Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA), is a ministry group formed for student-athletes to engage in various activities through their shared Christian faith. FCA holds certain core religious beliefs, including a belief that sexual intimacy is designed only to be expressed within the confines of a marriage between one man and one woman. The San Jose Unified School District (District) revoked FCA’s status as an official student club on multiple campuses for violation of the District’s nondiscrimination policies. FCA filed a motion for a preliminary injunction for violation of FCA’s First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and free speech and directed the district court to enter an order reinstating FCA’s recognition as an official Associated Student Body (ASB) approved student club. The district court denied the motion.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial. The en banc court held that the District’s Pioneer High School FCA had representational organizational standing and its claims for prospective injunctive relief were not moot. FCA National had organizational standing, and its claims were not moot because the District’s actions frustrated FCA National’s mission and required it to divert organizational resources, which it would continue to do in order to challenge the District’s policies. The en banc court next held that the district court erred in applying a heightened standard applicable to mandatory injunctions. The en banc court held that FCA and the other plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their Free Exercise claims. View "FELLOWSHIP OF CHRISTIAN ATHLETES, ET AL V. SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATIO, ET AL" on Justia Law

Appellants wish to openly carry handguns in California for self-protection, but California’s current licensing regime effectively establishes a statewide ban on open carry by ordinary law-abiding Californians. Appellants brought a Second Amendment suit against the Attorney General of California in his official capacity and sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of California Penal Code sections that impose criminal penalties for unlicensed open carry. The district court denied the preliminary injunction.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard to deny Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Instead of analyzing the first factor set forth in Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)—whether Appellants were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim—the district court erroneously determined that because the public interest and balance of harms disfavored the issuance of a preliminary injunction, it was not necessary to assess Appellants’ likelihood of success on the merits. The panel set forth three requirements to guide the district court’s preliminary injunction analysis on remand. View "MARK BAIRD, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was booked into a federal corrections center in San Diego for an alleged sex offense. Given the nature of his charges, Plaintiff requested protective custody. Jail officials, however, declined his request, instead placing him in general population. Plaintiff experienced harassment by other inmates, and at some point, the inmates forced Plaintiff to exercise to the point of collapse, leading to serious medical complications requiring hospitalization. Plaintiff filed suit under Bivens against two jail classification officers in their individual capacities. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Plaintiff did not state a viable Bivens claim. The district court denied the motion. Although the district court found that Plaintiff’s claim presented a “new Bivens context,” it concluded that an extension of Bivens could be warranted in his case.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court explained that when a party seeks to bring a Bivens action, courts apply a two-step test: whether the case presents a new Bivens context, and, if so, whether there are “special factors” that counsel against extending Bivens. Applying the first step, the panel held that this case presents a new Bivens context that the Supreme Court has not recognized in its Bivens jurisprudence. Applying the second step, the panel held that special factors counsel against extending Bivens to this case. The legislature and executive were best positioned to address Plaintiff’s interest and have, in fact, provided alternative remedies through administrative review procedures offered by the Board of Prisons. Accordingly, the panel declined to overstep its constitutional role to create a new damages action. View "STEVE MARQUEZ V. C. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a Section 2255 motion in the district court challenging her restitution order in a case in which Petitioner was convicted of wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The district court dismissed the motion on the ground that restitution claims are not cognizable in a Section 2255 motion. Petitioner then filed a second-in-time Section 2255 motion asserting new grounds for relief. The district court denied it as an unauthorized second or successive motion filed in violation of 28 U.S.C. Section 2255(h). Pursuant to Circuit Rule 22-3(a), the district court referred the matter to this court, which opened the matter as an application for authorization to file a second or successive motion.
The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s s application for leave to file a second or successive motion. The panel held that the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s first motion constitutes an adjudication “on the merits” for purposes of the second-or-successive bar. The panel explained that when an initial petition or motion is dismissed because its claims cannot be considered by the court or do not otherwise establish a ground for habeas relief, regardless of their underlying merits, any later-filed petition or motion is second or successive. Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner's second motion raises claims that could have been adjudicated on the merits when she filed her first motion, that aspect of her second motion is second and successive for purposes of Section 2255(h). Because Petitioner has not argued or otherwise made a showing that she meets the requirements of Section 2255(h), the panel denied her application to file a second or successive motion. View "TONG V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" on Justia Law

