Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the Secretary's denial of their claims for Medicare coverage for dental services. Plaintiffs contended that this denial was premised on the Secretary's unreasonable interpretation of the Medicare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, which contravened the intent of Congress and violated plaintiffs' right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. The court concluded that, although the statutory provision for exclusion of dental services was ambiguous in the sense that plausible divergent constructions could be urged, the Secretary's interpretation of the statute was reasonable. The court also concluded that the Secretary's statutory interpretation warranted Chevron deference and the Secretary's statutory interpretation was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fournier v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, the warden of the prison where defendant had served his sentence and the director of the Montana Department of Corrections, seeking damages related to his sentence and probation. The court concluded that prison officials who simply enforced facially valid court orders were performing functions necessary to the judicial process. Accordingly, the court held that prison officials, like defendants in this case, who were charged with executing facially valid court orders enjoyed absolute immunity from section 1983 liability for conduct prescribed by those orders. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. View "Engebretson v. Mahoney" on Justia Law

After petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison with the possibility of parole, California amended its constitution to give the Governor authority to review parole-board decisions for prisoners convicted of murder. The parole board subsequently found petitioner suitable for parole but the then-Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, reversed the decision. Petitioner claimed that retroactive application of the interim change to the California Constitution violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Rosenkrantz was not an unreasonable application of clearly established law, and neither was the Superior Court's decision in petitioner's case that relied on it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Biggs v. Sec'y of Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

Arizona House Bill 2036 (H.B. 2036), enacted in April 2012, forbids, except in a medical emergency, abortion of a fetus determined to be of a gestational age of at least twenty weeks. Arizona law separately prohibited abortions after fetal viability unless necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life or health. The challenged provision at issue, Section 7 of H.B. 2036, extended the abortion ban earlier in pregnancy, to the period between twenty weeks gestation and fetal viability. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the court concluded that Arizona could not deprive a woman of the choice to terminate her pregnancy at any point prior to viability. Section 7 effects such a deprivation, by prohibiting abortion from twenty weeks gestational age through fetal viability. The twenty-week law was therefore unconstitutional under an unbroken stream of Supreme Court authority, beginning with Roe v. Wade and ending with Gonzales v. Carhart. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of declaratory and injunctive relief. View "Isaacson v. Horne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Kohl's Department Store claiming that he bought merchandise from Kohl's that he would not have purchased had he not been misled by advertisements stating that the merchandise was marked down from a fictitious "original" or "regular" price. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiff alleged that he "lost money or property" and, therefore, had statutory standing under California law to sue Kohl's to enforce California's prohibition on this deceptive marketing practice. In Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that all a consumer needed to allege to establish standing to bring an Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, et seq., or Fair Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500, et seq., claim was that (1) the defendant made a false representation about a product, (2) the consumer purchased the product in reliance on the misrepresentation, and (3) he would not have purchased the product otherwise. The court rejected defendant's argument that Kwikset was distinguishable because it involved a different type of unlawful misrepresentation than the one at issue here. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's UCL and FAL claims. For nearly identical reasons, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code 1750, et seq., claims. The court also denied defendant's motion to certify both on the merits and because of the circumstances attendant to its filing. View "Hinojos v. Kohl's Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, father of Adolf Anthony Sanchez Gonzalez, sued officers and the City of Anaheim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his Fourth Amendment right of familial association and Gonzalez's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable and excessive force. Gonzalez's daughter and successor-in-interest then brought a separate suit raising similar federal claims and various state law claims. The district court consolidated both actions and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that striking Gonzalez in the arm with a flashlight was not excessive force given his stubborn refusal to follow the officers' commands; because all three Graham v. Connor factors supported the officers, they were justified in applying significant force; because the officers' prior conduct never amounted to a constitutional violation, the shooting was not unreasonable as a result; and plaintiffs presented no evidence to suggest that the officers, at any point, had a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest or self-protection and, therefore, plaintiffs' claim that the officers' conduct violated their due process right to familial association failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent 24 years in prison after being convicted for murder based largely upon the perjured testimony of an unreliable jailhouse informant, Edward Fink. Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the District Attorney's Office failed to create any system for the Deputy District Attorneys handling criminal cases to access information pertaining to the benefits provided to jailhouse informants and other impeachment information, and failed to train Deputy District Attorneys to disseminate this information. At issue on appeal was whether a district attorney acted as a local or a state official when establishing policy and training related to the use of jailhouse informants. The court concluded that the policies challenged by plaintiff were distinct from the acts the district attorney undertook on behalf of the state. Even taking into account the control and supervisory powers of the Attorney General, the District Attorney represented the county when establishing policy and training related to the use of jailhouse informants. Therefore, a cause of action could lie against the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the pleadings. View "Goldstein v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against correctional officials at the Saguaro Correctional Center (SCC), asserting that the decision to house him in the same cell with a member of a rival gang after he had fought with another member of that same gang violated his Eight Amendment rights. The district court rejected defendant's claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk he faced from the cell assignment. The court concluded that, despite the late Rand v. Rowland notice, plaintiff did not suffer a deprivation of substantial rights when the district court decided the summary judgment motion on the merits. Plaintiff's response demonstrated that he understood the nature of summary judgment and complied with the requirements of Rule 56. Thus, reversal and remand of the district court was not required. Further, the undisputed evidence in the record showed that defendants were not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of an attack if the rival gang member and plaintiff were placed in a cell together. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Labatad v. CCA, et al" on Justia Law

This dispute involved a revenue-sharing agreement between GCSD and SNW to build the Skywalk over the Grand Canyon on remote tribal land. GCSD filed suit against SNW seeking declaratory judgment that the Hualapai Tribe lacked the authority to condemn its intangible property rights and injunctive relief. After multiple hearings, the district court denied GCSD's temporary restraining order to enjoin SNW based on the principles of comity and ordered GCSD to exhaust tribal court remedies prior to review in federal court. The court affirmed and held that where, as here, a tribal court has asserted jurisdiction and was entertaining a suit, the tribal court must have acted in bad faith for exhaustion to be excused. The facts of this case did not support a finding of bad faith on the part of the tribal court. The submitted evidence supported the district court's finding that the tribal court operated independently from the tribal council and the evidence presented did not meet the narrow futility exception. The tribal court did not plainly lack jurisdiction because Montana v. United States's main rule was unlikely to apply to the facts of this case. Furthermore, the district court correctly relied on Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area, Inc. v. LaRance, which provided for tribal jurisdiction without even reaching the application of Montana. Even if the tribal consensual relationship with SNW or the financial implications of the agreement likely placed it squarely within one of Montana's exceptions and allowed for tribal jurisdiction. View "Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. v. 'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against Boeing and BISS alleging breach of contract as well as several statutory and common law claims. At issue was the enforceability of a forum selection clause. The court held that the evidence submitted and the allegations made by plaintiff were more than sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the forum selection clause at issue here was enforceable under M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shores Co. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by granting BISS's motion to dismiss without convening an evidentiary hearing. The district court also abused its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. The court did, however, grant Boeing's and BISS's joint motion to strike the portions of plaintiff's reply brief that included new evidence or alleged new facts not in the record before the district court. View "Petersen v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law