Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
Edgerly v. City and County of San Francisco, et al
Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against defendants alleging that he was unlawfully arrested and searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff was arrested for trespass under California Penal Code 602.8 because he was standing by himself inside a playground that was surrounded by a fence that had "No Trespassing" signs posted at every entrance. The court rejected defendants' argument that the grounds for custodial arrest specified in California Penal Code 853.6(i) applied not only to misdemeanors but also to infractions. Consistent with precedent, the statute's plain language, the rule against superfluity, and other persuasive authority, the court held that California Penal Code 853.5 provided the exclusive grounds for custodial arrest of a person arrested for an infraction. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's state law false arrest claim and remanded for further proceedings. If there are no further issues pertaining to liability on this claim, the district court should enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and proceed to a trial on damages. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining contentions. View "Edgerly v. City and County of San Francisco, et al" on Justia Law
Alliance of Nonprofits for Ins. v. Kipper, et al
ANI, a risk retention group, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Commissioner and the Division of Insurance under 42 U.S.C. 1983. ANI claimed that an order of the Commissioner violated the Liability Risk Retention Act (LRRA), 15 U.S.C. 3902(a)(1). The court held that the Commissioner's Order, which barred ANI from writing first dollar liability insurance policies in Nevada, was preempted by the LRRA. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's entry of declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of ANI. However, the LRRA did not confer a right to be free from state law that could be enforced under 42 U.S.C. 1983, making fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 unavailable. Thus, the court vacated the fee award. Finally, the court remanded so that the district court could enter a new summary judgment order consistent with this opinion. View "Alliance of Nonprofits for Ins. v. Kipper, et al" on Justia Law
Castro v. Terhune, et al
Defendant, a prison inmate, filed suit challenging his validation as an "associate" of the Mexican Mafia, a recognized prison gang. The court held that defendant's void-for-vagueness challenge of Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 3378(c)(4), an administrative regulation that guides officials in validating inmates as gang affiliates, failed because section 3378(c)(4) clearly indicated to defendant that his conduct could result in validation. Although the district court should have evaluated whether defendant was validated based on "some evidence," remand was not required to correct the error. The evidence in the record showed that prison officials relied on "some evidence" to validate defendant as an associate of the Mexican Mafia gang. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Castro v. Terhune, et al" on Justia Law
North East Medical Services v. CA Dept. of Health
This dispute arose from California's implementation of a change to Medicare in 2006. The Centers argued that California mishandled the shift in payment responsibility for dual-eligibles' prescription drug costs from state Medicaid programs to the new, federal Medicare Part D Program. The Centers brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. Among other things, the Centers urged the federal courts to declare unlawful California's "seizure" of the Centers' Medicare Part D funds, in excess of what would be owed under the per-visit rate for the Centers' expenses. The court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the Centers' claims for retroactive monetary relief; the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Centers' claims to the extent that they sought money damages; however, the court reversed the district court and remanded to allow the district court to assess Ex parte Young's application to the Center's remaining claims. View "North East Medical Services v. CA Dept. of Health" on Justia Law
Westendorf v. West Coast Contractors of NV
Plaintiff brought a Title VII action against her former employer, West Coast, claiming sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge. The district court granted summary judgment to West Coast and plaintiff appealed. Because the court concluded that the evidence, viewed favorably to plaintiff, did not show sexual harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of plaintiff's employment and subject her to an abusive environment, the court affirmed the judgment for West Coast on her sexual harassment claim. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to raise a material question of fact as to whether plaintiff's July 14 complaints - which the court already said could be protected activity - were a but-for cause of her termination. Therefore, the court believed that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the retaliation claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Westendorf v. West Coast Contractors of NV" on Justia Law
Rubin, et al v. City of Lancaster
Plaintiffs sued the City of Lancaster under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Article I, Section 4 of the California Constitution, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief from the City's policy of permitting prayers that mention Jesus. Plaintiffs argued that both the invocation at issue and the City's prayer policy amounted to an establishment of religion. The invocation did not proselytize, advance, or disparage any faith. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the City, through its prayer practice, placed its official seal of approval on Christianity where the City has taken every feasible precaution to ensure its own evenhandedness. Therefore, the court held that the district court correctly determined that neither the invocation at issue nor the City's prayer policy constituted an unconstitutional establishment of religion. For the same reasons that plaintiffs' First Amendment claim failed, their state claim failed as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rubin, et al v. City of Lancaster" on Justia Law
Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, et al
Plaintiff brought suit against the Chief of Police and the City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim. Plaintiff, a police officer for the City, led a no-confidence vote of the police officers' union against the Chief. The Chief subsequently delayed signing an application for a certification that would have entitled plaintiff to a five percent salary increase. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that plaintiff failed to meet his burden under Garcetti v. Ceballos, to show that he undertook his act as a private citizen and not pursuant to his official duties. The court disagreed and held that plaintiff had established a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation. Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Chief and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City because plaintiff did not adduce sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on his Monnell claim. View "Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, et al" on Justia Law
Li, et al. v. Kerry, et al.
Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of a class of individuals from China who were seeking to acquire permanent resident status in the employment-based third preference category (EB-3). Plaintiffs alleged that during the 2008-2009 fiscal years, defendants did not allocate immigrant visas to eligible applicants in the correct order, thereby delaying their applications, and their eligibility for adjustment of status. The court held that the district court properly dismissed the complaint because there was no live case or controversy about the establishment of visa cut-off dates, and the allocation of visa numbers, in the 2008 and 2009 fiscal years. The district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief because they did not allege that defendants failed to take discrete actions they were legally required to take. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Li, et al. v. Kerry, et al." on Justia Law
Shell Offshore, Inc., et al v. Greenpeace, Inc.
This case stemmed from Greenpeace's public campaign to stop Shell from driling in the Arctic. Greenpeace appealed the district court's grant of Shell's motion for a preliminary injunction, which prohibited Greenpeace from coming within a specified distance of vessels involved in Shell's Arctic Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) exploration and from committing various unlawful and tortious acts against those vessels. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the action presented a justiciable case or controversy, that the district court had jurisdiction to issue its order, and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "Shell Offshore, Inc., et al v. Greenpeace, Inc." on Justia Law
Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc.
Plaintiff, who has difficulty walking because of certain health problems, alleged that United did not provide her with adequate assistance moving through the airport on two airplane trips and that she suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result. The court held that the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. 40101 et seq., and its implementing regulations preempted state and territorial standards of care with respect to the circumstances which airlines must provide assistance to passengers with disabilities in moving through the airport. The ACAA did not, however, preempt any state remedies that could be available when airlines violated those standards. The court also held that the ACAA and its implementing regulations did not preempt state-law personal injury claims involving how airline agents interact with passengers with disabilities who requested assistance in moving through the airport. Finally, the court held that a terminal used for transportation by aircraft was excluded from definition as a Title III-covered place of public accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12181 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law