees have clearly shown a risk of irreparable harm; in light of the major hardship posed by needless prolonged detention, the court concluded that the balance of the equities favored appellees; and the public interest also benefitted from a preliminary injunction that ensured federal statues were construed and implemented in a manner that avoided serious constitutional questions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rodriguez v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action alleging wrongful foreclosure and related claims that defendants had removed to federal court. Plaintiffs argued that under the "prior exclusive jurisdiction" doctrine, or under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, the district court should have remanded sua sponte. The court affirmed the district court's remand under the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, explaining that the state court had continuing jurisdiction over the water-rights decree that was the basis of the contempt action at issue, and the action before the district court arose from enforcement of the same water-rights decree. Because plaintiffs have not shown that any state proceeding relating to their house was pending concurrently with federal proceedings, the Colorado River abstention was not implicated any more than the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine. View "Sexton v. NDEX West, LLC" on Justia Law