Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the court considered whether San Rafael's mobilehome rent regulation violated the park owners' substantive due process rights, constituted a regulatory taking under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, or ran afoul of the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment under the standards articulated in Kelo v. City of New London. The court concluded that the district court properly rejected the City's arguments that MHC's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and precluded by res judicata, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing MHC to amend its complaint. The court also concluded that the regulation did not constitute either a Penn Central or a private taking. Because the court reached the merits of the takings issue, the court need not resolve the question of ripeness. The court further concluded that the district court did not err in granting judgment on MHC's substantive due process claims; the district court did not err in submitting the breach of settlement contract claims to the jury, denying the motion for a directed verdict on that question, denying the motion for a new trial, or awarding attorneys' fees; and in its original lawsuit, MHC waived its claim for damages in order to have a bench trial on the constitutional claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's holding as to the Penn Central and private takings, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "MHC Limited Financing v. City of San Rafael" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Trump University for, among other things, deceptive business practices. Trump University counterclaimed against plaintiff for defamation based on the statements in letters and Internet postings plaintiff had made. Plaintiff then moved under California's "anti-SLAPP" (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) law, California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, to strike the defamation claim. At issue on appeal was whether Trump University, a private, for-profit entity purporting to teach Trump's "insider success secrets," was itself a public or limited public figure so as to implicate the First Amendment. The court concluded that Trump University was a limited public figure for the limited purpose of the public controversy over the quality of the education it purported to provide, and to prevail here, must demonstrate that plaintiff acted with actual malice. Because the district court erred by failing to recognize Trump University's status as a limited public figure, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Makaeff, et al v. Trump University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the County Defendants. Plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the County Defendants conspired to violate, and did violate, her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they unlawfully searched her home pursuant to an invalid search warrant, used excessive force in the execution of that warrant, and arrested her without probable cause. Because there was probable cause to search plaintiff's residence and to arrest her, the court affirmed the district court's entry of judgment with respect to those claims. Because disputed issues of material fact remained regarding plaintiff's excessive force and conspiracy claims, however, the court reversed and remanded those claims to the district court for further proceedings. View "Cameron v. Craig" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued several police officers and their employer, the City of Los Angeles, for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff was charged with attempted murder and was eventually acquitted. At issue was whether plaintiff's action was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. The court concluded that plaintiff raised a genuine dispute as to whether an officer fabricated evidence at the preliminary hearing by falsely testifying that the victim had identified plaintiff as the shooter. That alleged fabrication plainly met the materiality threshold for defeating summary judgment on the merits. In this case, the state court never purported to find either that the officer's testimony was credible or that the victim's testimony was not. Accordingly, plaintiff was not barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion and, therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Wige v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

AGC sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Caltrans and its officers, on the grounds that Caltrans' 2009 Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program unconstitutionally provided race- and sex-based preferences to certain groups. On appeal, AGC challenged the district court's adverse summary judgment rulings. The district court held that Caltrans' substantial statistical and anecdotal evidence provided a strong basis in evidence of discrimination against the four named groups, and that the program was narrowly tailored to benefit only those groups. The court dismissed AGC's appeal because AGC did not identify any of its members who have suffered or will suffer harm as a result of Caltrans' program, and therefore AGC had not established that it had associational standing to bring suit. View "Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Cal. Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

Appellees are the named plaintiffs representing a certified class of non-citizens who challenged their prolonged detention, pursuant to certain federal immigration statutes, without individualized bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention. The district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the government to identify all class members detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) and 1225(b), and to provide each of them with a bond hearing before an IJ with power to grant their release. The government appealed. The court held that appellees were likely to succeed on the merits; appellees have clearly shown a risk of irreparable harm; in light of the major hardship posed by needless prolonged detention, the court concluded that the balance of the equities favored appellees; and the public interest also benefitted from a preliminary injunction that ensured federal statues were construed and implemented in a manner that avoided serious constitutional questions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rodriguez v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action alleging wrongful foreclosure and related claims that defendants had removed to federal court. Plaintiffs argued that under the "prior exclusive jurisdiction" doctrine, or under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, the district court should have remanded sua sponte. The court affirmed the district court's remand under the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, explaining that the state court had continuing jurisdiction over the water-rights decree that was the basis of the contempt action at issue, and the action before the district court arose from enforcement of the same water-rights decree. Because plaintiffs have not shown that any state proceeding relating to their house was pending concurrently with federal proceedings, the Colorado River abstention was not implicated any more than the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine. View "Sexton v. NDEX West, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of KPMG's motion to intervene, and modifying a protective order so that a deposition transcript would be held in escrow rather than destroyed. This case stemmed from plaintiff's suit against Merrill Lynch and Thomas Mazzucco for their advice in connection with an initial public offering of Buy.com (the "federal action"). Plaintiff then sued KPMG (the "state action"), claiming that but for KPMG's advice he would have sold all his shares in Buy.com in 1998 for $400 million. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding KPMG's motion to intervene timely; in granting the motion to intervene where plaintiff failed to establish that KPMG's intervention to modify the protective order with regard to one document would result in prejudice; and in modifying the protective order to hold the transcript in escrow. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blum v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Nicaraguan citizen, sought review of two decisions by the BIA: (1) a decision reversing an IJ's grant of withholding of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and (2) a decision affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner's conviction for lewd and lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14, in violation of California Penal Code 288(a), was a particularly serious crime, rendering him statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that petitioner's appeal from the denial of withholding of removal presented a live case or controversy. The court granted the petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner committed a particularly serious crime and remanded with instructions that the agency engage in a case-specific analysis in accordance with Matter of Frentescu to determine whether his conviction was a particularly serious crime. The court denied the petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's claim for relief under the CAT because substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that petitioner failed to establish a clear probability of torture. All pending motions in this case were denied. View "Blandino-Medina v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal for failure to demonstrate good moral character. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(7) on the ground that it violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Petitioner argued that section 1101(f)(7) presumed an individual to lack good moral character based solely on the length of time served in prison, rather than on the nature of the underlying criminal conduct. Given the wide variation in sentences imposed by different States for the same conduct, petitioner argued that section 1101(f)(7) allowed disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals. The court rejected petitioner's challenge, concluding that there were plausible reasons for Congress' action. Congress could rationally conclude that the expense and other difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule. The court also rejected petitioner's contention that section 1101(f)(7) violated equal protection principles because it relied on the period of incarceration generated by state sentencing regimes that were not uniform in operation. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Romero-Ochoa v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law