The Center for Biological Diversity, Sierra Club, and Grand Canyon Wildlands Council (collectively, “CBD”) contend that the United States Forest Service (“USFS”) is liable under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), for “contributing to the past or present . . . disposal” of lead ammunition in the Kaibab National Forest. The district court concluded that USFS is not liable as a contributor under RCRA and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that (a) the Forest Service’s choice not to regulate despite having the authority to do so does not manifest the type of actual, active control contemplated by RCRA; (b) although the Forest Service has the authority to further regulate Special Use permits, it has not done so, and RCRA does not impose a duty on the Forest Service to do so; and (c) mere ownership is insufficient to establish contributor liability under RCRA. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying CBD’s motion to amend its complaint to add RCRA claims against Arizona officials because CBD’s proposed amendment did not add any new claims or allegations against the Forest Service, and its claims against Arizona officials were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Finally, the panel denied as moot CBD’s request that this case be reassigned to a different district judge. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ET AL V. USFS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of twenty-seven months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release for attempted reentry following removal. Defendant had been deported from the United States six times, most recently about a month before his arrest. The same district court judge who sentenced Defendant in this case had presided over his prior sentencing hearing for illegal reentry. On appeal, Defendant raised two challenges to the court’s sentence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The panel held that so long as Defendant is apprised of the consequences of entering into a Type B plea agreement and accedes to them voluntarily, he has no right to withdraw from the agreement on the ground that the court does not accept the sentencing recommendation or request. Accordingly, the district court’s use of the word “reject” in the context of a Type B plea agreement can have no legal effect. The panel wrote that the record establishes that Defendant was aware of the consequences of entering into a Type B plea agreement, and concluded that the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances.   Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error when it used Defendant’s alleged promise at his prior sentencing hearing not to return to the United States as a sentencing factor. Reviewing for plain error, the panel held that the district court’s factual finding that Defendant had assured the court at the prior sentencing hearing that he would not return to the United States is supported by the record. View "USA V. URBANO TORRES-GILES" on Justia Law

Two police officers were dispatched to a gym after a man reportedly threatened gym patrons and assaulted a security guard. The suspect then violently attacked the officers and refused to stop after they repeatedly deployed their tasers. One officer eventually resorted to lethal force to end the aggression. Plaintiff, the man’s mother, filed this lawsuit against Defendant and the City of Los Angeles. She claimed a violation of Section 1983 based on the officer’s allegedly unreasonable use of deadly force. She also sought to hold the City liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services. Plaintiff further brought wrongful death actions against the officer and the City under California law. The court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims for similar reasons. Defendant appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that because Defendant did not challenge the district court’s determination that a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant violated the man’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, this appeal turned solely on the second step of the qualified immunity analysis. The panel held that Defendant’s use of deadly force, including his failure to give a warning that he would be using such force, did not violate clearly established law given the specific circumstances he encountered. The court wrote that there was no basis to conclude that Defendant’s use of force here was obviously constitutionally excessive. View "PAULETTE SMITH V. EDWARD AGDEPPA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant moved from the United States to Cambodia in the spring of 2003. Between June 2005 and June 2006, he sexually abused young girls. The government presented evidence at trial from which a jury could infer that one of Defendant’s primary activities in Cambodia was molesting children. A jury convicted Defendant of two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 2423(b) by traveling in foreign commerce with the purpose of committing illicit sexual acts and two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 2241(c) by crossing a state line with intent to sexually abuse a child under 12 and then so doing. Defendant appealed the sufficiency of the evidence for each of these convictions, as well as the district court’s instructions to the jury.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel wrote that Mortensen does not remove from the jury’s province its ability to rationally find that a person embarked on a trip with an innocent purpose but returned home with a motivating purpose of illicit conduct. The panel held that a jury could rationally find that the sexual abuse of children was one of Defendant’s primary motivations for returning from the United States to Cambodia, which is sufficient to uphold his convictions under Section 2423(b) (Counts 1 and 2). Noting that Section 2241(c) (Counts 3 and 4) requires the jury to find a slightly more specific motivating purpose, the panel held that a rational trier of fact could have found that Defendant’s charged victims were, in fact, under 12, and that Pepe crossed state lines with a motivating purpose of sexually abusing girls under 12. View "USA V. MICHAEL PEPE" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the sentence he received after violating several conditions of his supervised release. Defendant first argued that the district court unlawfully delegated its judicial authority to his probation officer to determine the duration of his inpatient substance abuse treatment. His second argument is that the court erred because one year of inpatient treatment, plus the prison time he was sentenced to serve, exceeds the maximum recommended sentence for his offense, and the district court failed to explain what Defendant considers an upward variance.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the special conditions of supervised release. The panel held that the district court, which ordered a specific time range for Defendant’s inpatient substance treatment with a hard upper limit of one year, did not unconstitutionally delegate its judicial authority by ordering the probation officer to supervise Defendant’s progress in inpatient treatment, and allowing the probation officer the discretion to reduce—but not increase—the duration of his inpatient treatment in consultation with Defendant’s care provider. The panel held that the district court’s imposition of Special Condition 2 in addition to a high-end Guidelines sentence did not constitute an upward variance. View "USA V. ARNOLD TAYLOR" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and a patient at Patton State Hospital in California, he was twice attacked by a fellow patient. He sued Defendant, the psychiatrist in charge of his unit, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for injuries from the second attack, alleging that Defendant violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel determined that both tests ask whether Defendant’s conduct was reasonable, and both require Alexander to show that Defendant’s conduct was worse than negligent. The panel held that under either test, Plaintiff offered no evidence that Defendant failed to act reasonably, let alone that he was “more than negligent” in not transferring Plaintiff or the other patient after the first attack. Although Plaintiff was attacked a second time, the evidence showed that Defendant’s responses to both incidents were thorough and careful. Accordingly, the panel found no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. View "SURIE ALEXANDER V. DAU NGUYEN" on Justia Law